



**RSC**  
**RESEARCH IN SOCIAL CHANGE**

Volume 10, Issue 2

May 2018

**RSC**  
**RESEARCH IN SOCIAL CHANGE**

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**PRINT** Ulčakar & JK Grafika

**PUBLISHER** Založba Vega

**ISSN** 1855 – 4202

**RSC** is included in Applied Social Sciences Index and Abstracts (ASSIA) and CSA Sociological Abstracts.

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## LEGAL RECOGNITION AND SOCIETAL REACTION ON SEXUAL MINORITIES: REFLECTIONS ON MORAL POLICING AND MENTAL HEALTH OF LGBT COMMUNITY IN INDIA

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**Abstract:** *Intolerance and discrimination towards sexual minorities are worldwide phenomenon. India's transformation from a prejudiced and stigmatised country to a minority friendly society is a worth speculating. Furthermore, people of sexual minorities, and their rights, once recognised in the past are more likely to face harassment, threat of violence, and, moral policing because of the lack of social acceptance and legal recognition. LGBT community, as a part of social minority group, suffers from various kinds of socio-economic and cultural injustices which in turn make them vulnerable to mental health problems. But this highly significant aspect is understudied by the academia and policy makers. This article is the first attempt to explore the impact of law, society and culture on the mental health of LGBT community in India.*

**Keywords:** *Moral Policing, Sexual Minorities, Mental Health, Marginalisation, Legal rights of LGBT*

### 1. Introduction

India like other British commonwealth countries still follows significant amount of laws introduced by the British Raj back in 1860 based on the Victorian morality. In twenty first century, where most of these laws are not followed at Queen's land and underwent significant changes out of the social irrelevance, India is yet to update her own version. For instance, out of many, two significant laws, Sections 292 to 294 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) are used to deal with obscenity. The other one being Section 377 that criminalises

same sex attraction or any sexual behaviour that is against the nature. These laws directly or indirectly influenced the human behaviour and gave birth to moral polices in India that is still under the process of transition.

“Moral police” is a term used to describe the vigilante groups which act to enforce a code of morality in India. The target of moral policing is any activity that vigilante groups, the government or police decides to be “immoral” and “against Indian culture” (Mondal 2016). India has several vigilante groups that claim to protect the Indian culture. They resist and oppose cultural concepts that they deem to have been imported from the Western culture. They have been known to attack bars and pubs as they speculate those are against the Indian culture and morality of the nation. Some of these groups have attacked or have forced to shut down art exhibitions, where they claim obscene paintings were being displayed (Mondal 2016; Times of India 2018).

On 13 March, 2018, one of the oldest schools in Kolkata, West Bengal had accused ten adolescent school girls for indulging in same sex activities. This incident came to limelight after parents of the accused girls staged a protest against school. Moreover, they condemned the authority, for obtaining a written statement from those students (Times of India 2018). The Education Minister of this particular state, however, said that same sex attraction of any kind would not be tolerated in schools as it is against the Bengali culture and society (Chaudhari 2018).

Those reactions can be explained by significant theories explaining the social behaviour of these ‘deviant’ groups of society. Societal reaction theory or labelling theory, as given by Charles Lemert, focuses on the linguistic tendency of majority group to negatively label minority group or those seen as deviant from norms. Moreover, this approach distinguishes between primary deviance (where individuals do not see themselves as a deviant) and secondary deviance (which involves acceptance of a deviant status). Primary deviance arises for a wide variety of reasons such as biological, psychological, and sociological. Secondary, or intensified deviance becomes a means of defence, attack, or adaptation to the problems caused by social reaction to primary deviant behaviour. This theory claims that the process of defining and suppressing deviance is important to social solidarity (Lemert 1967).

On the contrary, scholars like Edwin M Lemert, Howard S Becker, Kai Erikson and John Kitsuse elaborated Labelling theory as sociology of the underdog. Individuals those who are considered deviant are actually victims of ‘more sinned against than sinning’. Furthermore, they are neither inherently deviant nor deviance inherent in any particular behaviour as noted by Erikson in his “notes on deviance”. This point signifies that social audience confers the label of deviance on behaviour. This social audience could be the

community in general or particular agents of social control, e.g. the police. In other words, behaviour is not inherently deviant or normal but is defined and labelled that way by people in charge of defining and labelling. The key component of the process is the social audience, regardless of how social audience comes to be defined (Lemert 1951; Kitsuse 1962).

As a form of deviant behaviour, homosexuality presents a strategically important theoretical and empirical problem for the study of deviance. In the sociological and anthropological literature same sex behaviour and the societal reactions to it are conceptualised within the framework of ascribed sex statuses and the socialisation of individuals to those statuses. Furthermore, the ascription of sex statuses is presumed to provide a complex of culturally prescribed roles and behaviours which individuals are expected to learn and perform. Nonetheless, homosexual roles and behaviours are conceived to be “inappropriate” to the individual’s ascribed sex status, and thus theoretically they are defined as a deviant (Kitsuse 1962).

In Lemert’s terminology, norms concerning sex-appropriate behaviour have a high degree of “compulsiveness” and social disapproval of violations that is stringent and effective (Lemert 1951). Homosexuals themselves appear to share this conception of the societal reaction to their behaviour, activities and subculture (Hooker 1960).

However, symbolic interaction and social comparison theories portray a different perspective. These theories view the social environment as providing people with meaning to their world and organisation to their experiences (Pettigrew 1967; Stryker and Statham 1985). Moreover, negative views from others lead to negative self-regard (Rosenberg 1979) and adverse mental health outcomes (Crocker and Major 1989).

In the same way, societal reaction theory directly addresses the effects of stigma and negative social attitudes on stigmatised individuals. According to the societal reaction, deviance may lead to labelling and negative societal reaction. Consequently, stigmatised individuals develop adaptive and maladaptive responses that may include mental health symptoms termed “secondary deviance” (Lemert 1967, Schur 1971). Similarly, Allport (1954) that describes “traits due to victimisation” as the defensive reaction of stigmatised individuals. This may be caused by introverted mechanisms, including self-hate, in group aggression, rebellion, and extroverted mechanisms that includes shyness along with obsessive concern with the stigmatising characteristics (Meyer 1995).

Minority group members are also exposed to negative life events related to their stigmatisation and discrimination (Brooks 1981). However, minority stress arises not only from negative events, but from totality of the minority

person's experience in the dominant society. Further, the centre of this experience is incongruence between the minority person's culture, needs, experience, and societal structures (Meyer 1995).

Many scholars have attempted to study the effects of minority status (especially ethnicity) on mental health. However, the most widely used approach compares rates of psychopathology and distress between minority and non-minority groups. It has been predicted that, if minority position is stressful, and if this stress is related to psychological distress, then minority groups must have higher rates of distress than non-minority groups. But studies that compared rates of distress and disorder between different minorities and non-minorities show Blacks and Whites, women and men, homosexuals and heterosexuals did not confirm such predictions, leading some researches to refute minority stress conceptualisation (Williams 1986; Neighbors 1984, on Black-White differences; Schwartz 1991; Robins and Regier 1991, on men-women differences; Gonsiorek 1991; Marmor 1980; Martin 1990; Pillard 1988; Williams et al. 1991, on gay-straight differences). Besides, support for minority stress formulations is provided by some researches. For example, a review of studies of differences between gay and straight men in various psychological tests suggest that majority of gay men are not more stressed. However, when they do become distressed it is usually in areas that are consistent with minority stress conceptualisations such as self-acceptance, alienation, and paranoid symptoms (Meyer 1993).

Meyer's (1995) study describes stress is derived from minority status and explores its effect on psychological distress on gay men. The concept of minority stress is based on the premise that gay people in a heterosexist society are subjected to chronic stress related to their stigmatisation. In addition to that, minority stressors are conceptualised as: a) internalised homophobia, which relates to gay men's direction of societal negative attitudes toward the self; b) stigma, which relates to expectations of rejection or discrimination; and c) actual experiences of discrimination or violence. The study based on the gay men of New York, supported minority stress hypothesis: each of the stressors had a significant independent association with a variety of mental health measures.

Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) people face tremendous discrimination across the world in general. Likewise, in India, it is more profound because of its traditional and orthodox backgrounds. All these factors, however, put the people of LGBT community in a huge psychological distress. Moreover, this tremendous mental health crisis of the said community is documented but understudied (Rao and Jacob 2012, Rao et al. 2016, Rozatkar and Gupta 2018, Kar et al. 2018). This article is a novel

attempt to highlight this issue in the Indian context where sexual minorities are fighting to get legal recognition and social acceptance.

## 2. Sexual Diversity and Sexual Minorities in India

American sociologist, Vern Bullough, divides the modern cultures into 'sex positive' and 'sex negative' (Bullough 1998). Sex positive cultures are those where sex is seen as a positive activity and procreation is seen as a byproduct rather than the main function. In sex negative societies it is the other way around: sex is purely for procreation and not for pleasure (Bullough 1998; Kalra et al. 2010). Considering that Indian culture was sex positive for centuries, but post-Mughal and post-British rule it became much more sex negative (The New York Times 2013).

India's large diversity is not only limited to its culture, language, religion and food. It has a sexual diversity which is often misunderstood and misrepresented. There are certain monuments and temples like Khajuraho and Konark, that depicts the "sex positivity" of ancient India. Furthermore, Indian society has been tolerant to various sexual identities and behaviours since pre-historic era as it is evident from Hindu mythologies and ancient scripts like the Kamasutra (Kalra 2010).

At present, around 2.5 million gays and 0.5 million transgenders are there in India (Delliswararao 2018). However, Indian transgender population are commonly known as "*Hijra*". Hijra is a person beyond the boxes of man and woman. In addition to that, they follow the rules and regulations of the community, lives in feminine attire, and may or may not be castrated." (Chettiar 2015). Although, such nomenclature does not have an exact match in the modern Western taxonomy of gender and sexual orientation (Chettiar 2015).

On the other hand, UNAIDS data says, there are around one billion men having sex with men (MSM) in India out of which 4.3 percent are vulnerable to HIV infection (UNAIDS 2017). This Indian MSM sexual identities include *kothi* (more feminine in behaviour and dress, who predominately engage in receptive anal intercourse), *panthi* or *girya* (more masculine in appearance, who predominately engage in insertive), *double deckers* (may have masculine or feminine appearance, and engage in both receptive and insertive anal intercourse), alongside *others* which may be situationally fluid and change over time (Tomori et al. 2016). Besides, in the modern classification these are interchangeably used with Top, Bottom, and Versatile (Moskowitz 2017).

This large diverse group of India is often unrecognised due to the derogatory laws like section 377. In 2009, Delhi High Court decriminalised this particular section but later it was re-criminalised again by the apex court of India. In addition to that, the Supreme Court of India labelled this group as a “minuscule community” and dismisses their existence in December, 2013 (Rao 2017). However, the number of self-identified LGBT population were increasing after this verdict. It is worth to notice that, since 1999 every year “pride walks” are organised in different metropolitan states of India for the recognition of their equal rights. (Aswin 2017; Addley 2017). Besides, international pride walks are organised since 1970 to increase the visibility of the LGBT population and to fight against homophobia (Addley 2017). In recent years there are pride walks in rural places of India but the number of participants has significantly increased in the metropolitan cities like Delhi, Mumbai and Bangalore owing to the visibility of the LGBT community (Aswin 2017).

### **3. Legal Recognition Status and Its Impact**

The concept of human dignity is encountered with increased frequency in the context of gay rights and marriage equality in particular (Finck 2016). Throughout legal orders, human dignity has emerged as a justification tool for bringing about gay rights either through adjudication or legislation and this in the absence of a fixed content of dignity in juridical application in most domestic legal orders (Finck 2016). LGBT communities have an important stake in legal injustice issues. Specific groups within the LGBT community are disproportionately affected by violence and discrimination, sometimes at the hands of law enforcement officials (Finck 2016). LGBT youth, and sex workers are particularly vulnerable to police misconduct and abuse; transgender people are also at greater risk of being targeted by police and treated inappropriately or abusively while in police custody (Finck 2016). On the contrary, in India, LGBT community is not protected by the laws. The main hindrance of this lack of protection is Section 377. Although, the objective of Section 377 has remained unclear and unsubstantiated. The offence was introduced into British India with a presumption of a shared Biblical morality. Historians have speculated that “there were concerns that not having wives would encourage the Imperial Army to become ‘replicas of Sodom and Gomorrah’ or to pick up ‘special Oriental vices’ (Gupta 2006).

The Section 377 is not merely a law about anal sex alone, but applies to homosexuality in general. The lack of a consent-based distinction in the offence has made homosexual sex synonymous to rape and equated

homosexuality with sexual perversity (Kar et al. 2018). Section 377 is the biggest affront to the dignity and humanity of a substantial minority of Indian citizens (Gupta 2006). The common-law prohibition on sodomy criminalises all sexual intercourse per anum between men: regardless of the relationship of the couple who engage therein, of the age of such couple, of the place where it occurs, or indeed of any other circumstances whatsoever. In so doing, it punishes a form of sexual conduct which is identified by our broader society with homosexuals. Its symbolic effect is to state that in the eyes of our legal system all gay men are criminals (Chettiar 2015; Gupta 2006). The stigma thus attached to a significant proportion of our population is manifest. But the harm imposed by the criminal law is far more than symbolic. As a result of the criminal offence, gay men are at risk of arrest, prosecution and conviction of the offence of sodomy simply because they seek to engage in sexual conduct which is part of their experience of being human (Gupta 2006).

There are reported cases of LGBT Indian being raped and tortured by police (Chettiar 2015). Although, in July 2009, Delhi High Court decriminalised consensual same sex acts in private by declaring the Section 377 IPC unconstitutional saying “the section denies a gay person a right to full personhood” (Chettiar 2015; Tomori et al. 2016; Rao 2017). In 2013, in the Supreme Court, the petitioners argued that Section 377 does not classify any particular group or gender and hence is not in violation of Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution (Constitution of India 1950). They also argued that if the High Court judgment was approved by the Supreme Court, “India’s social structure and institution of marriage will be detrimentally affected and it would cause young people to be tempted towards homosexual activities”. The Supreme Court accepted the arguments advanced by the appellants and observed that Section 377 is the only law that criminalises pedophilia and crimes like sexual abuse and assault (Supreme Court of India 2013). It also reasoned that if Section 377 was a pre-constitutional statute and if it were in violation of any fundamental right, the framers of the constitution would not have included it in the first place. Based on such observations, the apex court overturned the decision of the Delhi High Court (Supreme Court of India 2013). However, the impact of this law is vast and not only limited to the courtroom.

There are documented cases in past that is responsible for imprisonment of many innocents due to the existence of this law (Chettiar 2015; Gupta 2006). However, social attitude has changed in recent years. In August, 2017, the apex court declared privacy is the fundamental right and mentioned sexual orientation is an essential attribute of privacy. Further, it declares, the right to privacy and the protection of sexual orientation lie at the core of

fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Indian Constitution (Constitution of India 1950).

The judgment takes note of how the state's argument against privacy and the arm-twisting ways of getting personal data can lead to an Orwellian society. The ruling, in a revolutionary move, has broadened the definition and scope of privacy beyond the physical confines of a room by stating that, "privacy attaches to the person and not to the place where it is associated". Quoting John Stuart Mill, the judgment defines privacy as intrinsic and hence inalienable. "In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign" (Supreme Court of India 2017).

The judgment observes that "privacy enables each individual to take crucial decisions which find expression in human personality. It enables individuals to preserve their beliefs, thoughts, expressions, ideas, ideologies, preferences and choices against societal demands of homogeneity" (Supreme Court of India 2017). The judgment, in the way it defines privacy and dignity of an individual, has far reaching implications on the rights of LGBT individuals as it believes privacy to include "the preservation of personal intimacies, the sanctity of family life, marriage, procreation, the home and sexual orientation".

Often, 'miniscule' minority group such as LGBT community face violence and discrimination for the simple reason that their sexual orientation and preference does not accord with the 'mainstream' notions. The judgment clearly states that discrimination against an individual on the basis of sexual orientation is deeply offensive to the dignity of an individual. Furthermore, privacy represents the core of the human personality and recognises the ability of each individual to make choices and to take decisions. Very explicitly, the judgment makes autonomy and personhood of paramount importance and views an individual as a constantly evolving being; just like the constitution.

#### **4. Moral Policing on Sexual Minorities**

Indian courts have never recognised an absolute space for "private immorality" which does not harm others, but they have scorned on unnecessary and unjustified police access to people's homes (Gupta 2006). For last two decades, there are series of attacks on minorities for their food preferences, freedom of expression, sexual orientation, and religious background. Painter and Padma Vibhushan awardee (the second-highest civilian award of India), Maqbool Fida Husain's painting of the Hindu

goddess *Saraswati* became a matter of controversy in 1996 which was created in 1970. Thus, the artist had to spend the last years of his life in self-imposed exile because of national outrage and continuous threats (Thakurta 2011).

In 2014, hundreds of people, mostly youths gathered in one of the Indian states, Kerala, to protest against increasing moral policing in Kerala Society by kissing each other in a public place, the protest named “Kiss of Love” turned to be an exposition of the pretensions of progressiveness by the most socially and culturally developed state in India (Tom 2017; Aneesh 2018). In 2017, bashing couple of adolescents for their sexual orientation received lots of criticism from different fraternities (Times of India 2018; Chaudhuri 2018). In 2018, there were incidences of brutal assaults on heterosexual couple for hugging on public places (India Today 2018). There was a recent incident in Kolkata where a teacher was sacked for his sexual orientation a day after his autobiography (*My Homosexual Confession*) was released at Kolkata International Book Fair (Hindustan Times 2018). However, incidents of moral policing on the basis of sexual orientation & sexual identity got reported but remained unnoticed for ages.

In July 2001, police in the city of Lucknow under the provocation that gay men were cruising in a well-known public park and that NGOs were running condom distribution campaigns for MSM, raided the offices of two NGOs. They arrested four activists under Section 377 along with other charges of criminal conspiracy, abetment, and obscenity (Gupta 2006). In the second incident on January 2006, once again the police in Lucknow arrested four men under Section 377 for allegedly having sex in a public park. News reports revealed pictures of all the four men with their names and home addresses. There is no evidence, including witness statements to indicate that any sexual activity actually took place, either in private or public. The entire case is based on the foundation that these men are gay, and should therefore be punished under Section 377 (Gupta 2006).

A local community group in Mumbai called ‘GayBombay’ has been receiving numerous stories, experiences and complaints by gay men about their personal experiences with blackmailers (Chettiar 2015; Gupta 2006). These stories typically involve entrapments by the police, when innocent gay men only hoping to meet another man for a social contact, are duped into giving out a lot of money under threats of disclosure of their sexual orientation. The Indian police often catch gay men in a public park, or a quiet corner in a dark street socialising with friends, looking to meet lovers or potential sexual partners, or showing some degree of same sex affection in public – just as is common with heterosexuals Chettiar 2015; Gupta 2006).

