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RSC, Number 4, Issue 1, January 2012, pp. 5-36.

## **Migrant Workers and the Changing Structure of Malaysian Society: The Challenges of Globalization<sup>1</sup>**

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**Abstract** *Several studies have been conducted on migration of people across spaces, but little, perhaps none adequately captures the gaps between migrant workers' negative experiences and their positive impacts in Malaysia. Against this backdrop, this paper sheds light on globalization-migration nexus. It gives brief information about migrants, their classifications, reasons for trooping to Malaysia, harrowing life vis-à-vis*

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<sup>1</sup>The authors wish to express a great appreciation to the Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM) for supporting this research through the USM-Fellowship Scheme.

*contributions in changing Malaysian society for decades. The inhumane treatments being meted out to migrants are fraction of the development challenges facing modern societies. It concludes that human rights and collective bargaining need to be respected in maximizing migrants' potentials for Malaysia's sustainable development.*

**Keywords:** Labour Migrants, Survival Styles, Development Changes, Globalization, Malaysia

## **1. Introduction**

Migration-development thesis has attracted a great attention worldwide, yet the changing forces associated with peoples' movement, their mixed life experiences while moving and living in their new social setting, like Malaysia are marginalized in research and less reported. These gaps need refilling, seeing the rising volume of temporary and permanent movement of people with their ideas, properties and services from one place to another for real or imagined, external or internal reason(s) that varied with persons, periods and places in modern world. However, studies have shown that people mostly changed their locations for survival, enjoying desirable life, better job and economic opportunities (Faruqi, 2007; Lee, 1966; Philip & Gottfried, 2008; Todaro, 1969), still there are cases, where some relocated for shameful deviant deeds, criminal records or when looking for haven to perpetuate undesirable acts. Owing to multi-faceted forces - increasing discoveries in science and technology, demand for quality goods, services and better living standard that sharpened industrialization, urbanization and globalization over the years, migration has taken diverse and complex format in contemporary age.

It is interesting that as every society responds to global changes, Malaysia is not an exception, since she has experimented with diverse liberal economic-oriented policy reforms that were structured on East Asian

theory of modernization and industrialization in early 1980's. The reforms were frustrated by world recession that hit Malaysia's fiscal and debt records, while deflecting private investment status, destroying primary commodity prices and devaluing local monetary strength of the country in mid 1980's. To wade off the declining growth caused by the "severe recession of 1985-86," the government re-launched her policies and programs along "export-led industrialization" supported by the East Asian-driven investments, local political will and vision to be a developed nation in 2020 (Sundaram, 2006, p. 118). These mission and vision led to the introduction of many labour-intensive industries, whose managements are hungry for cheap, but fast goal-delivering workers to maximize profits and meet the demands of competitive global markets. When these challenges set in labour markets, some Malaysians stylishly keep on rejecting some employment chances tagged as dirty, dangerous, difficult and poorly paid. This left a vacuum in the country's labour industry that is repeatedly filled by migrants. What is more, the gradual rise in population of the aged people beckons foreigners, who turned Malaysia's economy around by working in agricultural plantations, manufacturing, building, construction and service industries (Robertson, 2008). Even, the growing busy schedule of some Malaysian upper and middle classes in formal and informal sectors necessitated the services of foreign domestic helps.

These changes increasingly ushered migrants into Malaysia for pursuit of greener pasture and they have been adding value to her development process through hard-work, though they suffered gross exploitation, extortion, caning, seizure of passports, detention, denial of contract letter, lack of health insurance, denial of and delayed remunerations among other abuses and deprivations (Gurowitz, 2000; Hedman, 2008; Human Rights Watch, HRW, 2009, 2010; Jones, 1997). As migrants fall prey to ill treatments, little institutional interventions are launched to free them and their situations are loosely discussed in literature. Globally, most governments; capitalist-inclined regimes paid lip-services to their plights. The trends, changes and challenges linked with migrant workers' lives during their interactions with government officials, domestic and foreign

recruiters as well as employers of labour are greatly marginalized in local decision-making circles, even when their negative experiences are discussed and incorporated into public policy, less attention is given in seeing to the full implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the policy. The mixed realities that circumscribed the lives of migrant workers in Malaysia and beyond are not independent of the processes and tools of globalization – easy movement of people, ideas, skills, materials, trade and investments across national boundaries. Against this backdrop, need arises to unveil the many-sided impacts and experiences of migrants, as they foster and ensure sustainable progress in their host, Malaysia.

## **2. Globalization, Migration and World Figures of Migrants**

Globalization is widely discussed and debated as subject and object of social change in modern times. Therefore, literature abounds in a range of evidences that situate globalization along theoretical concepts, like transference, transformation, transcendence (Bartelson, 2000) and interpretations, such as stretched social relations, eroded sovereignty and reshaped national borders that have many implications on individual and collective actions (Martinelli, 2003). Van Der Bly (2005, p. 891) sees it as an “open society” that takes into cognizance “human agency” and “empirical parameters” for understanding and measuring the magnitude of the borderless of the society in question. Globalization is simply an increasing connectivity and interdependence of individuals, groups and nations under the influence of advancement towards the realization of perceived needs. Whatever perspective is applied in defining globalization, the point remains that mobility of people across artificially created borders has been subjected to a number of changes arising from the growing internationalization of social interactions and societies that deepens social inequalities and injustices between and among individuals and groups. Craig (2003) argued that globalization launches varied conditions that are favorable to increasing movement of people from the poorer countries of the South to the richer countries of the North. As this occurs, the latter

often designs and sponsors policies and programs, like structural adjustments that undermined the economies and people's welfare in the former, while exacerbating movement of people from the South to the North daily.


The United Nations Development Program's (UNDP, 2009, p. 21) report revealed that "about 740 million internal migrants," exists in the world in 2009, while international migrants amount to "214 million, or 3.1 percent of the world's population ..." It is important to recall that the statistics above represents only documented migrants, since most institutional records are lacking data on undocumented migrants. This limited data coupled with the rising global social problems (economic and financial crises, climatic change, conflicts, gap between increased aging and decreased working population in advanced countries) and global social progress (safe birth, healthy living and life expectancy owing to improved technology) across societies are likely indicators that migrants' figure stand to increase annually. The Population Reference Bureau (PRB, 2010, p. 3) argued that immigrant population in advanced countries has the capacity to increase in 2010, as long "as developed countries undergo aging and little growth in population size," while the "developing countries remain young and growing." The increasing life expectancies (Vallin & Mesle, 2010), fast adoption of modern birth control techniques and easy access to family planning services among people, including their responses to modern health care services in industrialized countries are potential forces for sustaining the disparity between the rising aging population in advanced countries and increasing youth population in developing countries. It is rather difficult to divorce the probable causes of these realities from some of the impacts of modernization and globalization that have facilitated the inflow and outflow of people, their ideas, goods and services across national borders. Contrary to the assumption that migration has been on increase for decades, Ratha, Mohapatra & Silwal (2010) expressed that the proportion of world migrants compared to the current world population is weak in relation to the late 19th century's migration flows and populations. This estimation might be partially

correct, yet migration records in some parts of the world, like Asia hold that the growing number of immigrants in their current population has never being experienced before now.

Asian region has won global notice as both migration-receiving and migration-sending zone in recent times. According to Shah (2010) out of 39,224,000 million population of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries – Bahrain (39.1%), Kuwait (68.8%), Oman (28.4%), Qatar (86.5%), Saudi Arabia (27.8%) and United Arab Emirates (70.0%) in 2009, 15,126,596 million (38.6%) are immigrants and are mostly of Asian origin, particularly from Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines and Sri Lanka. The nationals of these migration-sending countries, including those of Cambodia, Myanmar, Nepal, Thailand and Viet Nam also occupied large segment of immigrant population in Malaysia, one of the major recipients of migrant workers in South-East Asia (International Organization for Migration, IOM, 2008). The figure 1 shows the geopolitical map of Malaysia and few countries that supplied her migrant workers.

Robertson (2008, p. 1) reported that Malaysia is a host to 2.1 million documented migrant workers, who are about 25% to 30% of her labour force and 1 to 2 million undocumented migrant workers. By implication, “1 in 3 of the workers in the country are migrants.” Other major recipient in South-East Asia are Singapore, where migrants constitute 41% of her population (Pison, 2010), Thailand that housed 3.3 million documented and undocumented migrants (Integrated Regional Information Networks, IRIN, 2010) and Brunei Darussalam, where 36.4% (148.1 thousands) of her populations are immigrants (World Bank, 2010).

Figure 1: Map of Malaysia



Source: Nation Online Maps.

[http://www.nationonline.org/maps/malaysia\\_map.jpg](http://www.nationonline.org/maps/malaysia_map.jpg)

### 3. Background Information about Migrants in Malaysia

There are historical, anthropological and archaeological reports that between 80,000 and 60,000 years ago, the ancestors of modern humans migrated from their African homeland to Asia, where they settled in Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and Australia then to Europe, later to North America and finally to South America to colonize the world (Gugliotta, 2008). However, Biblical and Islamic scriptures traced the root of human migration to Adam and his wife Eve, who were commanded by God to relocate to the Garden of Eden. Whatever cause is adduced to early human movement, the point remains that history is replete with migration worldwide. Thus, trends of migration in Malaysia could be based on 4 stages, origin of the Malays; free in and out movement of people during

empires and kingdoms; free in and out mobility of people during colonialism; and before and after recession's migration in post-independence era.

The first segment of migrants to the area known as Malaysia today is members of ethnic group called Malays, which include the early generations of indigenous Malays, who are mostly found in Peninsular Malaysia (West), Malaysia Borneo (East - Sarawak and Sabah), Brunei, Southern Thailand, parts of Southern Philippines and North-Western Indonesia, especially east-coast of Sumatra. Skeat & Blagden (1906, pp. 14-15) argued that the earliest races in Malaysia are the Negritos, Indo-Chinese and Peninsular Malays. Of the three ethnics, the Negritos were the first to have arrived. During the mediseval era, "... some old Indo-Chinese race of comparatively high civilization, whose language has left its trace on the aboriginal dialects (but of whose domination there is no clear record in history)," became another dominant racial settlers in the region. Thereafter, "... colonies of Malay immigrants from Sumatra — a people also of some civilization (of a Hinduised type) whose immigration has continued to the present day, and whose influence on the aborigines is naturally much more marked," emerged as part of dominant race in the Peninsula. When the Indo-Chinese and Malays embraced Islam "less than 600 years ago," most aborigines were driven "into the hills of the interior" and this "reduce them to the condition of hunted outlaws, to be enslaved, plundered, and murdered by the Malay chiefs at their tyrannous will and pleasure." Records also revealed that Malays belonged to the category of Austronesia people and are seafarers, who migrated from the Yunnan province of modern China to settle around South Sea China.

Secondly, migration in modern Malaysia took place, when empires and kingdoms were in operation. According to Kurus, Goddos & Koh (1998) migration history in Malaysia is traceable to the old empires and sultanates that were characterized by free and recurrent human mobility influenced by political, social and commercial ties, including territorial conquests in the region. Kurus et al. (1998, p. 157) said

The old kingdom of Sri Vijaya in the 7th century AD, followed by the powerful Majapahit kingdom in the 13th century, the Brunei Sultanate and the Sulu Sultanate all exerted varying influences on the migration of peoples in the East ASEAN archipelago. These have paved the way for the earliest migrations of people well before the concept of nationhood emerged in the region.