The psychological and emotionally challenging effects of anti-sodomy laws on the personal lives of the people of sexual minorities can be debilitating. They continue to face discrimination and exclusion across the world in all spheres of life. Internationally, there are documented cases of people hiding their sexual orientation out of fear of losing their jobs. In February, 1994, “Don’t ask, Don’t tell” was the official United States policy implemented on openly lesbian, gay, bisexual military personnel. The policy that prohibited them from serving in the armed forces if they demonstrate a propensity or innate to engage in same sex activities (Human Rights Campaign n.d.). In 2017, an Indian naval officer who underwent sex change surgery has been discharged from their service (BBC News 2017). Indian data on public opinion shows that many Indians would not want an LGBT neighbour, and a huge percentage of people believe that homosexuality is never justified (World Bank 2012, 2013).

## **5. Moral Policing and Criminalisation**

The major highlighting social impact of moral policing and criminalisation in the LGBT community is quite complex and understudied and hence explained here:

### **5.1. Impact of Families on LGBT population**

Heterocentric, patriarchal, traditional family values of Asian culture have contributed higher stigma and incepted homophobia (Cho 2016). Homophobia is irrational negative attitudes towards the people of sexual minorities (Murphy 2007). It can be due to their intense value on lineage, marriage, and children, these expectations are considered normal and thus contribute to stigma, even among the unmarried and divorced as well as homosexuals (Cho 2016). Stigma is a process of labelling, stereotyping, devaluing and discriminating within unequal power structures, based on actual or perceived identity or status. Having said that, in developed countries, myriad of negative psychosocial outcomes are faced by gay men and lesbians who experience rejection by their family for not being heterosexual (Carastathis 2017). There are countless examples of transgender people being shunned by their families. Moreover, most families do not accept if their male child starts behaving in ways that are considered feminine or inappropriate to the expected gender role (Cho 2016; Murphy 2007; Carastathis 2017). Consequently, family members may threaten, scold or even assault their son/sibling from behaving or dressing-up like a girl or woman (Carastathis 2017). Some parents may outrightly disown and evict

their own child for crossing the prescribed gender norms of the society and for not fulfilling the roles expected from a male child (Carastathis 2017). Parents may provide several reasons for doing so: bringing disgrace and shame to the family; diminished chances of their child getting married to a woman in the future and thus end of their generation (if they have only one male child); and perceived inability on the part of their child to take care of the family (Delliswararao 2018).

## **5.2. Marginalisation**

Marginalisation is treatment of a person, group, as insignificant or peripheral (Collins et al. 2015). People who are marginalised have relatively little control over their lives and the resources available to them; they may become stigmatised and are often at the receiving end of negative public attitudes (Collins et al. 2015; Sangganjanavanich 2009). Their opportunities to make social contributions may be limited. Further, they develop low self-confidence and self-esteem and may become isolated. LGBT individuals may experience multiple forms of marginalisation, such as racism, sexism, poverty or other factors- alongside homophobia and transphobia that negatively impacts on mental health (Collins et al. 2015).

The marginalisation leads to social exclusion of many kinds:

### **5.2.1. Exclusion from Social and Cultural Participation**

Some members of the society ridicule gender-variant people for being 'different'. Even from police, they face physical and verbal abuse, forced sex, extortion of money and materials; and arrests on false allegations. Absence of protection from police means, ruffians find *Hijras*/Transgender people as easy targets for extorting money and as sexual objects. Study on MSM and transgender community shows increased incidences of forced sex, physical abuse, verbal abuse, blackmail for money and threat to life (Delliswararao 2018).

### **5.2.2. Exclusion from Education**

An important connection between stigma, exclusion, and economic outcomes flows through the educational and training process. Some evidence suggests that LGBT people face exclusion in educational settings. A small set of studies in India find that education and training opportunities are denied to LGBT people or are made more difficult by negative treatment and lack of support for LGBT people. Indeed, a 2005 Naz Foundation study found that half of MSM respondents had experienced harassment and violence by teachers and

classmates, and that treatment reduced their ability to continue with their further education (Bhatia 2017). Another study of a small group of transgender students in secondary schools found evidence of harassment and discrimination by students and teachers (Delliswararao 2018; Chettiar 2015; Bhatia 2017). Moreover, National AIDS Control Organisation (NACO) survey rates suggests shocking number of illiteracy rates amongst MSM (NACO 2011).

### **5.2.3. Lack of Social Security**

There are documented cases of social security issues faced by LGBT community (Cho 2016; Murphy 2007; Carastathis 2017). However, in India the transgender population is mostly vulnerable to this particular concern (Chettiar 2015; NACO 2011). Since most transgenders run away or evicted from home, they do not expect support from their own family in the long run. Subsequently, they face a lot of challenges, especially when they are not in a position to earn due to their health concerns, lack of employment opportunities, or old age (Chettiar 2015). Lack of livelihood options is a key reason for a significant proportion of transgender people to choose or continue to be in sex work - with its associated HIV and health-related risks (Delliswararao 2018; Chettiar 2015; Gupta 2018).

### **5.3. Bullying, Mockery and Abusing the LGBT Youths**

Despite the acknowledgment of societal attitudes such as homophobia foster bullying, the preponderance of bullying research neither addresses nor acknowledges sexual orientation as a possible factor (Mishna et al. 2009). Sexual minority students report more bullying and sexual harassment than their heterosexual peers (Mishna et al. 2009; William et al. 2005). Limited evidence suggests that youth of sexual minorities lack supportive families, friends, teachers and experience more victimization with isolation from their families and schools (Mishna et al. 2009). Lesbian and gay youth report that educators often did not intervene, even when they witnessed harassment of students perceived to be gay or lesbian (Mishna et al. 2009). Further, sexual minority youth may not seek support from their parents, who may be potentially available, out of fear that seeking support will lead to further victimisation (William et al. 2005). Lack of awareness, sensitivities and fixed ideas of heteronormativity in India makes the LGBT youth more vulnerable to hostility. In recent years, there are significant reported incidences of suicides and murder of Indian LGBT community (Gwalanil 2015).

#### **5.4. Ill-treating the Sexual Preference and Discrimination in Healthcare Settings**

In spite of the unfortunate history of perpetuating stigma and discrimination, it has been decades since modern medicine abandoned pathologising same-sex orientation and behaviour (Bhugra et al. 2016). Moreover, the World Health Organisation (WHO) accepts same-sex orientation as a normal variant of human sexuality since 1980 (Bhugra et al. 2016). But the attitudes of potential and working doctors holds a significant negative attitude towards the sexual minorities (Kar et al. 2018). Treatments like 'conversion therapy' which is a pseudoscientific practice of trying to change an individual's sexual orientation is still on practice which are ineffective and potentially harmful (Patra 2016). However, there are other traditional system of medicines like Ayurveda, Siddha, Unani and Yoga, Naturopathy, Homoeopathy, and many of them claimed to cure same sex attraction (Singh 2016; Ravishankar and Shukla 2007). All these contradictory theories lead to increase the cases of discrimination, lack of empathy and judgmental remarks towards the sexual minorities by the healthcare providers while performing any procedures like HIV test or taking their physical health history. Where rates of contracting HIV/AIDS are higher among sexual minority populations, discrimination for HIV testing is alarming. In the research literature, estimated prevalence rates of HIV for MSM range varies from 7 percent to 16.5 percent, and prevalence estimates to go as high as 55 percent for transgender people (Setia et al. 2008). People, living with HIV, often face discrimination while going to the government hospitals for regular checkups and collecting their antiretroviral drugs (the medicines that are required to keep the HIV infection at bay) (UNAIDS 2017). Surprisingly, a systematic review study suggests that MSM who face violence are more likely to engage in substance use, suffer from depressive symptoms, and engage in unprotected anal sex (Thomas et al. 2011).

#### **6. Impact of Social Factors on Sexual Minorities**

The roots of disease are still social. All of the disease, whether it is infectious, genetic or psychological, has social components in the larger perspective or a narrower one. Social determinants play a major role in health discrepancy and hence the remedies must be social (Bhugra 2014). The continuous exposure to negative societal attitudes in addition to the typical challenges faced by LGBT community along with mental and physical health issues have been documented in India and elsewhere. Furthermore, it has been shown conclusively that LGBT individuals have higher than expected rates of

psychiatric disorders and once their rights and equality are recognised these rates start to drop (Padula et al. 2016). In a country where mental health remains a fairly low priority for social and political action, it is not very hard to imagine how much stress is given upon the mental health of marginalised population (Bhugra et al. 2014).

“Minority stress” is an umbrella term that focuses on the psychological impact of LGBT people’s disadvantaged position, whether at a broad level, such as unequal treatment in legal or economic institutions, or the stigma revealed in everyday interactions and “micro-aggressions” against LGBT people (Meyer 2003). Even as the health needs for LGBT people may be greater as a result of minority stress, the health care system may not offer culturally competent or nondiscriminatory services to LGBT people. The fear of stigma in health care settings can lead to avoidance of care or poorer quality of care when relevant information about sexual practices is not revealed by patients. In addition to larger social discrimination as an influence on health outcomes, families of sexual minorities in India might play a crucial and complicated role in health.

Family support can improve the situation for LGBT people. Families sometimes accept LGBT sons and daughters, and that support might mitigate the harm of social exclusion, although supportive families might not be common (Vanita 2009). One study found that married MSM had lower rates of depression than unmarried MSM, perhaps because they could avoid some social stigma and had more general sources of support, although that support seems unlikely to extend to having sex with men outside of the marriage (Safren et al. 2009). Additionally, family influences can also be negative. Marriage out of provocation is common for LGBT people in India, and many of them report pressure to marry from their families. Being forced into different-sex marriages also creates minority stress, perhaps especially for lesbians, for whom marriage might not provide a zone of privacy for same-sex relationships (as may be true for some MSM) but instead a stricter set of social roles and reduced freedom. As a result of these additional challenges, the health status of LGBT people might be lower than that of non-LGBT people in India.

## **7. Evidence of Mental Health Disparities for Sexual Minorities in India**

Existing studies of sexual minorities in India find very high rates of depression, suicidal tendencies, anxiety disorders, substance use disorder, and body shaming disorders especially when compared with general

population rates. While the literature on health of this community in India is not extensive, some clear evidence of those particular negative health outcomes exists, and those outcomes can often be linked to stigma or lack of social support and resulting minority stress.

### **7.1. Depression**

Prior quantitative research on depression among MSM in India from most of the metropolitan cities indicates that MSM are at risk for depression, with estimates ranging from 29 to 55 percent (Tomori et al. 2016). Comparing the Indian population prevalence of depression to the prevalence in LGBT samples shows that rates of clinical depression for MSM were 6-12 times higher than other population rates. There are significant association between depression and risky sexual behaviour (Patel et al. 2015). However, researches were mainly on three Indian MSM sexual identities: *kothi*, *panthi* or *giryā* and *double deckers*, alongside gay, bisexual, and other MSM identities (Phillips et al. 2010). Qualitative studies indicate that *kothis* may be particularly vulnerable to multiple levels of stigmatisation, discrimination, and violence in their families and communities. Beyond identified high depression rates among *kothi* (Logie et al. 2012), data on depression across sexual identities remains limited.

### **7.2. Suicidal Tendency**

High rates of suicide attempts have been found in studies of LGBT people in India. Many studies claimed that suicide attempts and ideation are much more prevalent amongst sexual minorities than heterosexual people of the same age. In a nonclinical sample of MSM in Mumbai, 45 percent were currently suicidal, with 15 percent at particularly high risk (Sivasubramanian et al. 2012). However, an attempt to suicide was an offence according to the Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code which was rather decriminalised in the Mental Health Care Bill in 2013 (Behere et al. 2015). But, decriminalising suicide is not enough. There is a need for a comprehensive health program to reduce its incidence. Furthermore, the stigma attached with suicides will only recede if the government and the social sector take a proactive role in spreading anti-suicide awareness campaign (Behere et al. 2015).

### **7.3. Substance use disorder**

'Substance abuse' is characterised by a pattern of substance use leading to neglect of roles or commitments, physical hazards, legal issues, or interpersonal problems (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 1994). Risk factors categorised as familial include the childhood

maltreatment (abuse and neglect), familial substance abuse, and parent-child relationships. Social risk factors include association with deviant peers, popularity, bullying, and gang affiliation (Whitesell et al. 2013). Sexual minorities in India are more likely to indulge into drug addiction, heavy drinking, tobacco use and poly-substance abuse (Sivasubramanian *et al.* 2012). A growing body of research suggests that elevated rates of substance use among sexual minorities may be a symptom of stress associated with identity-related stigma (Hequembourg and Dearing 2013). Anti-gay bias also results in frequent hate crimes aimed at LGBT youths, adding further to the stress of homophobia and heterosexism (an assumption that heterosexuality is the preferred norm for everyone.) Since the early 1980, AIDS-phobia, from both the outside world and as another form of internalised negative self-perception, causes added stress for many LGBT individuals. However, studies of substance abuse and high risk behaviours in India have been largely focused on men in general (Go et al. 1999). These studies have found alcohol use to be associated with not only higher rates of HIV/STI risk behaviours, but also with higher HIV and STI rates among men in India. Although a growing number of studies have explored sexual risk among MSM in India (Sivaram *et al.* 2008), no studies to date have investigated the correlates of alcohol use and concurrent sexual risk among an exclusively MSM sample. Importantly, MSM in India experience multiple and complex challenges, including stigmatisation, isolation, homophobia, criminalisation and discrimination, which may put them at augmented risk for alcohol abuse and/or unprotected sex (Chakrapani et al. 2007). Additional research is needed to understand and address alcohol use and HIV risk among MSM in India.

#### **7.4. Body image disorder**

Body image is defined as, “a subjective picture of one’s own physical appearance established by self-observation and by noting the reactions of others” (Neagu 2015). Prevailing socio-cultural influences lead females to desire a thin body and males a muscular body, especially in adolescents. This results in body image anxiety which may lead to social phobia (Waghachavare et al. 2014). International studies suggest gay men tend to report greater body dissatisfaction, body related distress, eating-disordered behaviour, and poorer body image than do heterosexual men. Internalised homophobia, stigma, discrimination, prejudicial events like anti-gay attacks create a physical dissatisfaction. Furthermore, some scholars speculate that, being a victim of an antigay attack may also lead to a greater desire for a more powerful physique as a mechanism through which gay men can feel safer from and more powerful against future antigay attacks and discrimination, as has

been speculated to be true for some lesbians (Mahalik and Kimmel 2006). In India, *Kothis* and some *double deckers* specifically identified their feminine appearance or behaviour as the basis for their systematic stigmatisation, harassment, and violence, which led to emotional distress and physical dissatisfaction (Tomori et al. 2016).

## **8. Economic Impact of Mental Health Disparities**

There are no such studies in India that can estimate the economic impact of mental health disparities for LGBT community. But there are certain international studies on cost of homophobia that has detailed data on hospitalisation, lost days of work, and early mortality (Hanlon and Hinkle 2011). The health impact measure is the disability-adjusted life year, or DALY, which was estimated by the Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Study 2010 for India (WHO 2017). The Global Burden of Disease reports total DALY for India in 2010 was - (a) "Self-harm" -13,063,200 DALYs; and (b) Major depressive disorders - 10,038,500 DALYs (WHO 2017). Moreover, these estimates would illustrate the magnitude of the economic cost of stigma and exclusion on the health of LGBT people.

## **9. Conclusion and Recommendations**

It is clear to conclude that sexual minorities of India faces series of discrimination, exclusion from the society, thus quite often, meet with obstacles to satisfy their needs. There is no short cut solution that can address the problems facing many LGBT people in India. Therefore, in the light of the above-mentioned discussion, following recommendation can be developed in recognising the role that individuals as well as institution can take effectively.

- a) Government support to establish and decriminalise anti-LGBT laws.
- b) Support the most marginalised of the sexual minorities- Transgender, low income, people with HIV.
- c) Awareness campaigns to create a tolerance and inclusion and positive policies towards sexual minorities.
- d) Better individual health for LGBT people can affect all individuals, such as reducing the transmission of disease or freeing up health care resources to treat other conditions.
- e) Research can measure the impact of stigma and other following details: (1) Research can be used to evaluate the success of interventions designed to address exclusion; (2) Research can be helpful in designing new policy approaches to strengthen the

inclusion of LGBT community. Monitoring the process of providing those protections to transgender people as the recent Supreme Court decision in 2014 to recognise the third gender is implemented in India could provide ideas for LGBT people. (3) Research on mental health crisis and identifying the high risk states. Implementation of mental health programme according to the risk identifications.

- f) Schools and teacher education programmes are crucial sites where LGBT issues and concerns need to be addressed. To help promote health and safety among LGBT youth, schools can implement the following policies and practices: (1) Encourage respect for all students and prohibit bullying, harassment, and violence against all students. (2) Encourage and facilitate student organised school clubs that promote a safe, welcoming, and accepting school environment (e.g., gay-straight alliances, which are school clubs open to youth of all sexual orientations). (3) Ensure that health curricula or educational materials include HIV, other STD, or pregnancy prevention information that is relevant to LGBTQ youth; such as, ensuring that curricula or materials use inclusive language or terminology.
- g) Training needs to be conducted for health professionals to increase their understanding of LGBT identity as potential risk factor for self-harm suicidal behaviour and depression. Respective authorities should ensure that physical health, mental health and social care services are provided in a way that is accessible and appropriate to LGBT people.
- h) Police force at all levels need to be sensitised on LGBT issues and also on the general principles of fundamental human rights.
- i) To check the violence that is perpetrated in the home as well as in the public sphere, the domestic violence law has to be expanded to include non-spousal and parental violence as well.
- j) To change societal attitude media has to play a responsible role by reporting on LGBT issues and promoting a culture of tolerance and freedom for minorities.

At the end it can be said that, protecting sexual minorities from violence and discrimination does not require the establishment of a new set of laws nor does it require the creation of new international human rights standards. All people, irrespective of sex, sexual orientation or gender identity, are entitled to enjoy the protections provided for by international human rights law, including in respect of rights to life, security of person and privacy, the right to be free from torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, the right to be

free from discrimination and the right to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly.

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## INTEGRATION PROBLEM

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**Abstract:** *Social sciences many times struggle to explain what integrates society of irresolvable oppositions. To fill this gap, integration is reconceptualised from dual (Durheim, Giddens) to triadic concept first and situated in a meso, instead of conventional micro or macro frame. The case is illustrated with a case study. Three measures of integration are derived. A strong balance is a measure of the mechanical integration between primary oppositions involved in the evaluated issue. Cohesion is a correlative measure of cooperative achievements. The third is a weak balance which measures mutuality of relations, assessing if they weave social ties in an emancipatory way. Mesoscopic approach will have profound impact on strategic approaches to social integration in future.*

**Keywords:** *Society, Integration, Balance, Cohesion, Meso level*

### **1. Introduction**

Social integration is a core concept to social sciences, comparable in its importance perhaps only to the concept of the market for economists (Norton, De Haan 2012), which is itself, first and foremost, an integration mechanism. Integration is a fundamental process in the evolution of every social system, that bonds its divergent elements together (Putnam 1993) creating a meaningful and functional whole (Chan et al. 2006). A social cohesion as a concept, sometimes the terms 'an integration' and 'a cohesion' are, though not always appropriately, taken as interchangeable (De Boe et al. 1999; Ratzel 1897), describes convergence between aspirations for freedom and order, or between diversity of a society's members and uniformity of its connecting structure.

Many key preconditions for high social integration are currently met in the larger part of Europe better than ever before. The majority of the population

enjoys a high level of general welfare in international comparisons, while for the marginalised population there are at least some essential supporting services in place. Well-established democratic procedures and highly advanced technocratic tools seem to assure relatively effective governance of public concerns even in harder times. The general public quite routinely holds official institutions responsible for their operation in terms of legality and effectiveness, such as how they improve access to public services for diverse citizens' needs. Furthermore, public participation in policy-making is customary and ranges from civil society's evaluating governmental operations' impacts to its involvement in shaping legislative proposals and strategic documents, sometimes even participatory budgeting. Civil society is rather highly mobilised and active in pursuing public goods. Unstructured organic relations between individuals have also markedly enhanced and strengthened in recent decades by an increased level of education and easier access to advanced technological means of communication on local, national and on global levels, which significantly enrich opportunities for cohesive collective actions in addition or even irrespective to government induced integration efforts.

Despite largely fulfilled preconditions for high social integration, contemporary societies continue to disintegrate. In Germany, for instance, the majority of people already believe that cohesion is declining because 'society is becoming increasingly fragmented,' so that its 'cohesion is threatened' (Zick, Kupper, in Dragolov et al. 2013). Official institutions that used to be the source of collective associations and the stability of social systems on national level erode by processes of fragmentation of social concerns, their increasing complexity, and globalization (ECLAC 2007). On the other side, opportunities for a free association between individuals progress most in social practices that alienate its protagonists such as on global market or in social networking on the internet. Complex societies face potentially dangerous situations for their future prosperity amid persistent failures of their core institutions to translate existing integration potentials and efforts into coherent collective outcomes.

One of the important reasons for the failure of integration efforts is a narrow understanding of the mechanism of social integration. Indisputably, this is not an easily understandable concept. Since Durkheim, the prevailing emphasis is on a dualist model with two integration mechanisms: mechanical and organic. Mechanical integration requires unification of the building blocks of the social system that secures the structural stability and predictability of members' behaviours. Its forces are vertical, political, bureaucratic, and technocratic. Mechanical integration requires submission

to central norms resulting in high level of exclusion of the outsiders and of non-fitting members, which brought Granovetter (1985) to consider this form of integration, as 'over socialized'.

For many others, however, integration is much more about strengthening voluntary links between members that requires extending freedom of interactions between diverse and autonomous members. This is an organic aspect, in which integration operates through voluntary interactions in cultural (Delanty 2000), or evolutionary (Hayek 1991) processes that are unpredictable and free. While the social integration through enhanced relations between individuals often produces a range of new collective opportunities, it cannot also offer radical choice; it enhances connectedness among subjects by fabricating cohesion that many times lacks the vertical structure of primary concerns. This sort of integration that does not base on shared central values is for Granovetter 'under socialized'.

The two integration approaches are contradictory so it is highly unlikely that integrative efforts will automatically translate into convergent results. Just the opposite! Different strategies many times act against one another and distort integrative endeavours into battles for status and prestige. For Habermas (1987), the dualistic integration concept with two one-sided mechanisms leads integration efforts to contradictions, rather than to harmony. For him, like for Parsons, contemporary society needs an integrated understanding of itself, but at the same time he believes, like neomarksists (Adorno, Althusser), that its integrative function is disabled from the inside (in Delanty 2000).

The same bleak attitude manifests among many other authors who tend to more actively criticize existing operating principles and methods of social integration than to contribute to organizing social conflicts (Touraine 1992). There is a greater consensus in the field about what threatens social integration – increasing social complexity is among the most prominent causes – than on what promotes it (Jeannotte, in Berman and Phillips 2004). It seems that theoretical work on these issues lags considerably behind amounting practical challenges.

Trends of social systems' disintegration decidedly put the imperative of integration back on the political agenda (Janmaat 2011) as a priority goal. This is especially evident in the European Union (Gough and Olofsson 1999; COM/2005/0299) because the EU rests on the idea of integration between diverse constituents (De Boe et al. 1999) with rather dissimilar integration practices. The development strategy 'Europe 2020' specifically prioritizes inclusive growth that fosters social and territorial cohesion (Fischer et al. 2013). For EU, cohesion deserves an importance equal to that of the

establishment of the shared currency, the Euro, and the creation of an area without internal frontiers (in Berman and Phillips 2004).

The political relevance of this concept would suggest addressing the integration problem in less theoretical and more operational and pragmatic way. Therefore, it may be appropriate to develop its theoretical foundations with the assistance of a case study that examines a practical example in the area of territorial cohesion – with evaluation of the National Energy Program's (NEP 2004; EPA 1043-III) impacts on territorial cohesion in Slovenia (Golobič et al. 2008; Golobič, Marot 2011; Radej 2008).

Territorial cohesion is the newest of the EU's cohesion pillars. The concept of territorial cohesion has been around in European political discourse since the 1990's, beginning with the Council of Europe's pan-European perspective (De Boe et al. 1999), which echoes in the EU's Fifth Report on Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion (2010) and in the Territorial Agenda of the European Union 2020. Territorial and social cohesion are two facets of the same concept since social cohesion cannot materialize outside of a specific territory. 'The term social cohesion has to do with how members of a community, defined in geographical terms, live and work together' (Dragolov et al. 2013). Analogously, territorial cohesion always takes place in a concrete social context.

Certain key political documents understand the concept differently. Some see cohesion as a synonym for integration;<sup>1</sup> others equate it with a balance between its main constituents.<sup>2</sup> A Cohesion report<sup>3</sup> instead defines cohesion as covering both aspects – balance and integration. The contradicting comprehension of concepts of integration, balance and cohesion even in the main guiding documents in the EU is not a result of a sloppiness of bureaucratic jargon. The definitional perplexity in the literature regarding the core meaning and relationship is symptomatic also in many other attempts to define complex phenomena that cut through diverse frames of meaning, such as sustainable development.

Contradictory conceptions of cohesion in Europe exhibit not only theoretical differences but also specific institutional approaches such as

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<sup>1</sup> COM/98/333; EU Commission Communication to the European Council in Cardiff on "Partnership for Integration, Cardiff, June 1998.

<sup>2</sup> COM/2004/394; EU Commission Communication - Interim Territorial Cohesion Report, 2004; EU Community Strategic Guidelines, 2005; EU Territorial Agenda Background Document, 2011; European Spatial Planning Observation Network.

<sup>3</sup> COM/2004/0107; EU Commission Communication - Third progress report on economic and social cohesion, 2004.

between the EU and the Council of Europe. The former emphasizes cohesion as the reduction of disparities between social groups or territories. This is the communitarian (Andrews et al. 2013) sort of integration, which focuses on harmonious relations. The latter is the functionalist aspect of integration, which focuses on social solidarity, i.e. generalized support for intervention measures to promote social equity (ibid.).

The EU's concept of territorial cohesion itself evolves from two principally incompatible approaches (Cole, in Faludi 1998) that, nevertheless, are well justified in the institutional context in which they are applied (Faludi 2004): the German and the French concept. The latter serves needs of the centralized state that governs its fundamental internal contradictions hierarchically and vertically. The philosophy of this approach rests on the idea of similarity between the parts and the whole, and their central coincidence with cohesion between lower and higher levels. Its policies draw legitimacy from the quality of service provision for end users, based on efficiency, equal access, and protection of the environment (Peyrony 2007). In this model, public interventions prioritize grand investment programs for the development of public services in the fields of energy and transport, large infrastructure works and a policy of favouring metropolitan growth. The French model is characteristic for promoting unity without diversity, in which the aspirations of citizens may be at times neglected, which can present a threat to fully-fledged democracy (Faludi and Peyrony 2011).

The opposite of this is the German model. It understands territorial cohesion in ways that are closer to the concept of polycentrism (Peyrony 2007), which seeks to achieve cohesion by balancing territorial interests on many lower levels (Faludi and Peyrony 2011). This approach is a logical extension of the decentralized structure of the German state. Cohesion policy wants to achieve strong balanced development with a focus on the least developed regions and with priority on peripheral regions, with the local and regional community receiving primary attention (ibid.). The model further insists on individual, regional and national responsibility rather than on cooperation and solidarity. The advantages of the German model lie in its great democratic legitimacy. At the same time, however, it lacks the aspect of critical mass to face macro level challenges, especially those that are taking place on a European-wide scale (ibid.).

The EU aims to build a hybrid approach to territorial cohesion with a mixed model that situated itself between the two polarities (ibid.). It employs the idea of solidarity and integration through common networks and 'smart

policies<sup>4</sup> taken from the French model, but avoids the loss of individual and collective responsibility. It also uses the sense of local and regional attachment from the German model, while at the same time avoiding the risk of localism and non-cooperation (*ibid.*). The mixed European model of territorial cohesion aims to forge a sort of complex unity – through enhancing cultural bonds of similarity (mechanic solidarity) while simultaneously pursuing a division of functional tasks (organic solidarity; Trenz 2008).

The EU's effort of mixing two distinctive cohesion approaches into a hybridised EU model is praiseworthy, but it is also a rather ambitious undertaking, since contradictions in reference models cannot be put aside simply by cherry picking – 'taking best of two approaches' – while dismissing the logical consequences and implications of selective choices. One of the possibly most serious shortcomings of this approach is that specific intervention logic of the EU's hybrid model of complex territorial cohesion does not exist. The unfortunate outcome of a political project that prioritizes the will for cohesion over its internal logic is usually political voluntarism. The core challenge for our inquiry is then to formulate an intervention logic that can resolve the integration problem of complex societies and translate its contradictory integration forces into integrative achievements.

If one assumes that social integration is a mesoscopically complex and thus plural concept then the concept must consist of at least three distinct drivers. The first is 'strong balance' for assuring mechanic integration, the second one is 'cohesion' for invoking organic integration. The third category is newly introduced, 'weak balance', which is hybrid, between the first two. It arises from a process of organic cohesion but operates in mechanical logic, so it can connect vertical and horizontal perspectives of integration without disturbing the incompatibilities on which complex society rests.

The concept of weak balance is new in studying territorial integration (but not in the medicine<sup>5</sup>, finances<sup>6</sup>, or in the network theory<sup>7</sup>...). It is an indispensable concept because of contemporary societies' dominant reliance on asymmetrical cohesion, such as on the market, by bureaucratic rules or charity, rather than on symmetrical forms like solidarity, and mutuality. Even in democratic societies, some groups are more constrained and 'less equal'

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<sup>4</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/europe-2020-in-a-nutshell/priorities/smart-growth/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/europe-2020-in-a-nutshell/priorities/smart-growth/index_en.htm), IX 2016.

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18711425>, I 2017.

<sup>6</sup> <https://www.wallstreetoasis.com/forums/weakstrong-balance-sheet>, I 2017.

<sup>7</sup> [https://courses.cit.cornell.edu/info204\\_2007sp/balance.pdf](https://courses.cit.cornell.edu/info204_2007sp/balance.pdf), I 2017.

than others. Market regime or nationality is, for instance, something that one cannot just 'opt out of' (Gordon 2008) under normal circumstances. When an individual is denied citizenship he or she is also denied all other rights (Arendt, in Benhabib 2010), so it may be better for many to be systematic victims in asymmetrical cohesion than entirely excluded. Hayek (1991) similarly claimed that victims are often willing to accept certain interactions that are contrary to their will, merely to protect their structural relation to other social groups.

Asymmetric integration is more often the rule than the exception in contemporary societies. This requires distinguishing between situations in which a certain level of cohesion materializes in one-sided interactions involving a dominant selfish or altruistic agent, or alternatively, in mutually emancipating and empowering interactions for both parties involved. In the first case, the cohesion results from a win-lose fashion so it is not sustainable – this would become visible by removing barriers that protect the asymmetry. Only when integration materializes in a mutually empowering way for all involved can integration aspiration become not only successful but also self-sustaining. Due to its very subtle connective potential, weak balance emerges as a core integration principle for complex societies at meso level.

Next section explains core concepts, mechanisms, and measures of cohesion and integration. The evaluative case study then illustrates methodological operationalization of new concept on selected practical example. Discussion of wider implications of newly introduced mesoscopic logic of integration for governing complex societies will conclude the chapter.

## **2. Core concepts**

Durkheim's theoretical foundations of social integration concept consist of two contradictory forces. Mechanical integration is an indicator of a system's homogeneity (De Boe et al. 1999). It is a characteristic model of integration in primal and poorly structured communities (Schnurr and Holtz 1998) and in totalitarian regimes, marked by strong ties between members derived from a central collective ethos with shared values. Mechanical integration arises homogeneous and stable patterns of life. It sees the society through the perspective of its underlying constitutive principles so that it comprises only a systemic aspect of the social order (Perkmann 1998). This is a negative type of integration because it requires submission to central norms (Comtois 1986), or common denominator, with a high external exclusion for non-members and internal exclusion for non-fitting members. The main task of mechanical integration is to ensure the maintenance of pre-defined principal

relationships (Bailey 2002); therefore, it pursues a conservative aspect of integration. As rigid as it is, it is incapable of adopting a radical change in a transforming society without endangering its stability.

Mechanical forces push society towards unification and structure, while organic forces enhance spontaneity and differentiation. Organic integration is an outcome of purely functional bonds among diverse individuals related in their non-principal concerns who aim to achieve only interim, temporary limited and partial goals in day-to-day cooperation. Organic interactions produce cohesive bonds at an elementary level that are only local and weak (De Boe et al. 1999). The observer at a macro level, therefore, perceives them as ephemeral and of secondary importance. Yet, a network of weak links can grow dense and become a powerful driver of large-scale ordering due to exquisite 'strength of weak ties' (Granovetter 1985).

Durkheim already observed the evolution of societies from mechanical to increasingly organic integration. In this regard, Spencer envisaged that a specific agency for integration, such as the state, was decreasingly necessary because integration would come about of its own accord, by spontaneous means such as Adam Smith's invisible hand of the free market (in Møller 2002), Hayekian (1991) spontaneous ordering, or Giddensian hermeneutics (below).

A dichotomous concept of social integration (mechanical – organic) is characteristic of contemporary social sciences. Comtois (1986) defines integration as a process by which a combination of centrality and marginality forms the basic contradiction of the dialectical struggle between a type of integration that is based on direct and on indirect interactions. ECLAC (2007) frames cohesion as the dialectic between social inclusion and exclusion mechanisms. Lockwood (1999) divided social integration into civic integration (as the integrity of the core institutional order of citizenship at the macro-social level), and social cohesion, as the strength of networks (secondary associations intermediating between the individual and the state) at the micro- and meso-social levels. Chan et al. (in Acket et al. 2011) defined social cohesion as 'a state of affairs concerning the vertical and the horizontal interactions among members of a society'.

Theories on social integration are prevalently conceptualised with two interrogating integration mechanisms in mind (Lawrence, in Connelly and Richardson 2004). However, these two mechanisms are functionally dependent. Social integration is in danger either when structures fall out of balance, or when collective senses of affiliation, solidarity, and mutuality erode (Huschka and Mau 2005). Organic integration without structural order would not have sufficient support to reproduce collective primary values.

Analogously, a system remains structurally rigid and threatened by low adaptability if it reproduces without enhancing organic cohesion from below.

An observed contradiction between mechanisms of integration in tandem with their functional interdependence led Giddens (1993) to propose his structuration theory of social integration that aims to overcome rigid binary frame. In his model, integration is a result of cohesive connections emerging from the agency – from concrete relations and cooperation, but also from the structure – the rules and resources that give similar social practices an ordered form, which then uniformly frames agents operation. Agents on a micro level first produce structural order through their habitual interactions. Once established, the new order refines a framework inside which agents interact. Agents monitor the ongoing flow of activities and structural conditions, reflect them, and adapt their habitual actions to evolving understandings of processes in which they are involved, so that structure and agency unfold together by cyclically inducing adaptation between one another. In this model, not only is the behaviour of the whole determined by the properties of its parts (upwards causation), but also the behaviour of the parts is constrained by the properties of the whole (downward causation; Campbell 1974). Giddens emphasizes the point that structure and agency constitute one another in a cyclical manner so that they are not conceivable separately.

In his model, organic integration is a framework for mechanical integration, which is itself a framework for organic integration. Durkheim himself emphasized that this kind of micro-macro circularity is inherent to sociology (Gell 2001). Giddens called two-sided connectedness of opposites 'double hermeneutics of structure and agency'. Hermeneutics is a method of holistic interpretation for two-way connections between an agent and a structure as equally important, levels of social inquiry. For relating the whole to a part and a part to the whole, Heidegger (1927) introduced the concept of the 'hermeneutic circle'. Neither the whole nor any individual part can be understood without reference to one another. In this, an interpretive understanding results from the cyclically alternating explanation of relatedness between the parts and the whole. Sociology many times applies a circular explanation. Instead of relying on asymmetrical causal logic, first cause then effect, it relies on correlation as the symmetric and cyclic logic, where A affects B but B also affects A.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Hermeneutics is nevertheless different from correlation; the former implies vertical logic between two principal concerns, the latter horizontal that deals only with indirect relations.

The mesoscopic model of integration combines main characteristics of previous two approaches (mechanical, organic) but also goes beyond them, because it is not exclusivist. The mesoscopic model is developed on a practical example in the area of territorial integration. Ratzel (1897) developed a concept of territorial integration in a very similar approach to Durkheim. He also distinguished between mechanical integration (the homogeneity of the different parts of the territory, vertically) and organic integration (the intensity of flows between the different parts of the territory, horizontally). Ratzel understands territorial integration as a connection between policy sectors (energy, industry, services...), between spatial units and between sectors and spatial units. In contemporary discussions, his approach is characterised as global (De Boe et al. 1999), since it aims at centrally assessing all integrative processes from all aspects simultaneously.

The participants in the EU project 'European Spatial Development Perspective'<sup>9</sup> hold that standard antagonism between the vertical and horizontal integration is misguided. They identified both as preconditions for territorial integration. The general objective of territorial governance is to maximize vertical and horizontal coordination (Davoudi et al. 2008) by intersecting sectorial (vertical) themes, such as transport or energy infrastructures, with a horizontal territorial theme like urban or rural (Peyrony 2007), spread or concentration, and synergy or confrontations between different spatial dimensions and themes.

The most suitable tool for studying territorial integration (DG Regio 2004) is a matrical methodology because it can separately study direct from indirect integration, or primary (intended) from secondary (spontaneous) integration, and so also vertical from horizontal integration. EU project ESPON (Project 3.2, 2006, Vol. 5) conceptualised territorial cohesion with matrical methodology as the 'Hypercube'. Camagni (2005) instead proposed conceptualisation with the Venn diagram (Figure 1, below) that also implies matrical thinking.

The Hypercube has three axes – one for different territorial units, another for different territorial concerns and third for different sectorial policies. The attribute 'hyper' serves to emphasise a three-dimensional matrix also dynamically in time, as the fourth dimension of territorial cohesion. The concept is over-extended as it revives an idea of global harmonization, like in Ratzel's approach. Furthermore, it is redundant in its fourth, 'hyper'

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<sup>9</sup>[http://ec.europa.eu/regional\\_policy/sources/docoffic/official/reports/som\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/reports/som_en.htm), IX 2016.

dimension since territorial axes already have their distinctive and indeed incommensurable temporal perspectives.