The descendant of Parameswa, a Hindu Prince, who settled in Malacca around 1403 AD, but later married “Muslim princess of Pasai in Sumatra” and thus converted to Islam, while changing his name to Iskandar Shah coupled with the Portuguese and Dutch immigrants, who maintained social relations with Malacca’s people, Malaysia between 1511 – 1824 AD added value to the migration history in Malaysia (Raghavan, 1977, p. 44).

The third wave of free migration to and from Malaysia is associated with the colonial regime, particularly the coming of British in 1795 (Raghavan, 1977). The Portuguese and Dutch had profound impact on the social structure and multi-ethnic diversity of contemporary Malaysian society, but British colonial administrators are seen to have had greater influence on migration in Malaysia. Kanapathy (2007) expressed that it was under the British colonial system that a pool of migrants, who are of Chinese and Indian races arrived Malaysia. The immigrants were brought in for labour work, seeing the unwillingness of the locals to work for the British as manual labourers (Skeat & Blagden, 1906) and shortage of labour in British Malaya that later became Malayan Union in 1946, but in 1948 she changed her name to Federation of Malaya under which independence was gained on August 31, 1957.

The fourth stage of migrants to Malaysia came after independence, especially when she formed an alliance with British North Borneo, Sarawak, and Singapore. The alliance resulted to re-christening of the country to Malaysia on September 16, 1963, although Singapore was chased away on August 9, 1965, while Brunei voluntarily withdrew on 1967. In 1970s and 1980s, migrant issues, especially irregular migrant cases are neglected by Malaysia until 1991, when the government

introduced policies of regularizing, regulating and controlling migration through terms and conditions for guiding the recruitment of migrants. Perhaps, the changing attitude of the government towards migrants has link with the world recession that split to Malaysia in 1985-86. However, Huguet (2008) argued that the imposition of a special levy on migrant workers in 1991 is one of the conditions used by the government to frustrate dependency on migrant labour. Seeing that most of the terms could not succeed in lowering influx of migrants to Malaysia, the government freezes recruitment of migrants in April, 1993 with the view to encourage participation of locals in labour force, but this ban was lifted in June, 1993. In a related vein, August 1997 witnessed ban on renewal of work permits, but the migrants that applied for renewal are given options to either get redeployment to agricultural plantation or should return to their origins. The government softens her pedals, when she gave permission for recruitment in domestic work sector in September, 1997 and other sectors follow suit in October. Few years later, the government launched stricter migration policies for economic, social and security reasons, but the policies rarely deter migrants from infiltrating into Malaysian border and the country continue to experience a rising immigrant population (see table 1).

Table 1: The 1990-2010 Population and International Migration Profile of Malaysia

<b>Indicator</b>	<b>1990</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2010</b>
Estimated number of international migrants at mid-year	1 014 156	1 192 734	1 553 777	2 029 208	2 357 603
Estimated number of refugees at mid-year	62 672	5 293	50 502	29 299	35 122
Population at mid-year (thousands)	18 103	20 594	23 274	25 633	27 914
Estimated number of female migrants at mid-year	453 265	532 051	696 096	913 014	1 065 349
Estimated number of male migrants at mid-year	560 891	660 683	857 681	1 116 194	1 292 254
International migrants as a percentage of the population	5.6	5.8	6.7	7.9	8.4
Female migrants as percentage of all international migrants	44.7	44.6	44.8	45.0	45.2
Refugees as a percentage of international migrants	6.2	0.4	3.3	1.4	1.5
<b>Indicator</b>	<b>1990-1995</b>	<b>1995-2000</b>	<b>2000-2005</b>	<b>2005-2010</b>	
Annual rate of change of the migrant stock (%)	3.2	5.3	5.3	3.0	

*Source:* Adapted from the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2010). *Trends in International Migration Stock: The 2008 Revision*

The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA, 2009) record above indicates Malaysia's international migration trend for 20 years. The table 1 shows that at mid-year of 1990 Malaysia has

1.014,156 million (5.6% of 18.103 million population), since then until it reaches 2.357,603 (8.4% of 27.914 million population) in 2010. However, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2011) argues that Malaysia has 3 million migrants out of which 1.5 million is undocumented among, which are refugees, asylum-seekers and stateless persons. This increasing volume of migration to Malaysia mirrors the inability of government stricter policies to curtail inflows of foreigners and it demonstrates close relationship between changing Malaysian economy and migrant workers. Even the origins of the migrants; developing countries of Asia, where Gross Domestic Products (GDP) and their citizens' living standards are below Malaysia demonstrates link between availability of peoples' perceived basic needs, their accessibility to the needs and propensity for migration.

#### **4. The Classificatory Terminologies for Migrants in Malaysia**

Most countries around the globe continue to witness surging temporary, in some cases permanent relocations of their citizens within the country - internal migration. This mobility within a country has 4 patterns - rural-urban internal migrants, urban-urban internal migrants, rural-rural internal migrants and urban-rural internal migrants. Aside from the prevailing cases of internal migrants, substantial references are being made to international migrants; foreigners. These 2 major classifications of migrants did only exist in every society, but within each of the classifications there are varying sub-classificatory units, which differed among nations and continue to appeal to global community.

The Department of Statistics Malaysia (DSM, 2008, p. 11) classified internal migration, as urban within state migration; urban across state migration;

rural within state migration; and rural across state migration, but fairer classifications for internal migration ought to be rural-urban within state migration; urban-rural within state migration; rural-rural within state migration; urban-urban within state migration; rural-urban across state migration; urban-rural across state migration; and rural-rural across state migration; and urban-urban across state migration. Yet it is argued that most national data on internal migrants are relatively incomplete and at times unavailable, perhaps because governments have no law or regulation that requires their citizens, who intend to relocate within the country to process and possess travel document, like visa or pass. Indeed, this scenario has reduced inter-State movement to a complex format of migration, which suffers from weak records across the globalised world. As the patterns of internal human movement above are persistently being influenced by the forces of globalization, Malaysia follows suit, hence continue to witness structural changes. This is captured, when the DSM (2008, pp. 2-3) reported that Malaysians, mostly young adults "... between the ages 15 and 34 years," embraced within state and inter-state migration for "jobs, studies or new family formations." The movement of these young adults impacted on the volume of human capital in the receiving area, while enhancing rapid economic growth, development and provision of unmet services in the host areas. Ragayah (2005) argued that most internal migrants in Malaysia are largely low-income earners and most of them fall within the lowest occupational strata, like production and related workers, transport equipment operators and labourers. Internal migration is a less problematic and threatening phenomenon in Malaysia compared with foreign migration, especially illegal migration (Kassim, 2005, 2007). Contrary to this, in Nigeria internal migration is linked to life threats, which frequently undermine the country's development (HRW, 2006) compare to international migration.

Malaysia's immigrants spread across international skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled migrants, and they are frequently linked with a series of nomenclatures, which often project them as out-groups, even though some Malaysians originated from the same roots with current migrants. Belanger

et al. (2010) identified migrant workers, illegal worker and over-stayers, as the 3 categories of migrants found in 4 of the major Asian receiving countries - Japan, Malaysia, South Korea and Taiwan. Xavier (2009) said Malaysia is a home to different forms of foreign migrants, migrant workers; refugees; trafficked persons; and stateless persons. Kassim (2007) has more explicit, but not exhaustive typologies of foreigners in Malaysia. According to Kassim (2007) foreign migrants in Malaysia are, legally recruited unskilled and semi-skilled contract workers; expatriates (managerial, professional and skilled foreign workers); refugees and asylum seekers. Others include undocumented/irregular immigrants (undocumented illegal entrants, over stayers, pass abusers, contract defaulters, unregistered births of foreigners, fraudulent documents' holders, holders of expired IMM13 (P) among refugees, and holders of expired contract work pass); foreign students; permanent residents; and holders of Malaysia My Second Home's (MM2H) document. The varying classifications indicates that divergent terms have been weaved on migrants for years, which would not have being, if not for the institutionally created, recognized, politicized independent and non-independent geographical borders. The implication of the classification of people on the basis of non-migration and migration with the latter receiving severe treatment is that the labelling has the potent to affect inter-group (locals vs. migrants) relations, collective working formula and development in the world.

## **5. Reasons for Increasing Volume of Migrant Workers in Malaysia**

There are many issues grounded in the spatial relocation of people across internal and international borders, although most often explanations are given in order to support its incidence and prevalence. Notable among the explanations of human migration are Ernst G. Ravenstein's (1885, 1889 cited in the National Geographic System, NGS, 2009) laws of migration, Everett S. Lee's theory of migration (1966) and Michael P. Todaro's (1969) model of labour migration. Ravenstein (in NGS, 2009) posited that

proximity to host areas, quest to partake in advanced industrial sector and determinations to persevere quicken peoples' spatial mobility. The perceived status of the sources, sex differentials and zeal to access technological progress in locomotive, manufacturing and commercial units, indeed economic motive have had great impact on peoples' decision to change their locations over the years. Lee (1966) explained that the factors that often ignite people's willingness to relocate and the process of the relocation are origin-oriented, destination-motivated, route-driven and personal. The origin-oriented forces are the unfavourable conditions (push factors) at home, while the destination-motivated reasons are the attractions (pull factors) in the host areas. The route-driven causes are the intervening issues at the transit areas, while the personal factors are peoples' ability to take decision and action about migration. However, Todaro (1969, p. 138) theorized that people's knowledge on lack of "... existence of a large pool of unemployed and underemployed urban workers ...," coupled with their rural-urban 'expected' income differential" are forces behind rural-urban workers' migration. Against the backdrop of divergent theories of migration, it is possible to infer that substantial number of social issues have influenced migration for centuries, although there are few specifications to places like Malaysia.

According to Faruqi (2007, p. 95) migration within country, between countries and across continents, are never completely independent of political, human right, social, cultural, moral, historical points, including the structural lop-sidedness "... between the North and the South, ..." that defined global economic order, indeed "... the wide disparities in living standards amongst the people of the world ..." Kassim (2007, pp. 107-108) posited that in spite of Malaysia's experiences of recession in mid-1970 and financial crisis of 1997, her achievements, like steady execution of economic development plans; increased infrastructural base, rising "urbanization and economic transformation," replacement of agricultural-based and mining-oriented economy with manufacturing activities; growing patterns of formal employment opportunities; shrinking incidence of poverty among others constitute forces that attracted large number of

foreign workers into the country. These successes are intertwined with globalizing trend in Malaysia's migration history, as Kassim's (2007, p. 108) argued that the inflow, which began in the early seventies, increased exponentially in the nineties as Malaysia became enamoured with and became entangled in the web of globalization. ..., the Malaysian labour force began to be infiltrated by foreign nationals and accordingly, their number among the population increased.