Camagni's (2005) schematization of territorial cohesion comprises of Venn diagram with three partly overlapping circles, each representing one domain of territorial integration: Economic (E), Socio-Cultural (S) and Physical (P). He studies territorial cohesion by assessing how different government sectoral policies impact with their achievements on territorial domains. In his schematization, the concept of territorial integration bears a close relationship to the schematization of sustainable development with three partly overlapping domains (Faludi and Peyrony 2011).

For Camagni, territorial cohesion, as a narrower concept to territorial integration, is the outcome of meta-overlap between three overlapping cohesion domains: territorial quality,  $T_q$ , territorial efficiency  $T_e$ , and territorial identity,  $T_i$  (Figure 1).  $T_q$  is an overlap between S and P. It describes the quality of living and working environment, access to services and knowledge, and the absence of poverty. Areas with a high  $T_q$  will continue to attract residents, while other areas can expect depopulation.

The second cohesion domain,  $T_e$  results from the overlap between E and P. Camagni describes it in terms of changes in resource efficiency, polycentric urban systems, accessible infrastructure, and economic competitiveness of the territory, as well as its accessibility and good management of risks.

Finally,  $T_i$  arises from the overlap between S and E.  $T_i$  comprises cohesion arising from the presence of social capital, local knowledge and the comparative advantage of endogenous territorial potentials. This cohesion domain reflects anthropogenization of the territory, which emerges as a cultural and relational phenomenon (Caldo 1996).

Camagni's very effective schematization of the concept lacks equally effective translation into an operational evaluation model for assessing sectorial policies' impacts on territorial cohesion in practice. Fischer et al. (2013) argue that Camagni's operationalization suffers from some black box characteristics because it incorporates a problematic amount of expert judgments about baseline conditions that may hamper objective assessment of impacts. Camagni translated (and degraded) his evaluation project into a scientific project, where concern for truth overrides judgment about the public good. In their view, the model is highly dependent on the identification of cause-effect relationships that are not always available for each policy field and are especially not available in the case of entirely new situations. The scientific procedure is also too sophisticated for non-scientific applications in resolving practical issues in territorial governance, which, after all, was Camagni's original aim.

One can methodologically operationalize Camagni's concept in a way that is more productive. His conceptualisation is founded on the Leopold matrix of impacts (Leopold et al. 1971), which organizes a detailed assessment of how each individual sectorial policy measure affects each territorial evaluation criteria. Detailed territorial impacts in the Leopold matrix partially aggregate into a square input-output matrix of three territorial domains and then correlate cross-sectionally into evaluation synthesis. This procedure is mesoscopic. It produces three measures of territorial integration: strong balance, cohesion, and weak balance, which describe three main aspects of territorial integration for (dually) overlapping and non-overlapping areas in the Venn diagram.

This procedure gives ground for shaping two measures of the territorial cohesion: a measure of cohesion and measure of a weak balance. The latter arises from the correlation of cross-domain impacts. Correlation expresses the strength of linear dependence between two variables (technically, it assesses how much of the variation in one variable depends on variations in the others). Correlation produces a result with a value between 0 and (+/-)1, for completely unrelated or for fully related variables (positively or negatively).

However, correlation of overlap between integration domains (E, S, and P) cannot produce a uniform result, in a scalar value of total territorial integration rate between -1 and 1. As long as evaluation deals with incommensurable variables, its correlation results must also remain differentiated between domains. Furthermore, due to asymmetric forces of territorial cohesion, it is also sensible to present correlation results separately for how strong on average is a correlation between all pairs of territorial domains (c) and how (weakly) balanced is cohesion between integration domains (b).

Mesoscopic correlation of incommensurable variables on their margin produces a specter of partial results that precisely describe different types of connectedness between integration domains. In consequence, aggregate evaluation results are not unique and self-explanatory. To understand mixed results, an evaluator should interpret them in relation to one another as well as in relation to underlying contextual factors of the evaluation.

Figure 1 presents all three measures of territorial integration in Venn diagram. The strong balance 'B' shows how balanced policy impacts are between three integration domains - E, S and P. In the conceptual sense, balance means a middle point between two opposite forces that is desirable

over purely one state or the other.<sup>10</sup> Balance aspires to achieve equilibrium and symmetry between constitutive polar domains (Milkov 2006). Balance is an expression of the system's stability (Odenbaugh 2011),<sup>11</sup> and so it is appropriate as a measure of the mechanic aspect of integration.

'c' describes the strength of the cohesive links in three cohesion domains – Tq, Te, and Ti. 'b' relativizes achievements in c. b expresses how weakly balanced is the contribution of the territorial (integration) domains E, S or P to the cohesion domains Tq, Te, or Ti. Balance is weak because it operates in a weak relationship of cohesion, with weak, not with strong incommensurability, which is within overlap, not between domains. b and c together describe the system's organic integration (in Durkheimian terminology) or 'territorial cohesion' (in Camagni's schematization).

Mesoscopic integration can only occur when a given sectorial policy intervention boosts all domains simultaneously in their core concerns. An ideally balanced situation is one in which a given policy intervention's impacts are balanced at the highest level of positive impacts between all domains.


However, in a complex society, a balance is an unnatural condition. Complex societies operate as imbalanced in dis-equilibrium. Ideal balance can be only a reference point for decision-makers, around which reality and policy-making oscillate in opposite directions. Public policies are mainly interventionist and only corrective. Their operational task is not to reach an ideal, but to counterbalance existing territorial imbalances toward an ideal situation by adopting measures that invoke precisely inverse changes relative to observed negative trends. Many times, imbalance is reinforced intentionally, which reflects different institutional, historical or cultural conditions in different territories or communities – such as a specific pattern of imbalance between three integration domains in nature parks, in comparison to specific imbalance in old city centers. In these regards, policies need to adopt action priorities that are imbalanced, the most favourable and most relevant to prioritised territorial domain. B, therefore, needs to be evaluated not only to an ideal situation of equality (of net positive impacts) between domains but also, and probably more importantly, in relation to existing imbalances between territorial domains.

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<sup>10</sup> Wikipedia, #Metaphysics, IX 2016.

<sup>11</sup> 'Other measures of stability are resilience (how fast the variables return to their equilibrium following a perturbation), persistence (how long the value of a variable lasts before it changes to a new value), and volatility (the degree to which a variable varies over time)' (Odenbaugh 2011).

Figure 1: Concept and measures of territorial integration and territorial cohesion



Source: Reworked from Camagni 2005, by adding three measures of integration and distinguishing territorial integration from territorial cohesion.

Notes. Meaning of symbols: (i) 3 territorial domains of integration: P for Physical; S for Socio-Cultural and E for Economic; (ii) 3 territorial domains of cohesion: Te for Territorial efficiency, Ti for Territorial identity; Tq for Territorial quality); (iii) 3 measures of integration: B for Strong balance, c for Cohesion, and b for Weak balance.

The analogous is the case with organic integration. The ideal of full cohesion and full overlap between territorial domains is beyond our reach, even as a matter of principle. If all domains fully cohered, even in their cores, they would cease to persist as incommensurable. This would immediately override previous concerns put forward with B and also annihilate distinction between integration and cohesion.

A sensible operational goal in enhancing c is to increase the strength of the overlap between domains only in a given socio-political context that emerges from a gap between its concrete baseline conditions and specific benchmark target. However, these two are regularly changing in response to previous cohesive achievements. On one hand, policy-makers adopt increasingly more ambitious cohesion benchmarks. Analogously, if a cohesion policy is progressive then its baseline conditions become increasingly stringent because of deeper understanding of the complexity of the challenge. In this manner, cohesion policy constantly deconstructs its previous achievements,

so that ideal cohesion is always beyond its reach. Only with such 'a deconstructive cohesion' (or 'radical hermeneutics', Caputo 1988), ambitious long-term cohesive policy is feasible without a danger of subverting complex foundations of society. The goal of cohesion policy, obviously, is not to maximise the level of integration relative to some predestined and fixed ideal but to maximise integrative concerns in increasingly complex conditions.

The mechanical and organic aspect of integration then share an important characteristic in a mesoscopic methodology. B and c both need to advance in an inverted way and so 'only' in irrationally consistent manner – with unbalancing of integration domains and with deconstructive cohesion. This is not a paradox: for irrational challenges posed by social complexity, only irrational responses seem to be rationally adequate.

Finally, the measure of weak balance, b: it is not about principal matters like B but informal. The guiding metaphor for b is not merely connectedness between domains, but inclusion. Imbalance in weak terms reflects socially (environmentally, territorially...) irresponsible, even though not illegal, attitude towards others' reasonable expectations. Weak imbalance takes place as collectively acceptable ignorance in ways that are in concordance with predominant values, beliefs, formal norms or customised procedures – such as by taking advantage of weaker partners in competitive undertakings, or hurting communal and global commons. Despite their weak nature, this kind of imbalances operate systematically to the benefit of some groups and types of behaviours at the expense of many others (Bachrach, Baratz, in Gordon 2008), in particular against the aspirations of the weaker, against the non-present, and against radical difference. It turns out, at closer inspection, that the way, how society treats these, currently marginal, even invisible social concerns, are of central importance for mesoscopic integration in emerging complex conditions.

### **3. Case study**

The case study illustrates the meso level approach to integration on the practical example. The case study evaluates the impacts of the National Energy Program on territorial cohesion in Slovenia. The intersection between the energy sector and territorial development is exemplarily complex, and the reasons for this are located on both sides of this overlap.

Achieved level of territorial development in Slovenia is relatively high in international comparisons. However, trends in main territorial development indicators have been mostly negative (MOP 2015) in the previous two

decades. Development is chaotic in terms of suburbanization, degradation of the cultural landscape including unplanned forestation of abandoned agricultural land, and loss of settlements' heritage, due to the intensive construction of transport and energy infrastructure. However, a recent study (Golobič et al. 2014) showed that the implementation level for the Strategy of Territorial Development of Slovenia (STDS 2004) is poorly to medium successful. Their conclusions are based on the verifiable finding that considerable harmonisation has been achieved between stakeholders in spatial policy since STDS adoption a decade ago.

There is a significant disparity observed between largely negative territorial trends and a positive assessment of territorial governance on the strategic level. The gap is entirely consistent with normative intervention logic of territorial governance, which claims that a high level of formal harmonization between stakeholders of spatial policy is a sufficient condition for successful implementation of territorial development goals and 'consequently' (automatically) for the reversal of negative spatial trends. Policy-makers say that the law limits their options and that their effectiveness can improve only if law awards them broader jurisdictions with more executive powers in relation to other sectors.

Normative intervention logic would be an entirely suitable approach in situations that are at their core simple, such as when policy challenges are well understood and in the same way by all stakeholders. There should be no major disagreements about the appropriate way to resolve territorial challenges – that is, about a definition of a challenge and how most effectively approach it. Implementation capacities of governance would also (need to) be strong, including sanctioning non-compliance and for the effective enforcing of the resolution of territorial conflicts.

Unfortunately, these are precisely the conditions that are largely absent from territorial governance, not only in Slovenia. When spatial processes are interconnected and overlapping, as they typically are, then horizontal governance with non-normative intervention logic is more appropriate, because it better emphasises intersectorial and multifunctional concerns of territorial challenges. In the EU, horizontal governance has significantly increased over time (Schimmelfennig et al. 2014). In Slovenia, however, the opposite trend operates, decreasing from a comparatively high emphasis on horizontal governance in spatial planning before two to three decades (ESPON, project 2.3.2). Harmonization between territorial policy and sectors take place mainly in a normative way, based on imposing new constraints, either spatial, or economic, or political..., not by increasing win-win territorial resolutions between them. With reinforced verticalism, territorial

governance itself become one of the obstacles to broader territorial integration in Slovenia.

The economic sector, on the other side, has invoked largely negative spatial and environmental trends in the previous decade, with its over-emphasis on lowering costs wherever possible to increase competitiveness and earnings on the international markets even with lowering spatial and environmental standards at home. Negative impacts are particularly evident for the energy sector, squeezed between contradictory economic and territorial demands.

Slovenia is poor in energy resources. The country imports more than half of all primary energy, with oil, nuclear fuel and coal having the prevailing share (Božič, Fendre 2011). Domestic primary energy sources consist only of low-quality coal and hydropower. The latter, together with other renewable sources, is improving but still poorly utilized. Despite poorness in primary energy sources, energy intensity per unit of GDP is one third higher in Slovenia than the EU average (*ibid.*) due to structural reasons such as a high share of energy intensive industry and low energy efficiency both in the industry and in households. Additionally, Slovenia is a relatively large exporter of electric energy due to its very attractive location on the corridor between the Pannonian and Po Valley macro regions, one with a surplus and the other with a deficit of electric energy supply. This causes a large transit of electricity from East to the West, demanding a large enough infrastructure, especially in terms of a more capable transmission network and distribution lines, but also in terms of new production capacities in Slovenia. In fact, the energy sector is one of the most lucrative in the national economy, which serves as a strong argument in favour of the energy sector's extensive spatial demands despite the fact that domestic final consumption of energy has been decreasing already for a decade and energy dependence is also the lowest since 2005 (Plan B 2015). Hunger for volume growth in the energy sector is best evident in the ambitions of the NEP to invest more than half of the national annual GDP over 15 years. This is an especially symptomatic feature of the NEP for describing the relationship between the energy sector and spatial planning, which submitted a national spatial development strategy for adoption in the same year but without a specified budget for financing implementation of its intervention measures.

Baseline conditions in Slovenia at the intersection between the energy sector and spatial policy are not favourable in terms of territorial integration. Previous analytical research gives ground for anticipating the energy sector's strongly imbalanced impact on three integration domains E, S, and P. This further suggests that cohesion (c) might be also low and one-sided (b).

Territorial identity might be the weakest part of territorial cohesion in Slovenia as an overlap between the two territorial domains that experienced the most confrontational developments in the past two decades (E, and especially S).

Evaluation of the NEP's impacts on territorial integration in Slovenia started with applying Leopold's assessment matrix. It consists of the NEP's 26 selected policy measures (in rows) with identifiable territorial impact and of 12 assessment criteria of STDS (in columns of the matrix; for selection process see Golobič, Marot 2011; see its results in Appendix 1) that are relevant for assessing the NEP. Assessment of the impacts took place with the assistance of the input module of the Urban Planning Institute of RS12 that enabled standardised collection of assessments. An interdisciplinary group of experts (consisting of a geographer, a sociologist, a regional and landscape planner, a chemist, an environmental scientist, a macroeconomist, and a green energy expert) took part in the expert assessment of the NEP's territorial impacts on a scale with 5 scores, ranging from very negative (-2) to very positive impact (+2). Experts based their assessments on their proven expertise and on a prior comprehensive literature review and analysis of the spatial and energy situation in Slovenia (Golobič et al. 2008) in all main impact areas.

The assessment of impacts consisted of two phases. In the second step, experts tried to align their most divergent assessments, which accounted for about one ninth of all assessed impacts (Golobič et al. 2008). The remaining disagreements reflected legitimate differences about narrow details so they were neutralised in aggregate by calculating an average assessments score for each remaining dissonant assessment (Appendix 2). At the end, detailed results were summarised into meso-matrix from which obtained evaluators with three measures of territorial integration that consistently explain the NEP's overall territorial impact in mesoscopic perspective.

#### **4. Results**

Table 1 presents only the assessment results in their partially aggregated form. The table has three vertical subsections. Section I contains the input-output matrix at a meso level of evaluation. The meso matrix is composed of the NEP's measures (in rows) and STDS's evaluation criteria (in columns), both presented on the level of three territorial domains (E, S, and P). Section II analyses partially aggregated results that are located on the negative diagonal of the meso matrix. These give a ground for forming an evaluative

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12 <http://tia.uirs.si/>, I 2009.

conclusion about the NEP's direct contribution to three territorial domains that inform evaluation about achieving strong balance in mechanical integration, B. Finally, section III presents the results of correlation of impacts in three integration domains that produces three cohesion domains  $T_q$ ,  $T_e$ , and  $T_i$ . Results of Section III are further divided into two subsections to appropriately account for the difference between the measure of cohesion,  $c$ , and the measure of weak balance,  $b$ .

Section II reveals that the NEP's direct impacts on the three evaluation domains of territorial integration (non-overlapping areas of the Venn diagram)<sup>13</sup> are very uneven. The impacts of the NEP's socially related measures on the social domain of territorial integration ( $S \cap S$ ) are assessed as largely absent (impact score 0). The reason is that NEP's socially related measures are to an important extent inappropriate, relative to the selected evaluation criteria of the social domain of the territorial integration, and additionally are not sufficiently ambitious while they also remain poorly implemented.<sup>14</sup>

The direct effectiveness of the NEP's economic measures on the economic aspects of territory ( $E \cap E$ ) is of only moderate strength (score 1). This is rather disappointing, given that the NEP clearly prioritised economic over non-economic goals. Performance monitoring data also revealed that implementation of the NEP's economic measures has been very selective, characterised by neglect for the majority of the planned measures except for those linked to investment into energy objects.<sup>15</sup> Only the NEP's physical measures direct impact on the P had a very positive score (2;  $P \cap P$ ). However, this impact crucially depended not on NEP's effectiveness but on enforcing strict formal procedures of spatial planning (Golobič et al. 2008).

Overall, the direct contribution of the NEP to mechanical integration is absent since strong balance is absent ( $B = 0$ ) amid the energy policy's absent impact on S since S is an integral domain of territorial integration. NEP's failure to contribute to mechanical integration is again quite ironic, given that the sector as such and its strategic program, in particular, was previously criticised as an exquisitely one-sided with little concern especially for horizontal issues of territorial development.

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<sup>13</sup> Note that Picture 5 presents the overlap of a given territorial domain with itself as a non-overlapping area in the Venn diagram, in the sense that it does not overlap with any other domain but itself.

<sup>14</sup>[http://www.energetika-portal.si/fileadmin/dokumenti/publikacije/lep/lep\\_2007.pdf](http://www.energetika-portal.si/fileadmin/dokumenti/publikacije/lep/lep_2007.pdf). VI 2010.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

Table 1: The NEP's territorial impacts on integration and on cohesion, from '-2' (very negative) to '+2' (very positive)

Assessment results				Evaluation of assessment results							
				TERRITORIAL INTEGRATION							
I Input-output matrix				II Mechanical integration		III Organic integration (=TERRITORIAL COHESION)					
	E	S	P	Overlap	Balance (B*)	Domain	Overlap	Above diag, $\alpha$	Below diag, $\beta$	Cohesion: $c^{**}=\alpha+\beta$	Weak balance, $b^{***}= \alpha-\beta $
E	1	0	0	E∩E	1	Ti	(E∩S) ∩ (S∩E)	0	1	Very poor	Small imbalance, S discriminated
S	1	0	2	S∩S	0	Tq	(S∩P) ∩ (P∩S)	2	1	Medium High	Small imbalance, S discriminated
P	2	1	2	P∩P	2	Te	(E∩P) ∩ (P∩E)	0	2	Poor	Moderate imbalance, P very discriminated
<b>EVALUATION RESULTS</b>				<b>Strong balance is absent</b>		-	-	-	-	<b>Cohesion is poor</b>	<b>Weak imbalance small to moderate</b>

Source of data: Appendix 2.