Xavier (2009) reported that the influx of migrants into Malaysia is due to their perceptions of the prosperous nature of the country, which allows access to jobs and other elements of greener pasture, though most of them got trapped in problems, hard and risky lives for their poor knowledge about laws and system. These weaknesses of migrants are used by the employers and authorities – government agencies in exploiting them. Belanger et al., (2010, p. 20) revealed that migrant workers from Vietnam to Asian countries, including Malaysia indicated that they relocated in order to “earn more income,” settle “family debts, children's education costs and health expenses.” Other reasons are to offset “daily living expenses,” “to purchase land,” “to see the world,” to acquire “technical skills,” and to get money “to build or repair their house.”

Far from the aforementioned motives of people to migrate to Malaysia, there are reasons that suffered marginalization in literature and decision-making circuit. These are the historical, political, socio-cultural, religious ties and similarities of most migrants (Bangladesh, Burmese, Chinese, Filipino, Indians, Indonesians, Nepalese, Pakistanis and Thais) with Malaysians. Indeed, Malaysia shared many things in common with her neighbouring countries – origins of most migrants. For instance, millions of Chinese and Indians, who are Malaysian citizens today, are themselves product of migration several years ago. Further, the Malays, who are politically and demographically dominant group in the country, migrated from some communities located in the sources of the present day migrant workers, like Acehnese and Javanese from Indonesia and Filipinos from Philippines. The inter-marriages between the ethnic groups of migrants and the Malaysians are also a significant contributing force for migration.

These factors are salient, but latent social network' sources between the migrants' families and friends and the Malaysians, and these have invariably attracted migrants from neighbouring areas to Malaysia. These points bring to mind the argument of Ryan (2007) that social networks have initiated, promoted and sustained migration for years, particularly when informal and formal links between and among people influenced network members to take decisions to move. Again, fund for the journey are made available by network members to prospective migrants, while the intending migrants' housing facilities, job opportunities, social services and emotional supports are guaranteed at the destination by the same network members. Even, Malaysia's relatively improved educational industry, peaceful environment, labour-intensive ventures and industries among others have been attracting factors for migration. It is sad to note that despite all the reasons that foreign workers nursed for survival, they are faced with countless obstacles prior their movements, in the course of their migration and mostly after their arrival in the recipient communities. At times, they suffered from institutional bureaucratic bottlenecks. This is one of the reasons, why the UNDP (2009) argued that people's abilities to move are frequently constrained by institutional policies and economic crises.

## **6. Migrants, Recruiters, Employers and Government Agencies: Mixed Life in Malaysia**

The life experiences of migrants in the hands of not only the job recruiting agents and employers, but also when they interact with government officials, like police, immigration personnel, including the common citizens of the receiving countries is worrisome. Migrants are often treated inhumanly in most recipient countries, who always claimed humane environments that support better quality of lives of people. While some countries paid deaf ear to the deplorable lives of their guest worker, some have been participating in discussions at global and regional levels in seeing that the conditions of foreign workers are improved. The International Federation for Human Rights/FIDH and Suara Rakyat

Malaysia/SUARAM (2008) expressed that Malaysia, a constituent member of ASEAN has taken part in meetings call upon by the ASEAN to discover ways of managing immigrant population within the region. Yet, many registered foreign workers and so-called irregular, clandestine, undocumented, illegal, unregistered migrants continue to suffer from abuses and stiff migration rules that are weakening their abilities to impact on the hosts' economies, eke out living, enjoy improved basic services amidst globalization. This contradicts Faruqi's (2007, p. 104) point that, "Once a work permit is granted, a foreign worker acquires all the safeguards granted by social security and employment laws." In Malaysia, migrant workers are relatively denied much recognition and protection, especially domestic workers, who are referred to as domestic servants in the section 2 of the country's employment act.

Several records, though loosely pieced together have shown that immigrants rarely access Malaysian government's facilities and life boosting services (Mok, Gan & Sanyal, 2007), but Ragayah (2005) revealed that the migrants are perceived to be overstressing the little resources earmarked for locals, while depriving the locals from accessing opportunities in Malaysian urban centres. Perhaps, this account for the less inclusion of migrants' welfare in policy design and programs in the country, thus government is stocked with demands for basic services, rights' protection and dignified treatments for migrants (HRW, 2009, 2010). In urban Penang, one of the States in Malaysia, there is a rising neglect of the needs of migrant workers - mostly helpless Myanmar living miserable lifestyles coupled with inhuman treatments (IRIN, 2009). Still the government continues to demand for more foreign workers, as she intermittently hold talks with sending countries like Indonesia, while little is being done by Malaysia in assuaging migrants' deplorable conditions. The deprivation of rights and freedom to form union experienced by migrant workers in Malaysia has ever been limiting their chances of teaming up for solidarity to fight for a common cause in the country (Gurowitz, 2000; Xavier, 2009). The terrible conditions of migrant often became complicated by the activities of many locals, recruitment agencies

and employers, who are partners in the trafficking of these migrants. The traffickers usually exploit and extort the resources of the migrants (FIDH/SUARAMEA, 2008). The experiences of migrants in the hands of their traffickers; agencies and agents right from home through the transit areas to the host communities are very irritating. The activities of these traffickers are synonymous slave trading acts, though the trafficking is done in collaboration with few civil servants and uniformed workers (Hedman, 2008; HRW, 2004; Jones, 1996). The frightening issue is that the terrible lives of migrants are processed, organized and complicated by institutionalized agents, as this reminds the globalized world of organized criminalities.

The HRW (2009) reported that some migrants in Malaysia fall victims of corruption, extortion and information shortage in the hands of job recruiting agents, who often give fake promises of getting jobs and valid travel documents for them. At times, in Thailand-Malaysia border, deportees among migrant workers and refugees are treated like prey by the traffickers that organize ways for plugging back deportees to Malaysia, after collecting huge sum of money from victims and they offer the deportees for sale to bidders; fishermen and commercial sex work agents (Inter Press Service, IPS, 2009; IRIN, 2009). Often, deceptions are used against migrants by agents at sending and receiving areas (Jones, 1996), which cost trafficked migrants arrest, prosecution, criminalization, deportation, punishment, jail and forfeiture of belongings. The migrants' experiences span through whipping, fines, forced entry into patrol vehicles and other inhuman treatments, like exposure to poor nutrition – food and water, overcrowded and unhygienic detention camps. These inhuman and degrading treatments usually accrued from the immigration and police officials, specifically the untrained and unprofessional Ikatan Relawan Rakyat (RELA) – People's Voluntary Corps. Specifically, the undocumented migrants are exposed to violent attacks, threats, embarrassment, persecution, extortion, theft, destruction of identity and residency papers among other physical, psychological and social assaults in the hands of

RELA (FIDH/SUARAM, 2008; Huguet, 2008; HRW, 2009; IRIN, 2009; Project Maje, 2007).

The IPS (2009) reported that deported immigrants from Malaysia, particularly Myanmar migrants (Kachins and Rohingyas) are sold and bought like commodities at the Bukit Kayu Hitam area; border of Malaysia and Thailand. The report showed that government officials and middlemen - human traffickers, including deep sea fishing trawler operators and CSW patrons usually participate in this slave trading being termed "Bwan" or thrown away or worst form of human traffics by Myanmar migrants. Migrants who could afford to part away with huge sum of money are spared from being disposed and are returned to Malaysia. As most migrants struggle hard for livelihoods, rarely do government has any record relating to the types and extent of abuses, like denial of reward, low remuneration, unhygienic housing, overcrowded detention centres, inadequate nutrition, dearth of security, weak social, fragile economic and religious supports, which they have been exposed to for years. If the indices of hard core poor and poor people in Malaysia are anything to go by, most migrants fit into the category of wretched population in the country. The extreme (hard core) poverty depicts an individual or household, whose income is less than the food component or dietary requirements (cereal products; meat, chicken, eggs, fish; milk; oil and fats; sugar, vegetables, fruits and pulses) of Poverty Line Income (PLI) that are determined by sex and ages (UNDP, Malaysia 2008, pp. 23-73). Ragayah (2005) explains that the major aspects of poverty that Malaysia's PLI captures are 3, namely; food, clothing and footwear, including non-food elements; rent, fuel and power, furniture and household equipment, medical and health services, transport and communication systems, recreational, educational and cultural items. The question remains, to what extent do migrant workers have access to the life boosting goods and service above? Their inaccessibility to the above life comforters coupled with the miserable treatments they got from job recruiting agents, employers, government officials, and some locals are sources of trauma. The United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII, 2008) reported that

migration injects psychological trauma on both the migrants and his/her family members for losing each other to migration for a long period. These worries inform few self-sponsored and institutional funded researches, reports, policy design and programs for addressing the mass migration, still their harrowing conditions remain unabated.

## **7. Migrant Workers' Contributions to the Development of Malaysia**

There exist 2 major groups – restrictionists and advocates, whose perspectives have had profound impact on migration-development model. The restrictionists argued against the spirit of migration as a development instrument, as some of them contested that migration is not a vital tool for poverty alleviation (Nyberg, Van Hear & Engberg-Pedersen, 2002). The restrictionists group in the United States stood against federal immigration policy that seems to favour influx of people to the country for fear of national insecurity due to the incidence of 9/11 terrorist attacks, migration-induced population and environmental threats, upsurge of racial, ethnic, and cultural dilutions, globalization-driven unemployment level and job loss (Sohoni, 2006). On the contrary, the advocates countered that migration is a tool for fighting poverty and other underdevelopment indicators around the world (Newland, 2003). The set of ideas hatched by the advocates aimed at puncturing the rationale of the restrictionists. Among the advocates are local and international bodies, who have been applying a number of strategies, like formation of intergovernmental and inter-regional working groups on migration, meetings, seminars, conferences on migration, funding migration-related projects, lobbying government to adopt less restrictive laws and regulations on migrants along the pathways to harness migration for development. While the restrictionists relentlessly perceived immigrants, as naughty, unproductive and “unworthy” societal participants (Sohoni, 2006, p. 827), the advocates persistently lent credence to migration as a relatively new and global development approach. The arguments of both groups have led to a series of talks at the level of the United Nations, European Union, African Union,

Economic Community of West African States, Association of South-East Asian Nations among other world and regional bodies (FIDH/SUARAM, 2008; Gnisci & Tremolieres, 2006). Some of the talks account for the establishment of the International Organization for Migration, Global Commission on International Migration, European Commission-United Nations Joint Migration for Development Initiative etcetera were born out of the advocates' efforts to wrestle with the challenges facing migration-development projects. Against this backdrop, the UN (2007) posited that migration stands the chance to facilitate wealth creation, poverty reduction and development. This support for migration-development connection was also expressed in the 2009 Human Development Report (UNDP, 2009). In a related vein, Timmer (2010, p. vii) posits

There are more than 215 million international migrants in the world. Recorded remittances received by developing countries, estimated to be US\$325 billion in 2010 far exceed the volume of official aid flows and constitute more than 10 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in many developing countries. Cross-country analysis and evidence from household surveys suggest that migration and remittances reduce poverty in the origin communities. Remittances lead to increased investments in health, education, and small businesses. At the same time, the loss of skills associated with migration can hamper development and delivery of basic services in sending countries. The diaspora of developing countries can be a source of capital, trade, investment, knowledge, and technology transfers.

At the transit areas, migrants have had the opportunities of adding to the transit economy, especially when they used and paid for goods and services of hotels, restaurants, airports, seaports, motor parks, indeed transit areas in general. In few cases, transit migrants that cross borders by roads, especially through trekking or footpaths usually engage in itinerant trading, among other petty business transactions in the transit communities. They have also had influence on the population of temporary settlements in the transit areas (Gnisci, & Tremolieres, 2006).

Beyond the contributions made to homelands and transit areas, a number of migrants have had the occasion to impact on the receiving communities. According to Kurus et al. (1998) migrant workers have boosted national development of many Southeast Asian members, which Malaysia is part. The engagement of migrants, including the illegal migrants in the jobs (cleaning, tree branches' trimming, grass cutting, garbage disposing, cooking, house building, road and bridge constructing, gardening, agricultural and plantation manual/menial labour, hotel and restaurant work) despised by the locals demonstrated their worth and helped in shaping Malaysia. Most migrants are in diverse sectors of the economy; agricultural and plantation, manufacturing and construction, food processing and service industries doing their best to turn Malaysia's economy around (Huguet, 2008; Jones, 1996; Project Maje, 2007). The activities of migrants often give many citizens reliefs against the stress, which they ought to undergo doing the 3-D jobs. Further, the foreign migrants have been altering Malaysia's cultural practices, since most of the migrants have their community shops, which they often patronized to get goods and services imported to Malaysia from their homelands. This also enriches Malaysian economy, as they participate in commercial activities, while making payment for new visa, renewal of visa, work permits and services - banking, housing, electricity, health, water and transportation. Through their communities, they shared ideas and their homelands' ideals thereby promoting their culture in Malaysia. In recognition of the impact of migrants on cultural diversity of origins and destinations, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO, 2006) asserted

Migration has become a key issue in today's globalised world, both for the host countries and countries of origin. Policy maker are nowadays expected to implement new policies in order to protect the rights of migrants, to promote their integration in the society while safeguarding cultural diversity.

The FIDH-SUARAM (2008, p. 6) expressed that "various members of civil society confirmed that the viability of the Malaysian economy is deeply

related to this illegal immigration.” This is substantiated with the UNDP (2009) report that migration has reduced the sources’ unemployment rates, increased living standard of people and provided remittances to families at home. These submissions challenge every nation to design tool for managing the concerns of migration within her domain.

## **9. Conclusions and Ways Forwards**

Migration cross-cuts the origins, transit and destination, as people move along land, sea and air routes amidst “restrictive immigration policies and intensified migration control” that exacerbated irregular mobility and “a growing reliance on overland routes” (de Haas, 2008, p. 17). This exposed most migrant workers to miserable lives, while they apply their sweat and labour in changing the structures of their host, transit and sending societies. The harrowing life experiences of migrants, which contradicted the positive values to societal development, have generated a range of arguments in academic circuits, among decision-making bodies, policy designers and law enforcement groups across the world on the need to bestow humane treatments to them. Yet, the violation of legal provisions and human rights infringements facing foreign workers continue to blossom. The abuse of laws, agreements and mutilation of rights, which are meted out to migrants during the course of their social relations with recruiters, employers, officials, including locals threatened sustainable human development. Considering the increasing level of the abuses, it is pertinent to design and execute pro-active working philosophies and practices, which are imbued with dignity of human person and labour, indeed human face in Malaysia and other countries, where migrant labour are treated worse than animals. What is more, the inhumane treatments of migrant workers are just a fraction of the development challenges facing Malaysia as modern unit of globalized world. While bearing in mind, that most people have not only had the course to temporary or permanently migrate in their life time, but also their ancestors are migrants in one way or the other, it becomes imperative that migrants’ human rights and

collective bargaining are respected, while maximizing the potentials of their in advancing the course of sustainable development in Malaysia, Asia and world over. Doing this requires the recruiting agents, employers and officials, whose activities involve relating with migrants to be more sensitive to the demands and rights of migrant workers. The government and her agencies should be vigilante on the ways recruiters and employers treat workers, in such a way that any erring agent and company will be sanctioned. Further, government needs to provide enabling environment for migrant workers, so that their ill treatment will not lead to blacklisting of the country at regional and global arenas. Seeing that migrants represent global development tools, the locals should also serve as watchdogs over the ways recruiters, employers and officials are treating them and where any abuse occurred, it should be reported to appropriate channel for disciplinary measures to be taken.

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RSC, Number 4, Issue 1, January 2012, pp. 37-61.

## **Civic experts: The case of the EU**

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**Abstract:** *In this article we argue that transnational civic organisations, organised on the EU level, are imperfect representatives of the citizens; they can simply fail to mobilize on important issues and they generally do not have the capacity to intermediate between EU institutions and citizens of the EU. We argue that the function of civic organisations operating on the EU level may thus more properly be seen as to provide EU actors with expert knowledge/advice on certain policy issues rather than being primarily seen and understood as a bridge between citizens and the institutions of the EU. To support this argument we analyse how involved are civic organisations as policy advisers to the EU institutions and estimate the consequences of such involvement. However in order to have a legitimate participation of civic organisations in the system of governance, this also requires a certain level of support by masses. This is why we aim to establish, whether civic organisations, which are becoming increasingly involved in the EU level policy-processes have support from 'European masses'.*

**Keywords:** civil society, EU, policy, expert knowledge, confidence

## **1. Introduction**

Civic organisations have become increasingly involved in the processes of European Unions' policy-making. As sources of policy advice, they are becoming influential: actors in the European Commission, the European Parliament and national governments are frequently willing to listen to their perspective when drafting or deciding upon legislation. It is often assumed that EU citizens can gain new power and voice through the mobilization in national and transnational civic organisations. These organizations should represent mechanisms of vertical accountability that may include citizens acting through civic organizations on the EU level policy processes. In this theoretical framework organized civil society is seen as a lever for a higher degree of participative democracy in the EU (Friedrich, 2006; Adam and Makarovič, 2002). Civic organisations are seen as a way of allowing everyday citizens to have greater influence in the decision-making process, in the hope that this will eventually translate into greater knowledge of, interest in and support for the European integration process.

Although civic organisations have been involved in the governance of the EU since its creation, their structured incorporation into the European policy formation process is relatively recent. The European Commission has formalised the dialogue with civic organisations by adopting general principles and minimum standards that govern the process of consultation with interested parties. The formalisation of their involvement in EU policy conception and implementation is part of the new forms of governance introduced by the EU to improve its efficiency and legitimacy (Harlow, 2005). In this new mode of EU governance, the government's tasks are to enable socio-political interactions, to encourage different arrangements for coping with problems and to distribute services among various actors. Negotiation and mediation play central role in these systems, while

interaction between civic organisations and public institutions operating at different levels is curtail for the functioning of such system (Obradovic and Vizcain, 2007). It is expected that the active participation of civil society in EU governance in the form of early consultations will not only make the European integration process more inclusive and ensure that EU issues are debated by a wide range of interested parties, but will also contribute to more effective policy-making in the Union. The capacity of civic organisations to promote citizenship practice and influence policymaking requires investigation, however.

In this article we argue that transnational civic organisations, organised on the EU level, are imperfect representatives of the citizens; they can simply fail to mobilize on important issues and they generally do not have the capacity to intermediate between EU institutions and citizens of the EU. We argue that the function of civic organisations operating on the EU level may thus more properly be seen as to provide EU actors with expert knowledge/advice on certain policy issues rather than being primarily seen and understood as a bridge between citizens and the institutions of the EU. To support this argument we will analyse how involved are civic organisations on the EU level as policy advisers and estimate the consequences of such involvement. Additionally, we will explore the attitudes of EU citizens regarding involvement of experts (including experts from civic sphere) in decision-making processes. We argue that in order to have a stable democracy and legitimate participation of civic organisations in the system of governance, this also requires a certain level of support by masses. Acceptance of institutions by both the elite and masses namely helps to prevent disruptive conflicts and instability (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Newton and Norris, 2000). Most would argue that if democracy is to be stable, elite and the masses must have a minimum level of confidence in institutions and members of the elite and they must have a minimum level of trust in each other and a certain level of mass support (Steen, 2001). Do civic organisations, which are becoming increasingly involved in the policy-processes, have support from 'European masses'?

## **2. The EU civil society**

The concept of civil society is a relatively diffuse and polysemic term. It signifies and extends from radical social movements, such as the anti-globalization movement, to pragmatic and specialized interest groups, lobbyist groups on the national level or supranational level ect. (Adam, 2008). The difficulties in formulating statements about civil society are, up to a point, grounded in the indistinctiveness and vagueness of a much contested concept of civil society. Heinrich (2004) argues that civil society has become a buzzword and has attracted enthusiasm from scholars and policy-makers of different ideological persuasions. These differences range from neo-liberal thinkers to radical democrats, communitarians and neo-Marxists (Cohen and Arato, 1992; Etzioni, 2004; Gellner, 1994; Putnam, 2000). As such, due to its different historical and ideological legacies and framings, the concept of civil society is uniquely imprecise and fuzzy and is extremely complex and contested. However, implicit in most understandings of civil society is the notion of agency; that civil society actors have the ability to influence decisions that affect the lives of ordinary people. Their actions can be individual or organized. Individual actions might include writing a letter to a newspaper, signing a petition, demonstrating, taking part in a boycott, participating in neighbourhood or community meetings, joining an online-discussion forum or media debate ect. Collective actions might include advocacy campaigns, providing assistance and information, organizing citizens' juries, lobbying officials and parliamentarians, hosting public debates or mounting protests. Many of these actions take place within the context of non-coercive organizations or institutions ranging from small informal groups to large professionally run associations.

The analysis of literature on the role of civil society in the EUs' system of governance shows that on the EU level we are faced with an emergence of elite structures within civil society sector (civic elite) (Bang and Sorensen, 2001; Bang, 2005; Greenwood, 2008; Magnette, 2003; van Deth and

Maloney, 2008). Civic organisations working on the EU level employ professionals (which is tied to a greater need for accumulation of specialized expert knowledge in their field of work as well as in the field of managing, leading and fundraising) and have very weak links to European citizens on the local level (Finke, 2007; Kohler-Koch, 2008; Maloney et al., 2010; Saurugger, 2006). Some authors (Adam, 2008; Bang, 2005) also stress the importance of the rise of check-book participation, where citizens are content to contract out the participation function to the policy influencing professionals and pay for this service. Because of these processes the internal functioning of civic organizations can become undemocratic and can exclude the participation of the membership base of the organization (Aspinwall and Greenwood 1998; Fisher 1997). These developments cast a shadow of doubt on the ability of civic organisations to promote citizenship practices on the EU level. It is possible that civic organisations are no more than nominally citizen-friendly since they can be more accountable to particular wealthy donors than their general membership or the public (Kutter and Trappmann, 2010) and are “lobby groups like any other” (Kohler-Koch and Buth, 2009). It seems that these processes reduce the spaces of participation in civic sphere, while the functions of representation and interest lobbying are being more pronounced. Civic organisations may be trapped by the need to adapt to the ‘logic of influence’ prevailing in Brussels (Kohler-Koch and Buth, 2009). In order to engage in decision-making processes on the EU level they must have the capacity to develop policy-related positions that they wish to communicate to political decision-makers. They then have to identify the relevant decision-makers and suitable communication channels to access them (Obradovis and Pleines, 2007). In order to do so they must pose adequate capacity including financial and human resources, political ties as well as expert knowledge (Carmin, 2010) to initiate and sustain their activities.