Legend:

\* B is: 'Well balanced' when impacts are 2,2,2 or 1,1,1, 'Small imbalance' when impacts are 2,2,1 or 1,1,2, irrespective of order; 'Absent' ('Not integrated'), when at least one domain's impact is 0, 'Fully imbalanced' ('Disintegration') when at least one impact is negative.

\*\* c is: 'Very high' when  $|\alpha| + |\beta| = 4$ ; 'Medium high' when  $|\alpha| + |\beta| = 3$ ; 'Poor' when  $|\alpha| + |\beta| = 2$ ; 'Very Poor' when  $|\alpha| + |\beta| = 1$ , 'Absent' when  $\alpha, \beta = 0$ .

\*\*\* b is: 'Balanced in weak terms' when  $\alpha = \beta$ ;  $\alpha, \beta > 0$ , 'Small imbalance in weak terms' when  $|\alpha - \beta| = 1$ , 'Moderately imbalanced in weak terms' when  $|\alpha - \beta| = 2$ ; 'Fully imbalanced in weak terms' only when some of the impacts are negative; not relevant here); 'Absent' when  $\alpha, \beta = 0$ .

The absence of balanced impacts in strong terms shows that the NEP did not contribute to the stability of the territorial relations but was also detrimental to territorial aspiration to increase b and c. The failure links to several factors, including the one-sided imposition of a supply-driven strategy against demand-driven concerns of the majority of end-users. Another factor is the not fully democratic preparation of the NEP, with an exclusion of legitimate concerns of many stakeholders from non-energy sectors. With systematic neglect for intersectorial impacts (between domains), NEP considerably constrains cooperative attitude among stakeholders in spatial planning. There is also an observable lack of knowledge and sometimes even a straightforward ignorance of the energy systems' meso-level dynamics (cf.

Schenk et al. 2007) that requires a more horizontal intersectorial approach in energy policy.

As evident in subsection III.1, the NEP's impact on  $T_q$  is medium high. The overlap  $S \cap P$  is strongly positive (score 2) because energy policy interventions that improve social conditions translate very favourably into improved indicators of territorial development, such as when energy consulting for residents translates into spatial development harmonized with spatial limitations. The impact of  $P$  on  $S$  contributes less decisively to territorial cohesion (score 1). The weak imbalance in  $T_q$  ( $b = \text{small}$ ) is associated with the regulatory model of territorial governance, which favours physical goals while remaining socially less sensitive (Golobič et al. 2008).


As initially predicted, the NEP's poorest contribution relates to the second component of territorial cohesion,  $T_i$ . The overlap  $E \cap S$  is practically nullified (score 0) from within. The impact of  $S$  on  $E$  is weakly positive (score 1), while the inverse relation falls behind even this mediocre result. Poor results on  $T_i$  are consistent with the observation that energy sector increases territorial disparities (Golobič et al. 2008) amid a concentration of activity only in selected 'energy regions' where major energy suppliers, energy dispatchers, and energy users are located. The overlap is also weakly imbalanced ( $b = \text{small}$ ) against  $S$ . Energy policy clearly neglects the social aspect both in non-overlapping and in overlapping contents, directly as well as indirectly. It becomes obvious that the NEP's impacts are systematically asocial.

Finally, the NEP's impact on territorial efficiency  $T_e$  is poor. Besides, it is also considerably imbalanced in a weak sense ( $b = \text{medium imbalanced}$ ), since economic interventions are usually constraining for a variety of other territorial functions in affected areas. The opposite impact of  $P$  on  $E$  is strongly positive because physical measures increase economic indicators of territorial integration such as by improving infrastructure and economic access. The program is in this respect also built on the imbalance – now at the expense of  $P$ . Although the program prioritises improvement in efficiency as its key objective, its examined impacts are inconsistent – it enhances economic efficiency only directly, without also improving territorial efficiency indirectly with strengthening coherence and two-sided synergies between territorial domains.

Figure 2 presents the summary evaluation results from the Table 1. The territorial impacts of the NEP do not balance in strong terms ( $B=0$ ). This means that the NEP enforces its main concerns in sectorial manner, only paying attention to direct impacts and even this selectively. Its contribution to mechanical, as vertical integration, is absent. Despite designed to meet economic interests in the first place, the best impact NEP produces is not  $E$

but P. For the coupe de grâce, the most territorially cohesive contribution of NEP, Tq, is precisely the one, which does not involve overlap with the economic domain.

Figure 2: Summary results from evaluation of the NEP's impacts on territorial integration



Source of data: Table 1. Meaning of the symbols: see footnote to Figure 1. Note: Different measurement scales apply on each level of the assessment (non-overlapping, binary overlapping, triple overlaps). See Table 1.

Mechanic and organic integration are pursued in isolation from one another that is itself detrimental factor to policy-makers ambition to achieve territorial integration. Territorial integration is not pursued in a mesoscopic manner. This at the outset worsens conditions for enhancement of the mutuality of territorial relations between domains, even though a low level of mutuality of relations between domains is not the Program's severest weakness. The relatively favourable result in b is rather confusing given the NEP's disappointing achievements in c and especially in B. Even though the NEP is principally a one-sided and incoherent instrument, it failed to subvert entirely mutuality of relations between the energy sector and territorial development. The surprising result is in part due to a relatively high level of inherited territorial development on the intersection with the energy sector, which was only one or two decades ago still governed in a significantly more horizontal, socially responsible and integrative manner.

The program's achievements are far from persuasive even in what is held in the NEP as its main criteria for measuring success, and far less so in terms

of its contribution to territorial integration. In complex conditions, as assumed in a concept of territorial integration, the NEP seems to operate largely as a self-defeating strategy.

## **5. Conclusions with discussion of implications**

The evaluation of the energy sector's contributions to territorial integration outlined that policy-makers should consider modifying their intervention logic from an economic in the energy sector and from a normativity logic in territorial governance. The two logics are vertical, therefore they necessarily immobilise one another. On a more rudimentary level, they also both prove to be ineffective in their own domains. Lastly, economic and normative rationality are largely predisposed only to increase cohesion asymmetrically, due to their characteristic reliance on the asymmetrical types of connectedness that are detrimental to achieving weak balance. The complex nature of the territorial integration suggests applying instead mesoscopic intervention logic. A new logic materializes through discovering a middle-ground between independently unfolding integration mechanisms by cohering contradictory integration mechanisms peripherally.

A high level of an energy policy's exclusion of other sectors' primary concerns is, of course, major obstacle to territorial integration. However, the one-sided economic strategy is also highly questionable from the perspective of long-term interest in the energy sector itself. Indeed, this case study could not confirm that the NEP is the most favourable for E. In a complex situation, powerful stakeholders can still impose one-sided strategies that are highly ignorant about other stakeholders' integral concerns. However, in a complex situation nobody, even the most powerful, can escape the negative consequences of one-sidedness, which requires increasing future efforts only for maintaining achieved the privileged position. What is ignored does not disappear from reality but interacts irrationally with the rest of the system in a non-linear way (Cilliers 2005) like a vicious version of an invisible hand by producing unexpected side-effects, wicked problems and hidden structures of opposition. These arise 'behind stakeholders' backs' and structurally subvert aspirations of the ignorant.

By developing three measures of integration, rational discourse about integration can extend on meso level of considerations, leaving less room for exploring an integration process as if it was hidden in a fog of micro-macro spontaneity. Direct micro to macro hermeneutics, just like the concepts of the invisible hand, aims to rationalize processes that are emergent and so at their core rationally unexplainable. There can be no definite and closed causal

explanation of such processes. By usurping the unknown and forcing rational explanations of the unexplainable with black box methodologies as its working mechanisms, these methodologies are rationalizing the unknowable. Gould (2000) could find no excuse for referring to miracles and magic in science when we fail to find any natural explanation. This is for him how a coward or a lazy person avoid defeat.

The mesoscopic explanation is different from Giddensian hermeneutics because it works with analytically objectivised contents and in vertical, as much as in horizontal direction (like Hermes, between gods, but also between people and gods). Furthermore, the hermeneutic method is not a replacement for analytical method; it is, instead, in a two-way relationship with the analytical method.<sup>16</sup> Not only can the analytical method extend its insight if evaluatively reinterpreted. The opposite also seems to hold true! The rational method must be furthered to most far end of its explanatory superiority, securing that interpretation does not interfere with what can be comprehensible already analytically.

The mesoscopic challenge of the integration seems especially relevant for Europe (Schimmelfennig et al. 2014), where diverse integration strategies are pursued simultaneously, many times against one another: Europe as social model, as civilisation, as federation, as cosmopolis, a social space, a network society, a public sphere, or as civil society (Trenz 2008). In light of radical diversity involved in multifarious integration challenge with discordant integration mechanisms in their core, the EU's aim to hybridise member states' integration strategies and develop a new philosophy of integration instead.

Take an example of principal differences between French and German spatial models of territorial governance, which seem to have inconsistent internal intervention logic. The French model is centralized and thus vertical but relies on cohesion between lower and higher levels of the administrative hierarchy. In the mesoscopic approach, vertical structures integrate by balancing on the same level of consideration, not by cohesion between levels. On the other side, the German integration model is horizontal among its federal units but it nevertheless relies on a balance between them. However, according to mesoscopic methodology, horizontal integration results from cohesion, not from balancing. The hybrid integration model of the EU could overcome the narrow intervention logics involved in the dissimilar national

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<sup>16</sup> Karl Popper worked with a concept of 'an objective hermeneutics' (in *Objective Knowledge* 1972).

spatial models with adopting more connective and more consistent the mesoscopic integration approach on EU level.

Application of the mesoscopic approach has profound implications on framing integration challenge. Mesoscopic methodology links contradictory integration strategies in an indirect way, by irrationally inverting their classical tasks. Mechanical integration is indispensable for providing strong balance. However, B alone is far too divisive an aspect of integration when implemented directly, by imposing order top down. Mesoscopic logic gives ground for enhancing mechanical integration in an indirect way instead, simply by lowering the threshold of mechanical integration (Münch in Trezn 2008). That is, by promoting primary goals decreasingly with exclusionary means such as with amplifying in systemic fairness, by emphasising communicative action, sharing culture and inclusiveness that equalise differentiated chances to act (Eder 1992) for all, thus improving B indirectly, by first improving b. The most mechanically integrative, therefore, will be those vertical interventions that can achieve their primary aspirations by simultaneously improving the conditions for a higher level of mutuality of relations in organic, non-structured interactions between individuals and between narrow groups. By progressively relaxing its exclusionary character, mechanical integration could increasingly emerge in a horizontal way.

Historical examples of expanding social integration by the essentially decreased exclusionary character of mechanical integration, are rather abundant. Social cohesion fundamentally improved with the abolishment of slavery and the outlawing of racism. Former black slaves become citizens, voters, soldiers, customers, taxpayers, with essentially extended civic capacity, which enhanced and deepened organic relations among members of concerned societies. Granting voting and political rights to women is another case. Since the end of the Second World War, we have witnessed in Europe the provision of basic human rights, including full gender equality and the special needs of children and other vulnerable groups, as a key driver for further social integration. In an information society, unused integrative potential lies in free access to information such as relevant to the general public as an instrument of transparent public governance. Further increase in mutuality of relations seems to call also for guaranteeing economic safety for all members of societies, irrespective of their direct involvement, and especially independently of their productive contribution, e.g. by an introduction of an unconditional basic income to every citizen (Van Parijs 2001).

The analogous kind of mesoscopic transposition is important also for organic integration. The possibility for achieving high territorial cohesion

merely by increasing *c*, irrespective of *b*, is also severely limited. The organic interactions cannot become sustainable if interactions are socially alienating for at least some of those involved if not for the majority – social disintegration amid market globalisation is a relevant example. In view of the Council of Europe's European Committee for Social Cohesion, a cohesive society is a community of mutual support made up of individuals pursuing their own goals by producing collectively valued outcomes (2004 in ECLAC 2007). The most horizontally integrative are then those initiatives for cohesion and those organic integration practices that best improve *b*, a weak balance between vertical domains. Horizontal to the vertical transposition of integration forces materializes with socially responsible behaviours when individuals interact and cooperate in a way that they also strengthen the structural order in a vertical direction. For instance, when I take in cooperative actions a more ethical and socially responsible account of others' legitimate aspirations even if they are not present and cannot penalize me when I am ignorant for their legitimate expectations.

To summarise! Vertical integration transforms with enhancing *b* into horizontal integration, and horizontal integration, in the same manner, transforms into vertical integration. *b* arises in a mesoscopic model of integration as a medium for enhancing *B* and *c*. An integration formula at meso level is then straightforward: a given policy is most integrative when it is strengthening *b* in a mechanical and in an organic integration in all integration domains simultaneously. This finding gives ground for mesoscopic modifying the Giddensian two-part integration mechanism. Organic integration is, via enhancing *b*, a framework for mechanical integration, which itself is a framework for organic integration only via enhancing *b*. Contradictory forces of social integration can produce integrative results only when their outcomes simultaneously strengthen mutuality of relations. *b* is then the central category in the mesoscopic model of social or territorial integration.

The first two case studies aimed to demonstrate that a complex social system could successfully connect its elements without wasting their constitutive diversity. Complexity needs not to be a driver of social systems' fragmentation, but in fact, just the opposite. Mesoscopic (ir)rationality develops extensive connective and integration potentials, not despite but precisely because one understands contemporary society as increasingly a complex system.

## Appendix 1: List of the NEP's policy measures and STDS's goals

### I. STDS's goals (Golobič, Marot 2011):

#### **E- Economic goals**

C01: Rational and effective spatial development

C03: Increased competitiveness of Slovenian towns in Europe

C06: Development of complementary functions of rural and urban areas

C07: Integration of infrastructure corridors with the EU infrastructure systems

#### **S - Socio-cultural goals**

C02: Polycentric development of the network of cities, towns and other settlements

C05: Harmonious development of areas with common spatial development characteristics

C10: Cultural diversity as the foundation of national spatial identity

#### **P - Physical goals**

C04: High-quality development and attractiveness of cities, towns and other settlements

C08: Prudent use of natural resources

C09: Spatial development harmonized with spatial limitations

C11: Nature conservation

C12: Environmental protection

### II. NEP's measures (Golobič, Marot 2011):

#### **E - Economic measures**

M1.1.1: Long-term production of lignite in the Velenje mine

M1.2.1: Long-term production of electricity in the Nuclear Power Plant Krško

M1.4.1: Construction of a hydro power-plant on the lower Sava River

M1.4.2: Construction of the pumped-storage hydro power plants Avče and Kozjak

M1.5.2: Investments into new production units in the Zasavje region

M2.3.1: Enabling access to cross-border transmission possibilities

G2: Development of a modern, safe, transparent and efficient energy market

G3: Deregulation of the gas market

#### **S - Socio-cultural measures**

M2.1.1: Rules for defining market prices and the purchase of electricity from the qualified producers

M2.3.3: Definition of the share of each production source for the electricity

M3.2.2: Rules for rational use of energy during heating, cooling of buildings & water heating

M3.7.2: Project Energy consulting for inhabitants

M3.12.1: Foundation of the Faculty of Energy Technology

M3.12.2: Project Children changing energy culture

M3.14.1: Non-governmental organizations in the field of energy provision

M3.6.16: Programs supporting transparency, openness, education, promotion and qualification process, and pilot projects

G1: Mechanisms of guarantying the technically reliable functioning of energy networks and the increase of energy provision quality

### **P - Physical measures**

M 3.1.2: Action program to decrease greenhouse gas emissions by 2012

M3.3.3: Supporting environmental investments

M3.6.1: Project GEF–Removing barriers to increased use of biomass as an energy source

M3.6.2: Obligatory local energy concepts

M3.11.1: Regulation in energy efficiency of non-industrial buildings

M3.2.8: Financial incentives for increasing energy efficiency of existing buildings and the sustainable construction of buildings in the service sector and industry

M3.6.12: Financial incentives for the energy efficient systems for the heating of households and service sector buildings

G4: Projects for the increase of renewable energy's share in production of electricity and provision of the heat

G5: Assessment of use of fossil fuels in all heating uses.

Appendix 2: Leopold's matrix of the NEP measures' impacts on STDS's goals, by three domains of territorial integration (E, S, P), average of experts' assessment on a scale from very negative (-2) to very positive (+2).

STDS Goals (evaluation criteria)		E				S			P				
		C01	C03	C06	C07	C02	C05	C10	C04	C08	C09	C11	C12
E	M1.1.1	-0,09	0,03	0,01	0,01	0,22	0,12	0,06	-0,07	-0,60	-0,05	-0,17	-0,76
	M1.2.1	0,88	0,45	-0,25	0,48	-0,09	-0,20	-0,04	-0,27	0,40	-0,13	-0,22	0,58
	M1.4.1	0,74	0,14	0,30	0,14	0,17	0,11	-0,10	0,16	0,39	0,09	-0,23	0,44
	M1.4.2	0,17	0,06	0,28	0,29	0,01	0,03	0,00	-0,10	0,25	0,00	-0,23	0,32
	M1.5.2	0,51	0,06	0,03	0,01	0,29	0,11	0,04	-0,04	0,03	-0,04	-0,15	0,13
	M2.3.1	0,82	0,49	0,00	1,94	0,13	0,16	0,00	0,00	-0,41	0,00	-0,17	-0,17
	G2	0,65	0,65	0,16	1,15	0,32	0,00	0,00	0,16	0,82	0,00	0,49	0,82
	G3	0,33	0,38	0,00	1,31	-0,17	0,20	0,00	0,49	0,32	0,00	0,16	0,65
S	M2.1.1	0,16	0,49	0,00	-0,17	0,00	0,16	0,00	0,32	0,61	0,00	0,05	0,05
	M2.3.3	0,16	0,16	0,16	0,16	0,00	0,16	0,00	0,16	0,65	0,00	0,16	0,82
	M3.2.2	0,86	0,86	0,00	0,00	0,27	0,59	0,39	1,43	1,24	0,27	0,59	1,54
	M3.7.2	0,65	0,32	0,16	0,00	0,32	0,16	0,00	0,98	0,82	0,16	0,32	1,29
	M3.12.1	0,51	0,56	0,00	0,20	0,90	0,32	0,00	0,12	0,49	0,32	-0,17	0,32
	M3.12.2	0,32	0,16	0,16	0,00	0,16	0,16	0,33	0,32	0,65	0,16	0,49	0,65
	M3.14.1	0,50	0,32	0,32	0,00	0,16	0,16	0,00	0,49	0,65	0,16	0,49	0,98
	M3.6.16	0,82	0,16	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,16	0,16	0,32	1,13	0,23	0,65	1,13
	NEP G1	0,82	0,56	0,16	0,98	0,32	0,32	0,00	0,98	0,43	0,32	0,16	0,49
P	M3.1.2	1,13	0,49	0,49	0,49	0,49	0,32	0,65	0,82	1,47	0,49	0,32	1,41
	M3.3.3	1,05	0,90	0,65	0,32	0,49	0,49	0,16	1,20	1,45	0,32	0,98	1,78
	M3.6.1	0,98	0,39	0,49	0,00	0,16	0,49	0,16	0,56	1,62	0,65	0,42	1,31
	M3.6.2	0,94	0,49	1,08	0,14	0,45	0,72	0,35	0,68	1,32	0,42	0,11	1,15
	M3.11.1	1,45	1,08	1,29	0,00	1,08	0,98	0,26	1,29	1,55	0,58	0,56	1,45
	M3.2.8	1,22	0,86	0,00	0,00	0,47	0,27	0,19	1,24	1,35	0,27	0,59	1,35
	M3.6.12	1,06	0,86	0,39	0,00	0,19	0,19	0,19	1,16	1,16	0,39	0,59	1,18
	G4	0,97	0,32	0,98	0,32	0,16	0,49	0,10	0,32	0,98	0,32	0,22	0,65
	G5	0,65	0,49	0,65	0,16	0,49	0,42	0,49	0,98	1,31	0,65	0,88	1,62

Source of data: Golobič et al. 2008.