### **3. Civic organisations as sources of expert knowledge in decision-making processes on the EU level**

Several scholars have studied the role of expert groups in the European Commissions' (ECs') decision-making process, also known as 'comitology', and emphasized the extent of the use of expertise in these processes (Joerges and Neyer 1997; Vos 1997; Jasanoff, 2005; Gornitzka and Sverdrup, 2008 ect.). The decision-making system of the EU relies on a plethora of working groups, standardization bodies and committees of experts (Joerges et al., 1997). One of the sources of such a state of affairs can be seen in a specialization of the EU as a political system producing regulatory policy. Knowledge, rather than budget, is the critical resource in regulatory policy-making and the Commission utilizes these resources extensively. Regulatory policies aim at efficiency, rather than redistribution. This makes them suitable for discussion and negotiation in expert circles (Radaelli, 1999).

In part the widespread use of expert committees in EU policy-making, results from the fact, that the EUs' policy-making arena is quite distinct from the national one. The equivalent of a national government and parliament is virtually absent. As a result some traditional political channels, such as political parties, do not play as significant a role as in the national arena. A truly public debate on European policy-making is lacking as most of the media is nationally oriented, resulting in debates about the EU being held in the national domain. Finally, as has happened to European governments more generally, European governance has gone through a process of restructuring, which has given rise to a regulatory state instead of an interventionist, redistributive state (Majone, 1997). This restructuring process has also contributed to the more frequent consultation of expert groups.

Policy-making is organized around certain number of functional policy areas where Directorates of the Commission, Commissioners, and committees of the European Parliament, Council advisory groups, national administrations and interest groups form coalitions competing for power

(Peters, 2001). Fragmentation, coalition formation, bargaining, networking and negotiation in functional areas are important features of such processes. Yet, how much do civic organisations participate in these consultation processes?

In order to gain transparency in this complex system of expert consultation, European Commission has introduced an on-line register of expert groups<sup>i</sup> that provides us with an overview of the advisory bodies that assist the EC and its services in preparing legislative proposals and policy initiatives. An expert group is defined as a consultative entity comprising national and/or private-sector experts set up by the Commission to provide it with expert advice. Their main task is to advise the Commission and its services in the preparation of legislative proposals and policy initiatives (Commission's right of initiative) as well as in its tasks of monitoring and coordination or cooperation with the Member States. These groups can be either permanent or temporary. A group's composition varies depending on the type and scope of expertise sought.

As knowledge brought to the Commission should not only be excellent from a scientific view point, it also needs to be in phase with practical legal, social, economic and environmental considerations, therefore many groups include not only scientists but also public and private practitioners and other stakeholders alike. Members are appointed as representatives of a public authority (national, regional or local) or of civil society or as interested parties; or in a personal capacity, in which case they advise the Commission independently from any outside instructions (EC, Register of Expert Groups, 2011). ECs' register of expert groups also offers information on compositions of these groups according to the type of actors. By counting these groups we can answer following questions: Who is actually meeting with whom in the expert groups? How often are civic actors engaged in such groups?

We must however indicate the limitations of the use of such data. EU scholars have used a variety of sources, including directories maintained by the European Commission, commercial and scholarly directories of interest

organisations active in Brussels, and data on access to the European Parliament premises to describe the scope and characteristic of interest organisations' involvement into EUs' policy processes. However, variations of data collection methods and the substantive definition of what counts as an interest organisation are too easily conflated (Berkhout and Lowery, 2008). In this analysis we will use the data from Register of Interest Representation<sup>ii</sup> and European Commissions' Register of Expert Groups. Not all directories however gather and report the same information or include the same "population" of civic organisations. There are differences among them because the lists were developed using different methodology, different sources of data generating, different terminology and substantial definitions<sup>iii</sup> of what counts as an interest organisation or civic organisation. All these official directories provide snapshots of the population of organized interests engaged in influence activities aimed at different institutions (Berkhout and Lowery, 2008). Despite this, we believe, that data from these sources, can give us a better insight into the scope of the involvement of civic organisations in policy making processes on the EU level.

In July 2010 we analysed the expert groups listed in the Register according to the type of participants composing them. 1042 expert groups were listed, and they were composed of 2353 participant groups of different types of actors (see Table 1).

We can see that national administrations and competent national authorities (governmental groups) are the principal groups composing a great share of expert groups. Also academics as well as representatives from industries and enterprises form a quite large group. But also the participation of societal actors is larger than expected – representatives of non-governmental organisations represent 6, 11% of participants in expert groups, while quite high percentage can be seen also in the case of social partners – 5, 18% – if we take both of these percentages together (as we can argue that both categories belong to the civic sphere) it adds to 11, 29 % which is even a higher percentage than in the case of representatives from industries and enterprise or academics.

Table 1: Participants in Commission expert groups according to type of actor (July 2010)

	Number of participants in Commissions expert groups according to type of actors	% of participants in Commissions expert groups according to type of actors
National Administration	921	39,14%
Competent National Authority	490	20,82%
Academic/Scientists	211	8,96%
Industry/ Enterprise	171	7,26%
NGOs	144	6,11%
Practitioners	61	2,59%
Social Partners/Unions	122	5,18%
Regional and Local	78	3,314%
Consumers	81	3,44%
International Organizations	74	3,14%

Source: European Commission, Register of Expert Groups, 7. 7. 2010

Based on this data we can conclude that civic organizations are becoming an important player when considering consultative processes with the EU institutions. These processes are becoming a new niche of influencing the policy-decisions that presupposes a need for cognitive mobilization of civic organisations. And as it seems civic organisations are aware and interested in this novelty. In June 2008 European Commission has also launched a voluntary register of interest representatives. By opening this voluntary Register, in the context of the European Transparency Initiative, the European Commission wishes to let citizens know which general or specific interests are influencing the decision-making process of the European Institutions and the resources mobilized to that end. All entities engaged in activities carried out with the objective of influencing the policy formulation and decision-making processes of the European institutions

are expected to register. These activities include: contacting members or officials of the EU institutions, preparing, circulating and communicating letters, information material or argumentation and position papers, organizing events, meetings or promotional activities (in the offices or in other venues) in support of an objective of interest representation. This also includes activities that are part of formal consultations on legislative proposals and other open consultations. On the 12 June 2010 there were 2845 interest representatives listed in the register. Their composition was as follows:

Table 2: Number of interest representatives listed in the register of interest representation by category

	<b>Number</b>
<b>Professional consultancies/law firms involved in lobbying EU institutions</b>	168
Law firm	15
Public affairs consultancy	87
Independent public affairs consultant	33
Other (similar) organizations	33
<b>“In-house” lobbyists and trade associations active in lobbying</b>	1495
Company	380
Professional association	851
Trade union	74
Other (similar) organization	190
<b>NGO/ think-tank</b>	828
Non-governmental organizations/ association of NGOs	629
Think-tank	91
Other (similar) organizations	108
<b>Other organizations</b>	354
Academic organization/association of academic organization	101
Representative of religious, churches and communities of conviction	10
Association of public authorities	45
<b>Other (similar) organization</b>	198

Source: European Commission, Register of Interest Representation (12. 7. 2010).

Also from the data presented in Table 2, we can see that civic organisations represent the second largest group in the register of interest representation, following the “in-house” lobbyists and trade associations active in lobbying.

#### **4. Attitudes of Europeans towards involvement of experts (including experts from civic sphere) in decision-making processes**

Given the extent of involvement of experts (including those from civil society) in policy-making processes it seems legitimate to ask following questions: How do Europeans feel about experts being involved in policy-making? Do they have confidence in them? As we are not aware of any research that would offer us a direct answer to these questions we aimed to answer these simple questions by applying data from World Values Survey (WVS) and European Values Survey (EVS). In both cross-national surveys we find data on Europeans attitude towards “having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country<sup>iv</sup>”

Table 3: Having experts, not government, make decisions – data from European Values Survey, 2008

	Very good	Fairly good	Fairly bad	Very bad
Austria	14,1	44,1	25,3	16,4
Belgium	11	49,7	30,3	9
Bulgaria	37,2	52,4	9,3	1
Cyprus	9	16,1	21,5	53,4
Czech Republic	19	46,4	22,3	12,4
Denmark	7,6	20,9	34,7	36,8
Estonia	14,3	48,4	29,7	7,5
Finland	6	43,6	36,9	13,4
France	8,1	43,5	30,9	17,5
Germany	16,3	47,1	22,8	13,8

Greece	4,1	14	23,3	58,6
Hungary	33,7	50,7	10,4	5,2
Ireland	13,3	35,4	23,9	27,4
Latvia	16,8	53,6	24,9	4,7
Lithuania	10	42,6	38	9,5
Luxembourg	11,3	35,4	33,9	19,4
Malta	12,4	33,5	29,5	24,6
Netherlands	6,5	44,2	35,5	13,8
Northern Ireland	9,1	42,5	30,2	18,2
Poland	21,2	56,2	17,7	5
Portugal	12,1	51,5	31	5,3
Romania	32,6	41,4	19	7
Slovak Republic	22,7	62	11,9	3,3
Slovenia	23,2	58,1	16,4	2,3
Spain	14,2	48,3	22,7	14,9
Switzerland	6,1	32,6	38,3	23
Total	17,9	43,8	25	13,3

Source: European Values Survey, 2008 (fourth wave).

From the table we can see that a majority of Europeans (with an exception of Europeans from Cyprus, Denmark and Switzerland) have a positive attitude towards having experts making decisions in policy-making. Similar argument can be drawn on the basis of the data gathered in the World Values Survey (in the year 2000 and 2005), where the same question has been asked to the respondents of the survey.

Table 4: Having experts, not government, make decisions – data from World Values Survey, 2005

	Very good	Fairly good	Fairly bad	Very bad
Bulgaria	27.1 %	48.0 %	20.2 %	4.7 %
Cyprus	14.6 %	40.9 %	25.8 %	18.8 %
Finland	8.1 %	44.2 %	34.9 %	12.8 %
France	11.5 %	40.3 %	31.3 %	16.9 %
Germany	13.0 %	46.4 %	27.2 %	13.4 %
Great Britain	11.9 %	36.9 %	27.0 %	24.1 %
Italy	11.2 %	37.6 %	31.0 %	20.2 %
Netherlands	7.0 %	45.2 %	31.6 %	16.1 %
Norway	3.7 %	26.2 %	42.8 %	27.3 %
Poland	24.5 %	60.1 %	13.2 %	2.2 %
Romania	28.6 %	47.7 %	18.9 %	4.8 %
Slovenia	25.3 %	53.6 %	16.1 %	4.9 %
Spain	8.9 %	33.7 %	26.9 %	30.5 %
Sweden	6.3 %	29.6 %	39.2 %	25.0 %
Switzerland	6.3 %	36.2 %	39.2 %	18.3 %
Total	14.1 %	42.4 %	28.2 %	15.3 %

Source: World Values Survey, 2005.