Note: Average assessment results in Appendix 2 were translated on 5 grade scale to obtain the input-output matrix (in Table 1, Section I): from 0,00 to 0,20 = 0, from 0,21 to 0,50 = 1; from 0,51 to 1,00 = 2.

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## THE DETERMINANT OF THE WESTERNESS AND NON-WESTERNESS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES

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***Abstract:** Western IR theories nearly absolutely dominate the sub-sub-field of International Relations Theory. However, in recent times, there have been, and there are, attempts to discover or develop theories of IR that are non-Western. This paper argues that in order to determine that an IR theory is Western or non-Western we must rely on 'the principle of origination.' Essentially, the principle of origination says an IR theory is African only if it originates from Africa, an IR theory is Western only if it originates from the West, an IR theory is Chinese only if it originates from China, etc.*

***Keywords:** African IR Theories, IR Theory, Non-Western IR Theories; Thucydides, Western IR Theories*

### 1. Introduction

Theories of International Relations (IR) explain how international relations work or how states behave in the international arena. Western theories of IR such as realism or neo-realism, liberalism or neo-liberalism, English School or International Society and constructivism or social constructivism nearly absolutely dominate the sub-sub-field of International Relations Theory. However, in recent times, there have been, and there are, attempts to discover or develop theories of IR that are non-Western. Africa and Asia are some places where such attempt is going on. But the question is: How do we determine that an IR theory is non-Western? This paper is aimed at wrestling with this question.

In order to determine that an IR theory is non-Western, I will rely on a combination of theoretical analysis and historical analysis to explain and illustrate how to determine that an IR theory is non-Western. Ultimately, I will use what I refer to as 'the principle of origination' to judge whether an IR theory is Western or non-Western. Essentially, the principle of origination says that the 'Westernness' of Western IR theories or what makes Western IR theories Western is that they originate from the West. The 'Africaness' of

African IR theory or what makes an African IR theory African is that it originates from Africa. And the 'Asianess' of Asian IR theory or what makes an Asian IR theory Asian is that it originates from Asia. In other words, the principle of origination says an IR theory is African only if it originates from Africa, an IR theory is Western only if it originates from the West, an IR theory is Chinese only if it originates from China, etc.

The main discussion in this paper is done in the second, third, fourth and fifth sections. In the second section, I explain what IR theory is and what it does. Deductively, this explanation of what IR theory is and what it does is meant to help us understand what a non-Western IR theory will look like and what it will be doing when and where such theory exists. In the third section, I discuss Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* thematically in order to simultaneously show us a classical, pioneer and seminal theory of IR. While the discussion in the second section is an *abstract* theoretical explanation of IR theory, the discussion in the third section is a *historical* theoretical illustration of what an IR theory is.

The *historical* theoretical illustration in the third section is a positive case of IR theory, that is, it shows when and where an IR theory exists and how it looks like. Conversely, in the fourth section, I present a *historical* theoretical illustration which shows when and where an IR theory does not exist. While the former illustration in the third section is a *positive* case, the latter illustration in the fourth section is a *negative* case. Then, in the fifth section, I rely on the theoretical and historical analysis in the previous sections to determine the Westernness and non-Westerness of IR theories. The discussion starts with an interrogation of what is Western about Western IR theories. The result of this interrogation of what is Western about Western IR theories helps compare the 'Westernness' of Western IR theories to the 'non-Westerness' of any existing, possible or plausible IR theories that qualify as non-Western IR theories.

## **2. International Relations Theory and Its Function**

In Karl Popper's (2002) terms, a theory is a result of hypothesis which is falsifiable but has been corroborated by observation. But when the hypothesis is falsified, then it is an erroneous theory or it does not even qualify to be a theory at all in the first place. In other words, theories are products of conjectures, and are only viable if or when the conjectures are confirmed (Waltz 1979). On the other hand, theory can be defined as a statement that explains laws (Waltz 1979). In a nutshell, theories in the first sense of the definition mainly perform the function of description (descriptive

function), and theories in the second sense of the definition mainly perform the function of explanation (explanatory function). If we understand theory to be: “a system of ideas based on general principles designed to organise thought and to explain or justify something” (Rizzo et al. 2003, 549); the explanation of “the occurrences seen and the associations recorded” (Waltz 1979, 9); and the explanation of “why those associations obtain” (Waltz 1979, 5); then we will understand that the essence of a theory is to explain “a particular behaviour or phenomenon” (Waltz 1979, 1). In other words, the primary function of theory is explanatory. Therefore, of theories, we ask how helpful they are in performing explanatory functions.

Whether IR theory or non- IR theory, what qualifies a theory to be called a theory is that it is capable of explaining the behaviour of a certain phenomenon which it claims to explain or which it is created or developed to explain. The phenomena whose behaviour IR theories claim to explain or the phenomena whose behaviour IR theories are created or developed to explain are states. Phenomena do not exhibit their behaviour in a vacuum, that is, they do not behave or act in a vacuum; they always act in a certain domain. Therefore, theories do not explain the behaviour of phenomena in a vacuum, they always explain the behaviour of phenomena in a certain domain. The domain in which states exhibit their behaviour, that is, the domain in which states behave or act is the international arena and the domain in which IR theories explain the behaviour of states is the international arena.

In the domain in which they exhibit their behaviour, phenomena do not act non-relationally; they always act in relation to other phenomena. A phenomenon might be dependent or independent on another phenomenon or other phenomena, it might have close association or loose association with another phenomenon or other phenomena, but it does not act non-relationally in the domain in which it exhibits its behaviour; it always acts relationally to another phenomenon or to other phenomena. Therefore, theories do not explain the behaviour(s) of a phenomenon or phenomena in its domain or in their domains non-relationally, rather theories explain such behaviour(s) in relation to the behaviour of another phenomenon or other phenomena within the same domain.

Theories can, and do, explain the behaviour of phenomena within a particular domain in relation to certain phenomena outside that particular domain. But this is a secondary function in the explanatory function of theories. The primary function is to explain the behaviour of phenomena within a particular domain in relation to the behaviour of other phenomena within that same domain. Therefore, the primary function of IR theories is to explain the behaviour of states in the international arena in relation to the

behaviour of other states within that same international arena. For an IR theory, whether African IR theory, Asian IR theory or Western IR theory, to be 'worth its salt' it must be able to explain the behaviour of states in the international arena.

I have been proceeding with the discussion as if states are the only actors in world politics. I have been proceeding, as if in a realist manner, by focusing on states as if they were the only relevant actors in world politics. States might be the dominant actors in world politics, as realists and neo-realists would have it and as liberals and neo-liberals would agree; but they are not the only relevant actors in world politics, as liberals and neo-liberals have pointed out. Nevertheless, in this paper, I am not *broadly* concerned about theories of global politics which explain the behaviour of the various relevant actors in *global* politics at the *global* arena. Rather I am concerned about *international* relations theories which explain the behaviour of states (the dominant actors in *international* politics) at the *international* arena (Abumere 2015a).

In comparative terms, the terms international relations and international politics might be likened to the jet-age while the term global politics might be likened to the computer-age. But the former, in comparison to the latter, is not quite the stone-age (Abumere 2015a). I personally prefer the term global politics to the terms international relations and international politics because the former is more accurate and more helpful in understanding our current global system and politics (Abumere 2015a). But the latter is more appropriate for the subject matter of our discussion. In view of the foregoing discussion, the most prominent IR theories are realism or neo-realism, liberalism or neo-liberalism, constructivism or social constructivism, English School or International Society, and critical theories such as Marxism, feminism, and post-colonialism.

Moreover, there is no one way of looking at the workings of the international arena in terms of its organisation, arrangement, constitution or behaviour.

Throughout the history of the modern states system there have been three competing traditions of thought: the Hobbesian or realist tradition, which views international politics as a state of war; the Kantian or universalist tradition, which sees at work in international politics a potential community of mankind; and the Grotian or internationalist tradition, which views international politics as taking place within an international society (Bull 1995, 23).

Hedley Bull (1995) argues that while the Hobbesian or realist tradition is one extreme, and the Kantian or universalist tradition is another extreme, the

Grotian or internationalist tradition is the intermediate point between the two extremes.

The Grotian tradition describes international politics in terms of a society of states or international society. As against the Hobbesian tradition, the Grotians contend that states are not engaged in simple struggle, like gladiators in an arena, but are limited in their conflicts with one another by common rules and institutions. But as against the Kantian or universalist perspective the Grotians accept the Hobbesian premise that sovereigns or states are the principal reality in international politics; the immediate members of international society are states rather than individual human beings (Bull 1995, 25).

While in the Hobbesian tradition international politics is characterized by “complete conflict of interest between states,” and in the Kantian tradition international politics is characterized by “complete identity of interest between states,” in the Grotian tradition international politics is characterised by:

a game that is partly distributive but also partly productive. The particular international activity which, on the Grotian view, best typifies international activity as a whole is neither war between states, nor horizontal conflict cutting across the boundaries of states, but trade – or, more generally, economic and social intercourse between one country and another (Bull 1995, 25).

Finally, if we employ Martin Wight’s (1991) traditions of international theory, we still have at least three possible ways of looking at the international arena. Wight’s traditions of international theory are Realist/Machiavellian, Rationalist/Grotian and Revolutionist/Kantian (Wight 1991). Similarly, employing Alexander Wendt’s (1999) cultures of anarchy, we have Hobbesian culture, Lockean culture and Kantian culture. Therefore, these three cultures show that there are at least three possible ways of looking at the international arena.

In the foregoing discussion, I explained what theory is and what theory does as a prelude to our discussion on what IR theory is and what IR theory does. Deductively from our discussion of what theory is and what theory does, I explain what IR theory is and what IR theory does. This is meant to help us understand what non-Western IR theories will be like and what they will be doing when and where they exist. In the next section of the paper, I will engage in a thematic presentation or discussion of Thucydides’ *History of the Peloponnesian War*. This discussion will show that there are certain theoretic features which make Thucydides’ thesis an IR theory, and except non-

Western theories, ideologies, and written and oral international histories possess those theoretic features, they are not qualified to be IR theories.

### **3. Historical Theoretical Illustration of International Relations Theory: A Positive Case**

Thucydides is the founding father of International Relations Theory. His *History of the Peloponnesian War* (1972) is the first book on International Relations Theory (Abumere 2015b, 181). He chronicles the twenty-seven-year-war that was fought between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians in the late fifth century BC. In his chronicle, firstly, he juxtaposes the 'official cause' with the 'real cause' of the war. Secondly, he juxtaposes power with right. Thirdly, he juxtaposes peace/security with justice. Finally, he explains the importance of coalition (Abumere 2015b). In the first juxtaposition, he argues that official reasons given for fighting the war were actually not the reason why the war was fought (Thucydides 1972). He describes the violation of some legal codes and many other reasons which were cited for *the reasons* for fighting the war; he argued that actually those reasons were neither necessary nor sufficient to fight the war (Thucydides 1972). Such reasons were only given by the Peloponnesians because they wanted to appear, and be perceived as being, objective in their decision to fight their neighbour – Athens (Abumere 2015b).

Thucydides argues that “the war was actually waged by the Peloponnesians for a selfish reason. Hence, the reason was concealed. Having observed the non-ceasing growth of Athens, the Peloponnesians were afraid that someday Athens will grow so strong that it will be able to easily destroy the Peloponnesians if it wants” (Abumere 2015b, 181). Thus, the Peloponnesians decided to wage a preventive war – to fight Athenians now that Athens is still relatively weak rather than when it becomes too strong (Thucydides 1972). His assumption is that “*poleis* are rational and self-regarding. This can be seen in the case of the Peloponnesians who waged a preventive war. And it can be seen in the case of Athens which ‘will attack’ the Peloponnesians when it is capable. This is the first lesson realists learned from Thucydides – that states will always be rational and self-regarding even to the detriment of other states” (Abumere 2015b, 181). Nevertheless, it remains debatable “whether the Athenians would have actually attacked the Peloponnesians. However, being rational, Peloponnesians did not have to wait to see what the Athenians would actually do; they had to act fast”

(Abumere 2015b). In essence, this first juxtaposition explains 'preventive war.'

The second juxtaposition is contained in the Melian Dialogue (Thucydides 1972). The powerful Athens went to weak Melos in order to invade and take over the latter. Athens offered Melos two options; a peaceful surrender or a resistance that will entail the destruction of Melos by Athens. Although Athens advised Melos to choose a peace surrender, Melos chose resistance because the Melians felt Athens was waging an unjust war against them. Moreover, they thought that "the gods would come to their aid because they were not the aggressors and they were only in justice resisting the Athenians. However, as it turned out, the Melians were destroyed without the gods coming to their aid" (Abumere 2015b, 181-182). The theoretical explanation of this second juxtaposition is one of the tenets and pillars of realism. In international politics, peace and security are preferred to justice. Invading and taking "over Melos was essential for the Athenians in order to have a chance of winning the war, and winning the war would ensure the peace and security of Athens. Hence, although it was unjust, the Athenians had to destroy Melos. For the Melians, opting for peace and security would have averted the destruction while opting for justice did nothing to help them" (Abumere 2015b, 181-182).

In the third juxtaposition, the Peloponnesians had no right to attack Athens, but they did because they had the power. Athens had no right to attack Melos, but it did because it had the power. Melos had the right to defend itself, but the right did not count; the only thing that counted was the power of Athens" (Abumere 2015b, 181-182). This 'might makes right' realist principle abounds in our world even today. This principle is the grounds for Thucydides' (1972) final principle which is 'coalition.' On the one hand, Athens formed the Delian League by entering a coalition with some *poleis*. On the other hand, the Peloponnesians formed the Peloponnesian League. While the Delian League was led by Athens, the Peloponnesian League was led by Sparta. By this principle of coalition, Thucydides essentially explains the realist notions of balance of power, balancing and bandwagoning (Abumere 2015b).

Essentially, Thucydides (1972) propounded the theory of realism. His *History of the Peloponnesian War* is not just a history of Greek city-states, or a mere international history of Greek city-states. More than a mere description of the relationship between Athens and Sparta, and the relationship between the Athenian League and the Delian League, he theorises about the relationships. He establishes principles emanating from the behaviour of Athens and Sparta, and the Athenian League and the Delian league, and then generalises these principles to apply to not only Athens and Sparta, and not

only the Athenian League and the Delian League, but to states in general. He simultaneously describes and explains the behaviour of Athens and Sparta, and the Athenian League and the Delian League, and then asserts the non-peculiarity of the behaviour to Athens, Sparta, the Athenian League, and the Delian League. Importantly, he asserts the generalisation and applicability of these behaviours to states in general. Therefore, the generality and universality of Thucydides' international history of Greek city-states, rather than any form of particularity and peculiarity in the international history of Greek city-states, is what makes Thucydides' thesis in the *History of the Peloponnesian War*, or his description and explanation of the history of the Peloponnesian war, a theory of International Relations.

#### **4. Historical Theoretical Illustration of International Relations Theory: A Negative Case**

In the previous section, I thematically discussed Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*. I consider such historical theoretical illustration of international relations theory a positive case as explained in Section 1. Now, as explained in Section 1, I will present a negative case. Pre-contemporary Africa is my negative case. Note that in contemporary Africa there are African IR theories. Therefore, the argument in this section is not that there is no such thing as an African IR theory. Rather, for the purposes of illustration, this section uses pre-contemporary Africa to show when and where an IR theory does not exist in contradistinction to Thucydides' international history of Greek city-states.

Given that there are many written and oral histories of African empires, kingdoms, emirates, sultanates, quasi-states, pseudo-states and states, it might be argued that just as Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* is considered to be theorisation about international relations and his thesis is seen as an IR theory, such African written and oral histories should be considered as theorisations about international relations and their theses should be seen as IR theories. My discussion of Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* shows that there are certain theoretic features which make Thucydides' thesis an IR theory, and except the above-mentioned African written and oral histories possess those theoretic features, they are not qualified to be IR theories.

In pre-colonial Africa, given that there were no states as we understand the concept of state now, it might be argued that one cannot do international historical study of pre-colonial Africa and one cannot talk of international relations in pre-colonial Africa because international relations are relations

between states or among states. Although this argument, *prima facie*, carries some weight, it is only lightweight. If we were to accept this argument, then we will have to accept the argument that international history and international relations were not what Thucydides was doing when he was writing the *History of the Peloponnesian War* and that the Greek city states had no international history and there were no international relations among them because they were not states as we understand states now.

In pre-colonial Africa, there were empires, kingdoms, emirates and sultanates that were complex and sophisticated like the Greek city states. Histories abound of these empires, kingdoms, emirates and sultanates, and in these histories, we see how these empires, kingdoms, emirates and sultanates had clearly bounded, bordered and well-defined geographical territories, were organized political communities or defined groups of people, had governments and had monopoly of the legitimate use of force over their organized political communities or defined groups of people within their defined geographical territories. If we may use contemporary language, they had internal and external sovereignty. Nevertheless, while there were Empires, Kingdoms, Emirates and Sultanates that have these characteristics of state, there were societies that lack these characteristics.

While there are histories of these 'states' or 'entities', and there are 'international histories describing their trades, wars, relationships, etc. with one another, there is no known theorizing about how states behave, say, as Thucydides theorised about states' behaviour. In spite of the international history of pre-colonial Africa and despite the international relations among pre-colonial African empires, kingdoms, emirates and sultanates, there is no known IR theory that originated from Africa. Consequently, at this juncture, the best we can do is to discuss how pre-colonial African empires, kingdoms, emirates and sultanates behaved internationally in pre-colonial times. But this will be tantamount to doing IR theory about pre-colonial Africa rather than discovering an IR theory that originated from Africa or rather than developing an African IR theory. As will become clearer in the next section, doing IR theory about Africa does not necessarily make it African and is not sufficient to make it African. Therefore, we cannot be said to have discovered or developed an African IR theory; neither an African IR as such nor an African IR theory that explains the behaviour of the relevant actors in pre-colonial Africa.

Let us move from pre-colonial Africa to colonial Africa in our search for African IR theories. From early colonial Africa, through mid-colonial Africa, to late colonial Africa, what we can find are not African IR theories: rather, on the practical level, we find the 'behaviour' of states or entities; and, on the

theoretical level, we find the political ideologies and political philosophies of states or entities and leaders and scholars. The IR theories that can be employed, in fact, the IR theories that scholars have employed to study these three periods (pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial) of African international history and the three periods (early colonial, mid-colonial and late colonial) of colonial Africa are Western IR theories.