The reason why we are presenting the data from three waves of ESS and WVS is to allow for longitudinal dimension of analyses. It is interesting to note that in a framework of last ten years, a lot of ‘traditional subjects of governance’ like political parties, parliaments even government itself have been losing support – the trust, confidence and positive attitudes of Europeans have been decreasing (see for instance Standard Eurobarometer 72, 2009, autumn<sup>v</sup>). But when it comes to experts making policy decisions, the positive attitude has remained stable for the past ten years as shown on the graph below.

Table 5: Having experts, not government, make decisions – data from World Values Survey, 1999/2000

	Very good	Fairly good	Fairly bad	Very bad
Austria	13.7 %	46.9 %	29.4 %	10.0 %
Belgium	14.6 %	43.5 %	27.6 %	14.3 %
Bulgaria	29.7 %	52.6 %	13.5 %	4.2 %
Czech Republic	14.3 %	48.9 %	27.0 %	9.8 %
Denmark	7.4 %	22.2 %	35.8 %	34.6 %
Estonia	9.4 %	47.3 %	31.4 %	11.9 %
Finland	10.2 %	48.3 %	30.3 %	11.3 %
France	14.3 %	36.7 %	26.0 %	22.9 %
Germany	18.6 %	40.7 %	20.6 %	20.1 %
Greece	2.8 %	10.5 %	26.3 %	60.4 %
Hungary	36.7 %	48.6 %	10.0 %	4.7 %
Iceland	6.7 %	35.4 %	40.0 %	17.9 %
Italy	11.9 %	39.1 %	32.2 %	16.8 %
Latvia	12.1 %	48.5 %	31.7 %	7.7 %
Lithuania	11.7 %	45.4 %	33.8 %	9.1 %
Luxembourg	12.9 %	33.3 %	30.2 %	23.6 %
Malta	9.2 %	24.8 %	30.6 %	35.4 %
Netherlands	4.3 %	36.0 %	45.6 %	14.2 %
Poland	26.7 %	61.2 %	9.8 %	2.4 %
Portugal	10.5 %	36.9 %	43.8 %	8.8 %
Romania	39.4 %	45.3 %	11.7 %	3.5 %
Slovakia	37.2 %	48.4 %	12.2 %	2.2 %
Slovenia	26.4 %	55.0 %	14.0 %	4.6 %
Spain	9.3 %	34.8 %	38.4 %	17.5 %
Sweden	7.1 %	34.2 %	38.1 %	20.6 %
Great Britain	14.2 %	32.8 %	27.9 %	25.0 %
Total	15.6 %	40.5 %	27.6 %	16.2 %

Source: World Values Survey, 1999/2000.

Graph 1: Longitudinal analyses of the attitude of Europeans towards having experts, not government, make decisions – comparison of 3 waves (WWS 2000, WWS 2005, EVS 2008)



\* Compared are total values as presented in Tables 3, 4 and 5

Source: European Values Survey 2008, World Values Survey 1999/2000, 2005.

Additionally, it is interesting to review the data on expressed confidence levels that Europeans have in civic organisations. Again, the data is quite scarce. The only comparative data set we could find that would include civic organisations as subjects of measuring the confidence levels is the data set from World Values Survey 2005. Following questions: *I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?*, has been asked also in previous waves in the history of this survey, however it mainly

concerned so called 'traditional subjects of governance'. Only recently, in the last wave of 2005, the respondents were also asked to express their confidence in civic organisation, namely: charitable and humanitarian organisations, women' movements and environment protection movements. The results are surprising. As it can be seen from the data presented in Table 6, Europeans have more confidence in civic organisations compared to major companies, political parties, parliament, government or the EU.

Table 6: Confidence in organisations

	A great deal	Quite a lot	Not very much	None at all
Confidence: Charitable or Humanitarian Organisations	11,3	49,5	30,5	8,7
Confidence: The Environmental Protection Movement	8	50,9	32,6	8,5
Confidence: The Woman's Movement	7	44,8	36,6	11,7
Confidence: Labour Unions	3,9	33,8	43,1	19,2
Confidence: Major Companies	3,2	33,5	47,6	15,7
Confidence: The Political Parties	1,6	18,7	52,8	27
Confidence: Parliament	3,7	31,5	45,2	19,6
Confidence: The Government	4,4	32,6	43,9	19,1
Confidence: The EU	6,3	38,7	40,2	14,8

\* The data presented in the Table 6 is a Total of data for each individual category of organization (the question: *I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? Options: Charitable or Humanitarian Organisations, The Environmental Protection Movement, The Woman's Movement, Labour Unions, Major Companies, The Political Parties, Parliament, Press, The Government, The EU*) being collected in following countries: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland in

2005. The data for individual countries is available at: <http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSanalyzeStudy.jsp>

Source: World Values Survey, 2005

Even though the data presented is scarce and our ability to form firm statements about Europeans attitude towards experts (including those from civil society) would definitely need further, both theoretical and empirical consideration, we could, based on the data presented preliminary form following conclusions: Europeans have a positive attitude towards experts, not governments, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country. And when it comes to confidence in organisations, civic organisations according to the data presented, enjoy the highest levels of confidence among the stakeholders involved in policy processes on the EU level (sadly the survey didn't include the question of confidence in science, so this statement can't be generalized).

## **5. Discussion**

EU institutions are seeking to find different ways of allowing citizens to have a greater influence in the decision-making process in the hope that this will eventually translate into greater knowledge of, interest in and support for the European integration process. The complex issue research (based) policy deals with needs of a strong interaction among policy-makers and civil society. Interaction goes beyond keeping the public informed of on-going political debates and decisions. It means that civil society has its say, the means to formulate a position, for example, and to know that this position is being taken into account in the policy-making process.

We have shown that inclusion of civic organisations in consultative processes of EU institution is becoming a new niche of influencing the

policy-decisions that presupposes a need for cognitive mobilization of civic organisations. Representatives of NGOs form 6, 11% of participants in Commissions' expert groups, while quite high percentage can be seen also in the case of social partners – 5, 18% – if we take both of these percentages together it adds to 11, 29 % which is even a higher percentage than in the case of representatives from industries and enterprise or academics, so we can conclude that civic organisations are becoming very active players in providing expert knowledge to the EU institutions. Additionally we have established, that Europeans have a positive attitude towards experts making decisions according to what they think is best for the country. And when it comes to confidence in organisations the civic organisations, according to the data presented, enjoy the highest levels of confidence among the analysed stakeholders involved in policy processes on the EU level.

This statement raises numerous new questions and would however need further examination. The data provided gave us an answer to quantitative questions: Who is actually meeting with whom in the expert groups? How often are civic actors engaged in such groups? It would be also interesting to gain more qualitative information about the substance of the expertise provided by civic organisations, their characteristics and accountability. This might give us a better insight into a dilemma which was nicely formulated by Saurugger (2006): *"...we have to question the automatic link we draw between civil society representation and democracy...The better informed and organized a group, the greater its chances are to gain access to the European institutions. Expertise and perceived efficiency are central access goods for civil society...However, this may lead to an expertise-representation gap...: the better structured and organized group is, and the more it is therefore able to offer necessary expertise, the less its members feel represented"* (Saurugger, 2006, 261). The questions of positive attitudes towards experts and confidence in civic organisations also raise interesting questions about their democratic potential as well possible threats to democratic decision-making processes. In an era when positive attitudes and confidence in traditional political channels are in decline and when an

even greater number of Europeans are expressing dissatisfaction with the way national democracies are developing, the stability of positive attitudes towards experts (not democratically elected governments) making decisions and relatively high levels of confidence in civic organisations poses new dilemmas about the future development of governance and democracy in the EU.

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## Endnotes

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<sup>i</sup>The Register has been set up by the Commission to give an overview of the consultative entities that help it in relation to: a.) the preparation of legislative proposals and policy initiatives (Commission's right of initiative); b.) the preparation of delegated acts; c.) the implementation of existing EU legislation, programmes and policies, including coordination and cooperation with member countries and stakeholders in that regard. The Register lists both Commission

expert groups and other similar entities, i.e. consultative groups which were not set up by the Commission, but which have a similar or identical role to a Commission expert group and are administered and financially managed by the Commission. For each group, the register provides standard information such as the Commission department running the group, as well as the group's mission, tasks and membership.

ii The Register opened on 23. June 2008, both for registration and for information to the general public. All entities engaged in activities carried out with the objective of influencing the policy formulation and decision-making processes of the European institutions are expected to register. This also includes activities that are part of formal consultations on legislative proposals and other open consultations. As the title of the Register indicates, the Commission encourages all interest representatives to register, including such entities that do not consider themselves "lobbyists". Registration shows that an organisation represents interests. It does not mean that those registering can be labelled 'lobbyists'. The Register is accessible on the internet: <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regrin>

iii The perception of European Institutions, self-perception of civic organisations and perception of scientific community as regards defining the civil society organisations differ (Kohler-Koch and Buth, 2009). When the Commission opened a first (voluntary) online register for European-level civil society organisations it introduced the category of 'non-governmental organisations'. NGOs were defined more narrowly compared to the term civic organisations we are using in this article. NGOs are understood as voluntary associations, independent, i. e. not bound by instructions from outside bodies, and they are not-for-profit. They are expected to act in public, to serve the public good, be dedicated to the interests of a particular group of persons or of society as such and not to act in favour of the economic or professional interests of their members, i. e. act in the interest of the 'other' (Kohler-Koch and Buth, 2009, 3).

iv The survey question: I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country. Possible answers: 1.) Very good 2.) Fairly good 3.) Fairly bad 4.) Very bad.

v In Standard Eurobarometer 72 we find data that point to the rising dissatisfaction with the way in which national democracies work. This Eurobarometer wave revisited the question asked in autumn 2007 (EB68) on the way democracy works in each Member State and the European Union. In

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comparison with autumn 2007, dissatisfaction with the way national democracies work has increased (particularly in Central and Eastern Europe countries, but also in Ireland, France, Greece and Spain), while views on the way democracy works in the EU remain stable. 53% of Europeans say they are currently satisfied with the way democracy works in their country, while 45% are dissatisfied and only 2% expressed no opinion (EB72, 151). Dissatisfaction is particularly widespread in Lithuania (79%), Romania (79%), Bulgaria (77%), Latvia (76%) and Hungary (76%). In contrast satisfaction with national democracy is much greater in the Nordic countries – Denmark (91%), Sweden (81%) and Finland (69%) – and in Luxembourg (90%), Austria (76%), the Netherlands (72%) and Germany (68%) (EB72, 152). It is interesting to note that the European Union remains unaffected by this increase in »democratic disenchantment«. In the 2007 research (EB68, Autumn) 52% respondents expressed that they are satisfied with the way democracy works in Europe, while in 2009 survey (EB72, Autumn) 54% shared the same opinions, so the satisfaction increased for 2%, while the number of those who are dissatisfied remained the same – 32%.



RSC, Number 4, Issue 1, January 2012, pp. 63-80.

## **Views of care home managers on development potentials of publicly and privately owned residential care homes for elderly persons**

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**Abstract:** *In this article the problem of ageing society and the problems of care homes for the elderly are dealt with. The results of the empirical survey that was carried out in 15 publicly-owned and 15 privately run residential homes for elderly persons distributed across Slovenia are presented. The research objective was to carry out the opinion survey on a sample of care home managers about the current situation of residential care for the elderly in Slovenia as well as to present future development possibilities for public and private sector residential homes for elderly persons. In the future residential care homes for the elderly as providers of institutional care can expect to be given professional autonomy and financial independence, to have autonomous management and leadership mechanisms, recognition of real costs and sufficient sources of funding, and to have the opportunity for the development and expansion of their activities.*

**Keywords:** ageing, residential care homes for elderly persons, residential care, needs of elderly people, costs of residential care

## **1. Introduction**

Currently the world is facing the problem of global population ageing and some significant changes in demographic structure so the increase in the numbers of older people presents a great challenge of contemporary society. With all this in mind more problems such as the increasing proportion of elderly people who need health care and nursing are at the foreground; and not only this but also problems such as social marginalization and isolation of older people, social stratification, changes in values and views of ageing and old people, adult children who find it more difficult to take care of their elderly, etc. can be observed. (Stipp 2010:15) Solutions to all this can be found in providing much needed institutional care for the elderly so all European Union Member States are committed to providing general access and ensuring high quality long-term care for their elderly citizens. The ageing population makes it more difficult to tackle funding and logistical challenges at present but the issue will only become more evident in the future, as governments have to perform their functions in a competitive environment of increasing needs and with limited resources (European Commission 2008: 2).

The social aspect of the problem of care homes for the elderly lies in an inadequate distribution of housing capacities, inefficient management practices, insufficient development resources, rigid staffing norms, understaffing, full funding policy that places burden on users, their families and local communities, besides the care home infrastructure that is outdated. Health care for elderly in care homes involves an increasingly worsening health status of the residents and budget cuts in health insurance funding on the other hand (Slovenian Community of Social Institutions, 2010: 3).

Since Europeans tend to live longer public funding of health care and long-term care represent the second largest expenditure on social protection, immediately following the expenditure on old age pensions and survivors' pensions. With a higher life expectancy a pressing need to provide long-term care services at an older person's home or in institutional settings for care homes is created (European Commission 2009: 5).

## **2. Research Methodology**

### *The purpose of the research*

The motivation for this doctoral research lies in its objective to obtain general information about the residential care homes, their performance and information about the changes they want to introduce to care homes for the elderly in Slovenia, with a view also to improving the quality of service delivery.

### *The aim of the research*

The main goal of this empirical survey has been to present the views of care home managers about the current situation of institutional care in Slovenia and propose those changes to elderly care in Slovenia which would bring about improved quality of service delivery and other activities. Based on the results of the research, we have presented the development prospects of publicly-funded or privately-owned elder homes in Slovenia and made suggestions for better ways of working with the elderly, which all should contribute to older people's greater life satisfaction and quality of their life in residential care homes.

### *Research methods*

This empirical research is based on a combination of quantitative (we have used descriptive and causal, i.e. nonexperimental method) and qualitative educational research (i.e. a questionnaire).

Using a five-point Likert scale, we have researched into the managers' views about the current situation of institutional care for the elderly. The collected data have been transferred to a common scorecard database in SPSS program using descriptive statistics and nonparametric statistical tests processing. The test of the set of hypotheses was performed by estimating the associations between the dependent variables using the  $\chi^2$ -test, t-test, and Welch-Satterthwaite approximation.

### *Survey sample*

The survey was conducted between December 2010 and January 2011 in 15 publicly, and in 15 privately owned residential care homes (which is 31.91% of all the facilities) that are distributed across Slovenia. The sample included 28 care home managers (professional persons responsible for the day-to-day running of residential care homes), of whom 50% were managers of publicly run homes, and 50% were private care homes managers. The response rate was very high at 93.3 percent.

### *Research hypotheses*

The theoretical background and survey questions have helped us to examine the following two hypotheses:

H1: we assume that the material, personnel and pricing standards governing the operation of publicly owned care homes do not allow for the development of stable and quality service delivery for the elderly

H2: we assume that the number of residential care development projects both for infrastructure and content are decreasing.

### *The research variables*

In this empirical study we investigated the following variables:

- (1) The type of ownership of the facility
- (2) Funding for reconstruction and investment in care homes in the period of last three years
- (3) Resident capacity of elder care home
- (4) Waiting times for admission to home
- (5) The views of care home managers on the selection of service providers for the elderly
- (6) The views of care home managers on professional autonomy and financial independence of care homes
- (7) The views of care home managers on care homes by geographic region and bed size
- (8) The views of care home managers on the funding of social care services
- (9) The views of care home managers on bureaucratic and normative approach to management system
- (10) The views of care home managers on material standards, staffing norms and care home costs
- (11) The views of care home managers on the development of new home services and creating new activities
- (12) The views of care home managers on the care home infrastructure provision
- (13) The views of care home managers on development projects
- (14) The views of care home managers on the health of care home residents
- (15) The views of care home managers on the health care funding system
- (16) The views of care home managers on staffing norms
- (17) The views of care home managers on residential care costs

### 3. Research results and interpretation

#### *Financing reconstruction and investment in care homes*

Table 1: Financing reconstruction and investment according to the type of care home from a sample of managers

1 2		TYPE OF OWNERSHIP		Together
		Publicly owned	Privately owned	
RECONSTRUCTION INVESTMENTS AND FUNDING OF CARE HOMES	up to € 5,000	4 28.6%	2 14.3%	6 21.4%
	from € 5,001 to € 100,000	3 21.4%	3 21.4%	6 21.4%
	from € 100,001 to € 500,000	4 28.6%	4 28.6%	8 28.6%
	from € 500,001 to € 1,000,000	2 14.3%	3 21.4%	5 17.9%
	more than € 1,000,000	1 7.1%	2 14.3%	3 10.7%
Total		14 100.0%	14 100.0%	28 100.0%
Result from $\chi^2$ -test		$\chi^2 = 1.221, g=4, \alpha=0.875$		

Table 1 show that in the last three years most public sector care homes spent up to € 5,000 (28.6%), and from € 100,001 to € 500,000 (28.6%) for reconstruction and investment, and most private sector ones from € 100,001 to € 500,000 (43.5%). We can find that only in recent years many, mostly privately owned care homes, have been built in Slovenia through public-private partnerships, which is the reason for such investments in the recent period. As  $\chi^2$  result shows, when  $\alpha = 0.875$ , this means that the difference in reconstruction and investment funding by the type of ownership of the facility is not statistically significant, because  $\alpha > 0.05$ .

### *Resident capacity in elder care homes*

Table 2: Resident capacity in elder care homes according to the type of care home from a sample of managers

3		1		Together
		TYPE OF OWNERSHIP		
		Publicly owned	Privately owned	
RESIDENT CAPACITY	Up to 100 residents	3 21.4%	5 35.7%	8 28.6%
	Up to 150 residents	4 28.6%	4 28.6%	8 28.6%
	Up to 200 residents	6 42.9%	5 35.7%	11 39.3%
	More than 200 residents	1 7.1%	0 0.0%	1 3.6%
Total		14 100.0%	14 100.0%	28 100.0%
Result from $\chi^2$ -test		$\chi^2=1.983, g=3, \alpha=0.576$		

Table 2 shows that the majority of publicly owned elder care homes (42.9%) can accommodate up to 200 residents and the majority of privately owned ones (35.7%) up to 100, or up to 200 residents (35.7%). Based on this, we can reach the conclusion that care homes have higher care capacities (up to 200 beds) due to the increases in revenue resulting from the increased number of residents. As the  $\chi^2$  result shows,  $\alpha = 0.576$  which means that the difference between the types of ownership of the facilities is not statistically significant, because  $\alpha > 0.05$ .

*Waiting times for admission to care homes*

Table 3: Waiting times for admission to care homes according to the type of care home from a sample of managers

4		1		Together
		Publicly owned	Privately owned	
WAITING TIMES FOR ADMISSION TO RESIDENTIAL AGED CARE	Up to 3 months	2 14.3%	9 64.3%	11 39.3%
	From 3 to 6 months	5 35.7%	2 14.3%	7 25.0%
	From 6 months to 1 year	6 42.9%	3 21.4%	9 32.1%
	More than 1 year	1 7.1%	0 0.0%	1 3.6%
Total		14 100.0%	14 100.0%	28 100.0%
Result from $\chi^2$ -test		$\chi^2= 8.552, g=3, \alpha=0.036$		

Table 3 shows that waiting times for admission to most publicly owned care homes are from 6 months to 1 year (42.9%) and in most privately owned residential care homes waiting period is to 3 months (64.3%). We can see from this that in publicly run homes waiting times are longer because the users pay less for personal care in publicly run homes and therefore these homes are in greater demand. The difference in waiting times for admission to care homes is, depending on the type of ownership of the facility as shown in  $\chi^2$  result, statistically significant, because  $\alpha = 0.036$ . The differences are statistically significant when the risk of rejection of the null hypothesis, which shows that there are no differences between the arithmetic means, is 5% or less than 5% ( $\alpha \leq 0.05$ ).

### *Grading managerial views*

Using a five-point Likert scale we have measured the views of managers. Table 4 lists statements, the arithmetic mean, and the standard deviation.

Table 4: Significance of individual statements from a sample of managers

STATEMENT	Arithmetic mean (M)	Standard deviation (SD)
S1: The Government treats the elderly care providers equally and regardless of the status of the provider	2.28	0.97
S2: The Government provides professional independence and financial autonomy	2.32	1.21
S3: Geographic distribution of eldercare facilities by regions is suitable	1.82	0.66
S4: Social security financing for the provision of health care services is unsuitable	1.75	0.88
S5: Management structures that are too bureaucratic and inflexible make it difficult to meet the individual needs of care home residents	3.78	1.10
S6: Material standards, personnel qualification standards and price stability enable us to deliver and develop high quality services for the elderly.	1.89	0.68
S7: We are motivated to develop new services and create new activities.	2.46	1.03
S8: Our facilities and infrastructure require renovation and modernization.	2.53	1.20
S9: Infrastructure development and eldercare development projects are becoming increasingly rare.	2.10	0.62
S10: Health problems of our residents are becoming more of concern	4.28	0.65
S11: Health care funding cuts lead to lower quality services in elder care	4.10	0.95
S12: Staffing norms requirements for high quality service delivery are met	1.57	0.57
S13: Costs of residential care cover operating costs and bring profits.	2.25	1.10

Most of the managers agree with statement 11 (S11), i.e. that cuts in funding for health care lead to poor service delivery (the arithmetic mean is 4.10), but the smallest number of them agree with statement 12 (S12) claiming that the staffing norms ensure quality of services (the arithmetic mean is 1.57). The managers disagree most strongly with the statement 2 that the Government provides professional independence and financial autonomy to all the residential care providers (S2).