From the colonial period to the post-colonial period, we have Léopold Sédar Senghor's (1993) *négritude*, Kwame Nkrumah's (1970) *consciencism*, Julius Nyerere's (1968) *ujamaa*, Kenneth Kaunda's (1963) *humanism*, Southern African *ubuntuism*, etc. but these do not pass for IR theories because they do not explain the behaviour of states at the international arena. They are only political ideologies and political philosophies. They were interested in one or more things among interpersonal relationship, communal relationship, and the proper way to structure or organize societies, how Africans should behave, how African states should behave, and how the African continent should behave. Even the *prescription* of how Africans, African states and the African continent should behave does not pass for doing IR theory because it does not meet the tenets of IR theory.

Such political ideologies and political philosophies about how African states should behave do not meet the tenets of IR theory because: (i) they are concerned with *prescription* rather than *explanation*; (ii) they lack 'generalizability' and universality – they are only concerned about African states and the African continent without generalizing or universalizing their prescribed principles to the global arena. Regarding (i), having prescription as a concern is not the problem; but the problem is that explanation is not the concern. IR theories can tell us what international politics *ought to be*, some of them actually tell us what international politics ought to be; but, over and above telling us what international politics ought to be, they tell us what international politics *is*. Regarding (ii), the principles did not apply to non-African states. Even when Thucydides was concerned with Athens and Sparta or the Delian League and the Peloponnesian League or the Peloponnesian War, he generalizes or universalizes or argues that his principles apply to the rest of the world by arguing that states or city-states, generally or universally, behave like Athens and Sparta.

Nationalism and pan-Africanism too, like the aforementioned political ideologies and political philosophies, are not IR theories. For they do not explain how states behave in the international arena, rather they are at various times, at various places and in different circumstances political ideologies, political philosophies, ideological movements and political movements. Even non-alignment which quintessentially guided the

relationship of African states to the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies during the Second World War is mere foreign policy rather than any form of IR theory. After all, this foreign policy of non-alignment originated from India rather than Africa; African states were socialized into it by India.

Even in postcolonial Africa what we can find is not an IR theory that originated from Africa. What we can find is that Africans and non-Africans use Western IR theories to study the behaviour of African states. To see the behaviour of African states and non-African states, and to see how the international system functions, some use the lens of realism or neo-realism, some use the lens of liberalism or neo-liberalism, some use the lens of the English school or international society, some use the lens of constructivism, some use the lens of critical theories whether Marxism, feminism or post-colonialism, and others even combine the lenses of two or more theories.

More often than not, generalisations and a sweep of history are implausible. But there are a few times or a few cases in which they are plausible. One of the few times or few cases in which they are plausible is when the sort of analysis that I did in this section is being done. Space and time would not permit me to go into detailed analysis of pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial Africa. The length of this article did not allow me to do detailed analysis. Nevertheless, all the theoretical and historical analysis I have done in this section, and all the arguments and discussions contained in this section, and all the comparisons and logical deductions contained in this section can be summarised as follows: From pre-colonial Africa, through colonial Africa (from early period, through mid-period to late period) to post-colonial Africa and pre-contemporary Africa, we can conclusively assert the following: there is no IR theory that originated from Africa; hence there is no African IR theory in those periods.

## **5. The Westernness of Western IR Theories and the Non-Westernness of Non-Western IR Theories**

What is non-Western about non-Western IR theory? When is an IR theory non-Western? Is an IR theory non-Western when, or because, it is done by non-Westerns? Is it non-Western when, or because, it is done in non-West? Or is it non-Western when, or because, it is done about non-West? For an IR theory to be non-Western, it is not sufficient that it is done by non-Westerners. Africans and Asians do Western IR theories. But this does not make those theories African and Asian. Therefore, that an IR theory is done by Africans or Asians does not necessarily make it African or Asian. For an IR

theory to be African or Asian, it is not sufficient that it is done in Africa or Asia. Western IR theories are done in Africa and Asia, but this does not make them African or Asian. Therefore, that an IR theory is done in Africa or Asia does not necessarily make it African or Asian. For an IR theory to be African or Asian, it is not sufficient that it is done about Africa or Asia. Western IR theories are done about Africa and Asia, but this does not make them African or Asian. Therefore, that an IR theory is done about Africa or Asia does not necessarily make it African or Asian.

A helpful way to determine what is non-Western about non-Western IR theories or when an IR theory is non-Western is to look at why Western IR theories are called Western. If it is true or correct - as I have asserted - that an IR theory is done by Africans or Asians is not sufficient to make it African or Asian, and does not necessarily make it African or Asian, then it follows that Western IR theories are not so-called *merely* because they are done by Westerners. If it is true or correct - as I have asserted - that an IR theory is done in Africa or Asia is not sufficient to make it African or Asian, and does not necessarily make it African or Asian, it follows that Western IR theories are not so-called *merely* because they are done in the West. If it is true or correct - as I have asserted - that an IR theory is done about Africa or Asia is not sufficient to make it African or Asian, and does not necessarily make it African or Asian, it follows that Western IR theories are not so-called *merely* because they are done about the West.

Western IR theories are primarily, among other reasons, called Western because they originated from the West. That Western IR theories are done by Westerners is not the primary reason why they are called Western IR theories; for they are done by non-Westerners including Africans and Asians. That Western IR theories are done in the West is not the primary reason why they are called Western IR theories; for they are done in the non-West including Africa and Asia. That Western IR theories are done about the West is not the primary reason they are called Western IR theories; for they are done about the non-West including Africa and Asia. Historically, Western IR theories: (i) originated from the West; (ii) were developed by Westerners; (iii) were done by Westerners; (iv) were done in the West; (v) and were done about the West. Among these five historical facts, only the first and second facts remain constant, the third, fourth and fifth facts are no longer constant. Currently, the facts remain that Western IR theories (i) originated from the West (ii) and were developed by Westerners. But Western IR theories are no longer done: (iii) by Westerners *alone*; (iv) in the West *alone*; (v) and about the West *alone*.

Realism – the most prominent IR theory - was developed by Thucydides in the Greek city states, hence it is Western. Whether we term realism to be ‘Hobbesian tradition’ as Bull (1995) did, or we term it to be ‘Machiavellian tradition’ as Wight (1991) did, it is still an origination of the West because Thomas Hobbes (1651) developed his theory in England and Niccolò Machiavelli (1611) developed his theory in Florence. The contemporary form of classical realism, namely neo-realism, was developed by Kenneth Waltz (1979) in the United States of America; hence it is regarded as Western.

Liberalism was developed by Immanuel Kant (1724[1795]) in Prussia, therefore it originated from the West. The contemporary form of liberalism, namely neo-liberalism as developed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1977), originated from the United States of America. Thus, it too is regarded to be Western. What Bull (1995) refers to as the Grotian tradition as developed by Hugo Grotius originated from the Netherlands, and what Wendt (1999) refers to as the Lockean tradition as developed by John Locke originated from England. Hence these traditions are considered to be Western. The contemporary form of the Grotian tradition, namely the English School or International Society (Bull 1995) originated from the West. Constructivism (Onuf 1989) originated from the West. Critical theories such as Marxism and feminism originated from the West, and it is because of their origination from the West that they are said to be Western IR theories. In spite of Africa’s experience of colonialism, even post-colonialism - one of the critical theories – did not originate from Africa.

In a nutshell, the principle of origination is the principal determinant or determining factor of what makes an IR theory African or non-African, Western or non-Western, Eastern or non-Eastern, Asian or non-Asian, Chinese or non-Chinese, Latin American or non-Latin American, etc. Just as Western IR theories are so-called because they originated from the West, what makes an IR theory non-Western is that it originates from non-West. In other words, an IR theory is African when it originates from Africa and it is Asian when it originates from Asia. Therefore, to determine when certain IR theories are non-Western IR theories, we simply need to check whether the IR theories originated from non-West.

## **6. Conclusion**

I argued that the principle of origination is what determines the Westernness and non-Westerness of IR theories. Having understood the primary function of theory to be explanatory, I logically deduced that the function of IR theories is to explain the behaviour of states in international politics. It is based on this

standard that I judged what a non-Western IR theory will be like and what its function will be when and where it exists. To say that an IR theory is non-Western in the sense that it originates from non-West is to say that it is quintessentially different from Western IR theories. This is to say the theory is not realism or neo-realism, liberalism or neo-liberalism, constructivism or social constructivism, English School or International Society, or one of the Western critical theories.

Finally, it might not be *necessary* to have non-Western IR theories, but it is *helpful* to have them. In other words, on the one hand, it might not be *essential* to have non-Western IR theories because Western IR theories suffice to explain the behaviour of states in international politics. On the other hand, it is *desirable* to have non-Western IR theories because such theories are likely to reflect the international histories of non-Western states more than Western IR theories. Consequently, in comparison to Western IR theories, non-Western IR theories may be the optimum when we are explaining the behaviour of non-Western states in international politics. Therefore, the onus is on those who are at once non-Westerners and international relations theorists to continue the development of IR theories, which based on the principle of origination, are truly qualified to be called non-Western IR theories.

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## IMPORTANCE AND ROLE OF TURKEY IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

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**Abstract:** *The article deals with historical relations between Turkey and the Western Balkans. The purpose of this thesis is Turkish influence and significance in the Balkans. Over the long period of time, Turkey remains to be an important player in this area: firstly, as a conqueror, then as mediator of regional stabilization (during the last war) and lately economic power and investor in this area. Hence, Turkish strategic vision, created by Ahmed Davutoğlu, has rediscovered Turkish position of Ottoman inheritance in the Western Balkans. In that way, Turkey puts the Balkans at the center of few intersecting regions. This paper deals with the changes and consequences of the paradigmatic shift in Turkish foreign policy and explains strengthening relations with the Western Balkans countries, using historiographical method (chronology of relations and integration process with the EU). Additionally, analysis of content and method of classification was used during studying relations with the EU and NATO, as well as comparative method regarding the Western Balkans and Turkey on many fields, as well as statistical method for analysis of chosen indicators and trends.*

**Keywords:** *Turkey, the Western Balkans, the EU, Foreign policy, NATO, Strategic Depth*

### 1. Introduction

Turkish foreign policy was greatly influenced through Strategic Depth, which became the state's project of influence in the region for the purpose of satisfying Turkish global interests, created by Ahmed Davutoğlu, which was created and supported by Erdoğan's authoritarian system of governance.

The Erdoğan's victory on the early presidential elections on 24 June 2018 changed from the parliamentary to the authoritarian presidential system of governance.

Despite a few descriptive articles on Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans, there is no theoretically informed analysis of Turkish influence on the Western Balkans in the literature (Dursun-Özkanca 2016).

The goal of this research paper is to further explore: the relations between Turkey, the Western Balkans (and the EU); the factors contributing to Turkish cultural and political influence in the Western Balkans and motivation behind new Turkish ideological orientation, neo-ottomanism, in the context of Europe-Turkey (West-East) relations, which represent a good basis for European and Euro-Atlantic integrations. In that way, for Turkey, the Balkans is 'the gate to Europe', because through this region, all the routes for the EU countries are opened. In future, Europe will become energy dependent on oil and gas from the Middle East, and Turkey thanks to the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline will manage with those resources and be the main 'bridge' between two continents.

Research hypothesis is: "The legacy of the Ottoman Empire that ruled over the Balkans for over five centuries, Turkey used (soft power) as a basis for historical, cultural and geographical links with the Western Balkans." Hence, my theoretical framework is based on realist theory which seems the most appropriate to analyze the Importance and Role of Turkey in the Western Balkans.

Taking all these aspects into account, Turkey peruses *realpolitik* as pragmatic foreign policy in the Western Balkans.

## **2. The Western Balkans Term**

Since post-Ottoman period, Turkey has seen the Balkans as its closest allies due to deep and dynamic historical and socio-cultural links with the regional states (Brljavac 2011). The Western Balkans was and still is unstable region; place where power and diplomatic capability of rising great power(s) is demonstrated, day by day.

In the context of the Migration Crisis, a special emphasis is put on the countries of the Western Balkans - a territory that is defined as 'a geographically rounded group of countries, as a part of the Balkan Peninsula, West of Greece, South of Slovenia' (Đurović 2012, 319). Hence, Todorova claims that term the Balkans 'has been used over the centuries, often in a negative context, and exceeded the geographical definition. Some politicians from the Balkans called them 'the powder keg that could explode at any time' or 'wild Europe' (according to the fact that the First World War began in the Balkans), then for the geographical term of the Balkans, in the recent period, specifically during the nineties years of the last century, the term of the

Balkans is linked to the civil war that stemmed from ethnic and religious conflicts and led to the collapse of the state of the SFR Yugoslavia. The term 'balkanization' was often used in a negative context, which represented a territory characterized by constant conflicts and divisions (quoted in Đurović 2012, 319). Also, Đurović (2012) claims that the Western Balkans is noun of the newer date, which is linked with new countries which is appeared after the dissolution of the SFR Yugoslavia, while in 1998 the Western Balkans became a geopolitical region, which in this form did not exist before, and represents a new 'creation' of the EU. This region is located on the edge of Europe, which is surrounded by EU Member States. In this context, the new emerging countries of this region had to pass through a specific transition period (which was not simple at all, and it took a lot of time and investment) in order for states to reject the socialist regime, turned to the West, and accepted the values of major Western democracies (quoted in Šorović 2017, 18-19).

In Article 49 of the ***Treaty on the European Union*** has found the criteria for the EU accession, with the enhanced role of the European Parliament in the process of adopting any political decision concerning the accession of a new EU country. Nevertheless, the EU needs to remain an interesting Community that would attract Eastern countries, from the edge of the continent, without '*enlargement fatigue*'. However, the European Council adopted ***The Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans: Moving towards European integration*** at the Thessaloniki Summit (2003), where it was announced that 'the future of the Balkans lies in the EU' (The Thessaloniki agenda for the Western Balkans 2003). At this summit, the countries of the Western Balkans have been given the promise that with their certain progresses and reforms process, those countries will become the EU Member States. After many years, Croatia has succeeded in it.

The ***Berlin Process*** is a summit dedicated to the Western Balkans, 'whose main goal was to reach a common agreement on strengthening regional cooperation in the Western Balkans and establishing a four-year framework (2014-2018) for resolving all the remaining outstanding issues in the region' (Berlinski proces 2016).

The ***Stabilization and Association Agreement*** represents a framework document for the further path of the Balkan countries on the EU integration progress. During the negotiations, it is necessary to abide all deadlines and conditions which the country needs to fulfill in order to become the full EU Member State. Also, this document defines guidelines - general principles for: political dialogue, international cooperation, free movement of people, goods and capital, harmonization of domestic legislation with EU directives,

improvement of market competition, cooperation policy, etc. Hence, every country that strives to become the EU Member State needs to comply with the rules and regulations of the EU. In addition, it is important to point out that after the summit in Thessaloniki, the EU sends a clear message that 'there are no shortcuts to the EU' (Đurović 2012, 335) and that the accession process is quite complex and 'it requires a lot of engagement of all key segments of society in one country' (Đurović 2012, 335). This Agreement confirms the status of a potential candidate for membership in the European Community, but without a precisely defined date of entry into the EU. In short, the Agreement represents a 'waiting room' for country's entry into the EU. Hence, full membership in the EU is based on the individual capacity of the country to accept European criteria and standards, which derive from its affiliated membership (Đurović 2012).

The ***Stabilization and Association Process*** (PSP) for aim has stabilization and regional cooperation between countries of the Western Balkans. The first phase of the PSP begins with the establishment of a dialogue, in the form of the regular meetings between representatives of the European Commission and the potential candidate for the EU Member State, and finishes with the publication of the Feasibility Study (by the side of the European Commission, which represents the readiness and the ability of the country to fulfill the necessary conditions arising from the Agreement on Stabilization and Association). Therefore, this Agreement represents an international agreement between the EU and country, which is the legal framework for mutual cooperation, as well as approximation to EU values and standards. By concluding this Agreement, the country confirms the status of a potential candidate for EU membership, without defining whether the country may join the EU: start the institutionalization relations of the country with the EU (Mihanović 2005).

The Western Balkans, in order to meet the EU membership criteria, needs to implement comprehensive reforms in crucial areas. All countries must unequivocally overcome the legacy of the past, by achieving reconciliation and solving open issues, in particular border disputes, before accession to the EU. Hence, in Strasbourg on February 2018, the European Commission adopted a ***Strategy for 'A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans'***. On this summit, Juncker, the President of the European Commission stated: 'Investing in the stability and prosperity of the Western Balkans means investing in the security and future of our Union. Although there will be no further enlargements under this mandate, today the European Commission is charting the European path ahead for the Western Balkans. With strong

political will, real and sustained reforms, and definitive solutions to disputes with neighbors, the Western Balkans can move forward on their respective European paths. Whether this is achieved will depend on their objective merits. The European Commission will be rigorous but it will also be fair. I will travel to each of the countries of the Western Balkans at the end of this month with a clear message: keep reforming and we will keep supporting your European future' (Strategy for the Western Balkans: EU sets out new flagship initiatives and support for the reform-driven region 2018).

The Strategy explains the steps that should be taken by **Montenegro** and **Serbia** to complete the accession process in a 2025 perspective; while others could catch up. There are only two countries with which accession talks are already had started. But, this perspective will ultimately depend on strong political will, the delivery of real and sustained reforms and good relations with neighbors. **Albania** and **FYR Macedonia** are making significant progress on their European path. Hence, the European Commission is ready to prepare recommendations to open accession negotiations (the basis is fulfilling conditions). It will start with preparing an *Opinion* on **Bosnia and Herzegovina's** membership application, following comprehensive and complete answers to its *Questionnaire*. Bosnia and Herzegovina, with great engagement and effort, could become a candidate for the EU accession. **Kosovo** has an opportunity for sustainable progress through implementation of the *Stabilisation and Association Agreement*. However, 'a more effective system is needed to tackle systemic threats to or breaches of the rule of law in any EU Member State with a Commission initiative to be expected in October 2018. Finally, special arrangements must be put in place to ensure that future Member States are not in a position to block the accession of other Western Balkans candidates' (Strategy for the Western Balkans: EU sets out new flagship initiatives and support for the reform-driven region 2018).

### 3. Basic information

The area of Turkey (*Türkiye Cumhuriyeti*) is 783,562 km<sup>2</sup>, while total Turkish population in July 2017 was 80,845,215. This Parliamentary Republic is located in Southeastern Europe and Southwestern Asia, bordering the Black Sea, between Bulgaria and Georgia, and bordering the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, between Greece and Syria (CIA 2018). Hence, only 4% geographic percentage of Turkey integrated into the European continent. Additionally, in terms of military potential, Muftler (2000) claims that Turkey

has the second largest army of NATO (only after the United States of America) with nearly 1.043.550 active personnel (Ejdus 2006).

The Western Balkans is a territory which consists of 7 countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FRY Macedonia, Kosovo\*, Montenegro and Serbia; with total area: 264,425 km<sup>2</sup> and population: 22,948,788 (CIA 2018).