Table 1: The significance of individual statements according to the type of care home from a sample of managers

STATE-MENT	TYPE OF OWNERSHIP	Arithmetic mean (M)	Standard deviation (SD)	Levene F-test	t-test
S1	Publicly-owned	2.28	0.72	F=4.916 $\alpha=0.036$	t=0.000 g=26 $\alpha=1.000$
	Privately-owned	2.28	1.20		
S2	Publicly-owned	2.21	1.42	F=4.738 $\alpha=0.039$	t=-0.458 g=26 $\alpha=0.651$
	Privately-owned	2.42	1.01		
S3	Publicly-owned	1.92	0.73	F=0.018 $\alpha=0.894$	t=0.842 g=26 $\alpha=0.407$
	Privately-owned	1.71	0.61		
S4	Publicly-owned	1.78	0.89	F=0.171 $\alpha=0.683$	t=0.209 g=26 $\alpha=0.836$
	Privately-owned	1.71	0.91		
S5	Publicly-owned	3.64	1.21	F=1.122 $\alpha=0.299$	t=-0.680 g=26 $\alpha=0.503$
	Privately-owned	3.92	0.99		
S6	Publicly-owned	2.07	0.73	F=0.18 $\alpha=0.894$	t=1.403 g=26 $\alpha=0.172$
	Privately-owned	1.71	0.61		
S7	Publicly-owned	2,42	0.93	F=1.097	t=-0.179

	Privately-owned	2.50	1.16	$\alpha=0.305$	$g=26$ $\alpha=0.859$
S8	Publicly-owned	3.21	1.12	$F=0.017$ $\alpha=0.899$	$t=3.586$ $g=26$ $\alpha=0.001$
	Privately-owned	1.85	0.86		
S9	Publicly-owned	1.92	0.73	$F=0.777$ $\alpha=0.386$	$t=-1.540$ $g=26$ $\alpha=0.136$
	Privately-owned	2.28	0.46		
S10	Publicly-owned	4.07	0.26	$F=20.258$ $\alpha=0.000$	$t=-1.790$ $g=26$ $\alpha=0.085$
	Privately-owned	4.50	0.85		
S11	Publicly-owned	4.14	0.66	$F=10.771$ $\alpha=0.003$	$t=0.194$ $g=26$ $\alpha=0.848$
	Privately-owned	4.07	1.20		
S12	Publicly-owned	1.71	0.46	$F=2.182$ $\alpha=0.152$	$t=1.339$ $g=26$ $\alpha=0.192$
	Privately-owned	1.42	0.64		
S13	Public	2.21	0.80	$F=2.892$ $\alpha=0.101$	$t=-0.167$ $g=26$ $\alpha=0.869$
	Privately-owned	2.28	1.38		

Table 5 shows that the assumption of homogeneity of variances (Levene's F-test) in statement 1 (S1) about the publicly-owned and privately-run eldercare facilities is not justified, since  $\alpha = 0.036$ , so we use the outcome of the Welch-Satterthwaite approximate test. This shows that there are no statistically significant differences between the types of ownership of the facilities in the assessment of managers for this statement, since  $\alpha = 1.000$ . We talk about the statistical significance of differences when the risk of rejection of the null hypothesis, which states that there are no differences between the arithmetic means, is 5% or less than 5% ( $\alpha \leq 0.05$ ).

The analysis of responses about the professional independence and business autonomy (S2) indicates that Levene's test confirmed the views that there are statistically significant differences between the variances,

since  $\alpha = 0.039$ , so we use the outcome of the Welch-Satterthwaite approximate test. This shows that there are no statistically significant differences between the types of ownership of the facility in the assessment of managers in statement S2, since  $\alpha = 0.651$ .

The analysis of the response to the statement on regional distribution of residential care facilities (S3) indicates that Levene's test did not confirm any statistically significant differences between the variances, since  $\alpha = 0.894$ . The t-test result indicates that the difference in the assessment of managers in statement S3 is not statistically significant because  $\alpha = 0.407$ .

When analysing the statement on financing of home care facilities (S4), Levene's test showed that  $\alpha = 0.683$ , which means that the assumption of homogeneity of variances is justified. The results of the t-test show that there are no statistically significant differences between the types of ownership of the facilities in the assessment of managers in this statement, since  $\alpha = 0.836$ .

The assumption of homogeneity of variances (Levene's F-test) in the analysis of S5 statement about the management system is justified, since  $\alpha = 0.299$ , so we use the t-test. This shows that there are no statistically significant differences between the types of ownership of the facilities in the assessment of managers in statement S5, since  $\alpha = 0.503$ .

Levene's test showed that the assumption of homogeneity of variances in the analysis of statement concerning the material standards, personnel qualification standards and price stability (S6) is not justified, since  $\alpha = 0.894$ . The results of t-test show that there are no statistically significant differences between the types of ownership of the facilities in the assessment of managers in this statement, since  $\alpha = 0.172$ . We can therefore reject the hypothesis H1, which assumes that the material standards, personnel qualification standards and price stability of publicly-owned eldercare facilities do not allow stable development and do not assure quality service delivery for the elderly residing in care homes.

From the analysis of statement 7 (S7) concerning the development of new services and creating new activities it can be seen that Levene's test showed a statistically significant difference between the variances, since  $\alpha = 0.305$ . The result for t-test shows that the difference in the assessment of managers in this statement is not statistically significant because  $\alpha = 0.859$ .

In the analysis of statement 8 (S8) concerning the infrastructure renovation of the home facilities Levene's test showed that  $\alpha = 0.899$ , which means that the assumption of homogeneity of variances is justified. The result of the t-test shows that the difference between the types of ownership of the facilities is statistically significant in the assessment of the sample of managers, since  $\alpha = 0.001$ . We can see this difference in managers' average response that is higher for what regards publicly-owned home facilities (3.21) compared with privately run ones (1.85).

The analysis of statement S9 concerning the development projects indicates that the Levene's test does not reveal the statistical significance of the difference between the variances, since  $\alpha = 0.386$ . The result of the t-test indicates that there are no statistically significant differences in the assessment of managers in this statement, since  $\alpha = 0.136$ . We can therefore confirm the hypothesis H2, which assumes that both the infrastructure and eldercare development projects are becoming increasingly rare.

The assumption of the homogeneity of the variances (Levene's F-test) in the analysis of statement S10 concerning the health of the eldercare home residents is not justified, since  $\alpha = 0.000$ , so we use the result of the Welch-Satterthwaite approximation instead. The result of the t-test suggests that there are no statistically significant differences between the types of ownership of the facilities in the managers' assessment of in this statement, but there is a tendency, as  $\alpha = 0.085$ . Taking a look at the sample mean scores of the managers' responses we can see that they are higher for private sector facilities (4.50) than for the ones from public sector (4.07).

The assumption of homogeneity of variances (Levene's F-test) in the analysis of statement 11 (S11) concerning the health care funding cuts is not justified, since  $\alpha = 0.003$ , so we use the result of the Welch-Satterthwaite approximation. This shows that there are no statistically significant differences between the types of eldercare facilities in the managers' assessment of in this statement, since  $\alpha = 0.848$ .

When analysing statement 12 (S12) concerning the staffing norms, Levene's test showed that  $\alpha = 0.152$ , which means that the assumption of homogeneity of variances is justified. The result for the t-test shows that there are no statistically significant differences between the types of housing in the assessment of the sample managers in this statement, since  $\alpha = 0.192$ .

Levene's test concerning the cost of residential care in statement 13 (S13) showed that  $\alpha = 0.101$ , which means that the assumption of homogeneity of variances is justified. The result of t-test shows that the statistical differences between the types of housing in the assessment by the managers in the sample is not significant, since  $\alpha = 0.869$ .

#### **4. Conclusion**

As people age, they develop different healthcare needs, particularly the needs for high-quality nursing, social care and medical care. Eldercare homes face ever increasing demands for quality of service delivery so they need to keep on improving and evaluating the satisfaction of users with the quality of services provided by the institutions in question.

The analysis of the results of empirical research has shown that the majority of publicly and privately-owned eldercare facilities have the capacity of housing up to 200 residents. From this we can come to a conclusion that in economic terms the minimum capacity of residential care homes is 120 beds, with the homes with smaller capacity presenting a

much better option from psychological point of view, since they provide a more homely atmosphere.

The survey data shows that resources invested in care homes in the last three years range from about € 100,000 to € 500,000. One of the major problems is certainly the question of investment, renovation and maintenance of publicly owned elder care facilities. Compared with privately run institutions, they are in an unequal position, since only for privately-run care homes the rate of return of cost of capital is included in pricing.

We can reach the conclusion that public care homes have only limited opportunities to initiate new services for the elderly. The employees' work performance, due to their categorization as civil servants, cannot be further rewarded while privately-owned care homes offer a greater array of services and service options that are more suited to older people's individual needs. Besides that facilitating a wider range of services implies a greater degree of users' participation in decision-making. Residents in privately owned care homes are clients who use services or can be seen as customers who purchase them. For this reason they can expect high quality service delivery, friendly attitude of staff and provision of a wide range of additional activities.

We suggest that the homes for the elderly built in the future follow the modern model of household groups, both in designing from the perspectives of the elderly, and in the choice of programs that are better suited to the needs of older people. Care homes should be located in relatively quiet and unpolluted neighbourhoods. Well groomed parks should be in close proximity to the homes so as to provide a place for relaxation, daily walks and sporting activities.

The design of residential care homes should make elderly people feel happy and comfortable with furniture and fittings suited for elderly residents, handrails and stair railings installed on staircases, in hallways and in bathrooms. They should also be installed in bathrooms to prevent

slip and fall accidents on wet floors. Elevator doors should be set so as to leave enough time for safe entry and exit. Care homes should have the best new equipment available and the latest gadgets to provide more comfort and higher quality of life for the residents.

It would be useful for the government to define the norms of staffing so as to meet the actual requirements of each home care provider and its users. In order for the residents to be satisfied with the service delivery and nursing, we propose a creation of a new job description, i.e. 'residential home care giver' who would be there for the residents throughout the day and would care for the entire household (do the cleaning, cooking, washing, ironing, provide companionship for the residents, be a fitness instructor and activity coordinator), and do other work that does not require previous medical training. It would also be desirable for the employees to wear such work clothes that would not look like work uniforms but would rather resemble casual clothes which would imply more familiarity and help build trust between the residents and the staff. They should also wear ID badges, with the name and position title.

We presume that care home residents have low pensions, which makes it difficult for them to cover the costs of their stay in the home. We therefore present a new finance scheme for institutional care, namely that the Government should cover the costs currently paid by the users, which would relieve financial burden of home care for the elderly. Health Insurance Company should continue to cover the expenses for medical care, and leave the basic cost of residential care to the user.

We also suggest that publicly and privately-owned residential care providers operate under the same business conditions. The State should speed up the process of reducing the differences in home care costs between public and private sector homes, and take account of capital depreciation and maintenance costs in care home fees in publicly run institutions. The Government should ensure the same pricing for publicly-owned care homes, regardless of the provider's status; it should also provide the possibility of subsidizing the difference between the cost and

price of the services of institutional care in nursing homes the same way as it applies to certain other social welfare services. We propose strengthening the management of professional autonomy and independence of operators in the field of social services which will allocate the contractors broader responsibilities in decision making on business and technical issues.

Only with regard to personal habits and needs of care home residents and with improving the living standard of the residents, the working conditions and quality of life of eldercare home residents will be able to meet the needs of the existing residents and attract new ones.

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