NATO members from the Western Balkans are: Albania, Croatia and Montenegro. On the other hand, the EU Member State from the Western Balkans is only Croatia, while Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, FYR Macedonia (and Turkey) are the EU candidate countries. They are in process of 'transposing' EU legislation into national law. On the other hand, the potential candidates which do not yet fulfill the requirements for the EU membership are Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo (European Union 2018).

The Western Balkans is the bridge between East and West, Christianity and Islam, and that is the reason why this territory has been important during the centuries. Links between Turkey and Western Balkans have roots in culture and common heritage. Turkey has big economic investments in Balkans, but the EU is still the most important donor and investor in the region and political partner of it. The EU is also the Western Balkans' largest trading partner with an annual total trade volume of €43 billion in 2016 (Europa 2018).

#### 4. (The) Strategic Depth Doctrine

One of the main books which changed the powerful elites' point of the view and has made drastic changes in Turkish society was the *Stratejik Derinlik* (*Strategic Depth: Turkey's International Position*) by Ahmet Davutoğlu. He was one of the few academics who had opportunity to put theory into practice. Hence, after he became Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2009, the *Strategic Depth* has been the main reference on new Turkish Foreign Policy (Bağcı and Açıkalın 2015).

In *Strategic Depth*, published in 2001, he developed **new strategic vision**<sup>1</sup> about Turkey in which is presented new way of thinking, when it comes to the international position of Turkey - the 'neo-ottomanism' doctrine. Also, it is an asset of his foreign policy paradigms for Turkey. This book represents

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<sup>1</sup> The vision of the Turkish Foreign Policy is defined on five principles: 1) freedom (respect for human rights); 2) politics of 'zero' problems with neighbors; 3) versatility of Turkish foreign policy; 4) a new style of diplomacy; 5) dynamic diplomacy (Tahirovic 2014).

theoretical background for new Turkish Foreign Policy as a part of the state project **Turkey's Strategic Vision 2023**<sup>2</sup>.

The 'strategic depth' is defined as a balance in relation to Turkey's dependence on the West, in the way to create multiple parallel alliances in the region. Because of that, Turkey should take responsibility of being a core country. 'The premise of this argument is that Turkey should not be dependent upon any one actor and should actively seek ways to balance its relationships and

alliances, so that it can maintain optimal independence and leverage on the global and regional stage' (Walker 2007).

Also, Turkey's impact in international community is determined by its **geostrategic position** and **historical depth**. At the beginning of the book, Davutoğlu stated that only two methods can be understood and realized through historical assets and geographical depth of Turkey, because history and geography made Turkey unique country, an outcome of the Ottoman Empire. 'The analysis of an international relations sphere without penetrating its historical depth is similar to a psychological analysis ignoring the person's memory records' (Davutoğlu 2001). Hence, Turkey is not a history maker, nor an outcome of the existing system. Turkey had to leave its influential zones which were inherited from the Ottoman Empire. It made transformation (in domestic sphere in 1923 and later by global events - Soviet aggression and Cold War). That situation, Davutoğlu called a 'break off from historical continuity', which caused instabilities in Turkish domestic policy. However, the historical assets of the Ottoman Empire are still great potential for Turkey (Davutoğlu 2001).

Turkey is a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf and Black Sea country, which need, step by step, 'simultaneously exercise influence in all these regions and thus claim a global strategic role. In view of those, Davutoğlu rejects the perception of Turkey as a bridge between Islam and the West, as this would regulate Turkey to an instrument for the promotion of the strategic interests of other countries'(Grigoriadis 2010, 4). Hence, Turkish geographical depth is a

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<sup>2</sup> The aim of this project is to develop and implement some suggestions and to boost the strategy of the Turkey in foreign policy and in the economic, political, socio-cultural and technologic areas, in order to achieve this vision and to contribute to the efforts that will make Turkey a powerful and prestigious country in the world at the 100th anniversary of Turkish Republic. According to it, till 2023, Turkey will become the 10<sup>th</sup> most powerful economic force in the world and the EU Member State. (Turkey's Strategic Vision 2023 2010).

second vital element of new Turkish Foreign Policy in dynamic international relations. Turkey lies at crossroads of many geopolitical dynamic areas from its historical inheritance, and because of that, Davutoğlu links Turkey's historical assets with her geographical depth (Bağcı and Açıkalin 2015).

The combination of history and geography bring with it a sense of responsibility. Turkey needs to contribute actively towards conflict resolution and international peace and security in all these areas, arising from the depth of a multidimensional Turkish history. All that will be possible, only if Turkey capitalize its *soft power* potential. The base for historic depth is cultural link(s) with all regions, as democratic institutions and thriving market economy. Also, Turkey has had large and strong military through history. That image needs to promote regional economic cooperation and conflict resolution. Hence, Turkey needs to be regional intervention country, as the rest great powers<sup>3</sup> (Grigoriadis 2010).

In the *Strategic Depth*, Davutoğlu identifies two conditions for Turkey to succeed in its global strategic ambitions. The first condition refers to **Turkish domestic policy**<sup>4</sup>, while the second refers to its **relations with neighbors**. Hence, if Turkey wants to become a regional leader and play a global strategic role 'it needs to overcome phobic syndromes and establish cordial relations with all its neighbors. Its foreign policy should aim to resolve all the pending disputes which Turkey's diplomatic inertia had accumulated in the past; it can seek its own global strategic role. Developing close relations with all rising powers (China, India, Russia and Brazil), would be a key in that process. Seeking a leading role in intercivilisational and interreligious dialogue would become one of Turkey's leading priorities, as Turkey could capitalise on his historical and cultural legacy'(Grigoriadis 2010, 5-6).

In Davutoğlu's controversial speech in Sarajevo, in 2009, he proved his controversial perception of the Balkans: 'Our history is the same, our fate is the same, and our future is the same. ***Similar to how the Ottoman Balkans has risen to the center of world politics in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, we will make Balkans, Caucasus and Middle East, together with Turkey, the center of***

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<sup>3</sup> The founder of the neo-realist theory of international relations, Kenneth Waltz, talks about five criteria which define a great power: 1) population and territory; 2) resource endowment; 3) economic capability; 4) political stability and competence; 5) military strength (Waltz 1979).

<sup>4</sup> Turkey has tried to play more reconciliatory role in resolving regional problems, while its crucial problem – the Kurdish question is left by side. Turkish society is in the constant fear of terrorist attacks coming from the militarist Kurdish organization PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), which is struggling for more semi-autonomous Kurd-populated South-Eastern region of the country.

**world politics.** This is the aim of Turkish foreign policy and we will achieve this. In order to provide regional and global peace, ***we will reintegrate with the Balkan region, Middle East and Caucasus, not only or ourselves, but also for the whole humanity***' (Demirtaş 2015, 8).

The vision of the Turkish Foreign Policy was proved by Davutoğlu claimed that Turkey should base its Balkans policy on two important Muslim people of the region: **Bosniaks** and **Albanians**. In his point of view, if Turkey wants to establish a sphere of influence in the Balkans, it is possible only through cultivating close relations with those communities, because of the Turkish historical closeness to those communities. But, after becoming Minister of Foreign Affairs, he tried to develop Turkey's relations not only with Muslim communities, but with countries like Serbia and Macedonia, which consist of Christian majority (Demirtaş 2015).

Walker claims that policy implications of strategic depth are huge. First of all, it is word about **refocusing Turkey's historic Alliances** (traditional allies with America and Europe are important, but new emphasis needs to be paid to former estranged neighbors, such as Russia and Iran. On the other hand, new alliances with emerging powers, like China and India would help to 'balance' Turkey's dependency on the West). Then, Turkey would have **greater identification with the space of the former Ottoman Empire** (renewed interest in engaging Muslim former colonies that might welcome Turkey's 'return' to the Middle East with particular focus on Syria and Iraq; taking on greater responsibility for regional stability in the Balkans and resolving of historic differences with Armenia to enhance greater cooperation throughout the Caucus, with Turkey's 'central' role). And the last, but now the least important is **reaching beyond the Ottomans** (emphasizing Turkey's role in the Muslim world and historic relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan, while building stronger connections with places far away, like Malaysia and Indonesia) (Walker n.d.).

## **5. Long and Exhausted Journey to the EU**

Turkey is the only pluralist secular democracy in the Moslem world. It always has intentions to foster its relations with the European countries. After proclamation of the Republic in 1923, it chose Western Europe, as the model for its new secular country structure. Hence, it was natural for Turkey to enter into force the close cooperation with Western Europe in the political and economic area. Thus, in 1959, Turkey seeks close cooperation with the European Economic Community (EEC).

On 12 September 1963, cooperation between Turkey and EEC was realized in the framework of an *Association Agreement*, known as the **Ankara Agreement**. In this plan, an important element was establishing a 'Customs Union'. In that case, Turkey could trade goods and agricultural products with EEC countries without restrictions. This agreement entered into force on 1 December 1964. Its aim was securing Turkey's full membership in the EEC through the establishment (in three phases of) a customs union, which would serve as an instrument to bring about integration between both of them. Today, the *Ankara Agreement* still constitutes the legal basis of the Association between Turkey<sup>5</sup> and the EU.

In November 1970, the **Additional Protocol** set out in a detailed fashion how the Customs Union would be established. It brought significant advantages for Turkey's agricultural exports to the EEC and provided that the EEC would abolish tariff and quantitative barriers to its imports from Turkey, upon the entry into force of the Protocol. The aim of this Protocol was the harmonization of Turkish legislation with the EU, in economic matters. Furthermore, the *Additional Protocol* envisaged the free circulation of goods and services between Parties and the harmonization of Turkish legislation with the EEC (Ministry for EU Affairs, n.d.).

In July 1974, after many years of the Cyprus inter-ethnic violence, Greeks have organized a **military coup**. The president Makarios III was ousted and Nikos Sampson was set as dictator. After those circumstances, Turkey decided to get military intervention on Cyprus and occupied the northern part of the island. Nine years later, the **Turkish Republic of the Northern Cyprus** was established on this area, and since now, recognized only by Turkey (Tahirovic 2014).

Turkey as a NATO member applied to enter to the EU on 14 April 1987. Then, in 1996, Turkey entered into a Customs Union with the EU. Turkey is officially recognized as a **candidate for the EU membership in December 1999**, at Helsinki Summit of the European Council, through the opening with the EU formal negotiations in **2005**. Relations between them, from year to year<sup>6</sup> are improved, despite Turkey's dissatisfaction with that dynamics

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<sup>5</sup> Since 1963 Turkey has been an associate member of the EU.

<sup>6</sup> In March 2001, the European Council adopts the *EU-Turkey Accession Partnership*, as a road map for Turkey's EU accession process, while the Turkish Government adopts the *National Programme for the Adoption of the acquis*, reflecting the Accession Partnership. In the same year, at the Copenhagen Summit, the European Council decides to significantly increase the EU financial support through 'pre-accession instrument' (Delegation of the European Union n.d.).

(Grigoriadis 2010). Turkish accession to the EU is still one of the most important strategic foreign policy objectives of Turkey and it is the trigger for the democratization reform which will reshape Turkey in the great power. However, in accordance to Davutoğlu's view 'Turkey's EU membership is desirable, but it is not considered Turkey's unique strategic orientation' (Grigoriadis 2010, 9).

Turkey, under government of the Justice and Development Party (AKP)<sup>7</sup> has implemented significant reforms, in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria, in the field of the human rights, democracy-building, the rule of law, protection of minorities, etc. However, despite the AKP's actions and commitment to the EU accession process, the final EU membership has been blocked by numerous internal and external problems (Brljavac 2011).

The fact is that Turkey has been waiting the longest in the row (amongst the applicant countries) for becoming a candidate for a full membership of the EU. Before the Migrant Crisis, some the EU members were ready to grant Turkey as a '**privileged partnership**' instead of full EU membership (Christensen 2009). The Migrant Crisis, despite many promises from the EU's addresses, did not change anything significantly in the process on the Turkish EU path. During the years, between Turkey and the EU signed many document and agreements, but practice failed.

Turkey abandoned traditional 'realpolitik' and apply new approaches such as 'zero problems with neighbors' and 'win-win' policies. During the mandate of the Davutoğlu's patronage, Turkey placed to play significant role in the region. But, with his departure in 2016 and domestic crises after July 2016, military coup attempt, Turkey implements new course in Turkish foreign policy for the region. After military coup, Turkey increasingly slid into more authoritarian rule and features non-democratic tendencies and grew alienation from the EU (Vračić 2016).

## **6. History and Cultural ties between Turkey and the Western Balkans**

The Balkans has an important strategic geography and it makes a link between Europe and Asia. Throughout the history, the Balkans always has played significant geostrategic role, as the crossroad between West and East. Regional and global powers have desired to control this territory in order to realize their interests and to expand them to other regions (Zeljko 2010).

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<sup>7</sup> AKP (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*) is the ruling party in Turkey.

Relations between Turkey and the Western Balkans have started seven centuries ago. Many of the Balkans countries were under Ottoman Empire from 14<sup>th</sup> up until early 20<sup>th</sup> century, in some parts of the region. Therefore, thousands of Turks had settled in the smaller cities of the Balkans, serving as civil servants or garrison troops, but they also have great success as merchants and craftsmen. After Balkans wars<sup>8</sup>, only small group of them remained in Yugoslavia, mainly in Macedonia and Kosovo (Mitrović Bošković, Reljić and Vračić 2015).

Turkey length of rule and the strength links with the Western Balkans had had the strongest connection(s) in areas populated by Muslims. After Balkans Wars, Ottoman Empire lost control over the Balkans and large number of ethnic Turks and Muslims migrated. Due to the arrival of many Balkans origin people, the Turks have viewed the Balkans as somewhat part of Turkey's hinterland. Hence, many Balkans immigrants and their descendants<sup>9</sup> live in Turkey (Bulut 2006).

During the period of the establishment of the modern Republic of Turkey (1923) till 1980, relations between Turkey and the Balkans were formal and within the constraints of traditional high-level diplomacy, outside the scope of religion and culture. Thus, the Balkans immigrants assimilated into the majority culture over time, leaving such as Bosniak to sustain themselves in part of Turkey (Istanbul), but this was not typical pattern for other Bosniak communities in Turkey (Doubt 2014).

In 1953, in Ankara, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece signed an *Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation* (later called the Balkan Pact). Before this Agreement, the Balkans region was distant territory for Turkey. The treaty was perceived to be a fence against Soviet pressure in Southeast Europe. In that period Yugoslavia had developed policy that was increasingly non-aligned with Soviet Union and Turkey entered in NATO (Vračić 2016).

In the last two decades, Turkey has improved relations with the Balkans. The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s were important facts in Turkish foreign policy. Also, the creation of the new Balkans states significantly transformed the foreign policy strategies of Turkey, as aim for far-reaching political impact. In that period, Turkey had active role in the region. It was especially evident aftermath of dissolution of Yugoslavia, when region of the Balkans became the playground for strategic

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<sup>8</sup> The Balkan Wars consisted of two conflicts on the Balkans, from 1912 to 1913. They are known as wars for independence against ruling Ottoman Empire on this territory.

<sup>9</sup> The number of immigrants moving from the Balkans to Turkey between 1923 and 1995 were 1.643.058.

accomplishment of diverse interests of several actors, with the domination of the USA policy. Turkey had an active role in joining multilateral forces, during war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995), during the Kosovo war (1999) and throughout dispute between the FYR Macedonia and Greece over name 'Macedonia'. Also, Turkey had mediator's role in the region, in aim to secure greater political influence in the Balkans (Vračić 2016).

### **6.1. Turkey uses *soft power***

For great powers, especially after dissolution of Yugoslavia, the Balkans region has become the 'playground' for their strategic accomplishment of diverse interests of several actors. On the other hand, during the ongoing government of Erdoğan, Turkey's ambitions in the Balkans have forced the EU to pay more attention to political processes despite the EU '*enlargement fatigue*', where Russia and the United States also vying for influence and political domination.

The countries of the Western Balkans have lost more than a decade in term of democratization. This wasted time is used for considering closer relations between nearly all countries of the region and the EU (BiEPAG 2017). Also, Turkey has intensified its political, economic and social policy-making across the Balkans region. Turkey's diplomatic and financial deployment in the Balkans has provoked a response from the EU, which wants to remain the main authority in this region. Thus, Brussels has a lot of catching up to do, because in last few years, through the Migrant Crisis, it has lost much of credibility (Alic 2010).

However, Turkey has come a long way in reasserting itself in the Balkans and opened up new possibilities for Turkey. Now, Turkey uses *soft power* to create an efficient network of institutions across the region, focused on culture<sup>10</sup>, religion and history (Vračić 2016). Using *soft power*, as a part of the foreign-policy making, Turkey for a short period of time has initiated significant strategic and diplomatic moves at the Western Balkans countries.

Therefore, *soft power* is used as the ability to achieve its objectives through attraction and good image (Beng 2008). In that way, Nye points out that the central currencies of *soft power* are values, norms, culture and institutions of the actor, which has a potential to attract other actors to do and want what it wants, rather to coerce them (Nye 2004).

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<sup>10</sup> In last period, Turkish soap operas, like *Binbir gece*, have become very popular in the Balkans region, promoting Turkish culture, the costumes and life style (Balkan Chronicle 2010).

'Islam and the Ottoman legacy tend to be the eyes of Ankara a lever of influence in most countries of the Western Balkans' (Lika 2015, 63). Turkey thanks to using its *soft power* capabilities has made paradigmatic shifts in its foreign policy and it has taken new position on the world stage. For relations with the Western Balkans, Turkey has utilized rich historical and cultural heritage from the Ottoman reign. In that context, the best explication gave Aras: 'Turkey has gained the status of a *soft power* by experimenting with its foreign policy and demonstrating achievements on the ground' (Aras 2009).

Thanks to the recent proactive Turkish diplomacy in the process of the ethnic reconciliation and peace-building policy at the Western Balkans, Turkey has played important integrative role (Eralp 2010). Hence, in the lack of the simple and clear EU strategic approach for the Western Balkans, Turkish foreign policy has filled 'a diplomatic vacuum and strengthen its position of inevitable regional leader without it has become impossible to make necessary compromise solutions' (Brljavac 2011, 523-524). In particular, the interesting question would be: 'Will the European Union succeed in reforming one of the most complex regions in Europe, or will it fail and lose the credibility it needs to become a great power?' (Perco 2011). The time will give us answers to the Turkish interest success in the EU reforms.

## **7. Turkish pro-active politics in the Western Balkans**

In the last two decades, Turkey has been rediscovering its position and reviving Ottoman inheritance in the Balkans. Additionally, 'Turkey has always viewed the Balkans as its closest allies due to deep and dynamic historical and socio-cultural links with the regional states' (Brljavac 2011, 525).

In other words, Davutoğlu stated: 'basic elements of Turkey's policy towards the Balkans can be summarized as follows: developing relations to the highest level with the Balkan countries, with which Turkey has historic, cultural and humanitarian ties; enhancing the existing atmosphere of regional peace and stability; keeping the transportation connection of Turkey with Western and Central Europe open' (quoted in Brljavac 2011, 525).

Turkey's pro-active foreign policy in the region plays significant mediating role. Lately, Turkey initiated a number of a diplomatic meeting between the previous enemies, in order to contribute to peace, democracy and regional stability (like several meetings between officials from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia, culminating in the *Istanbul Declaration* in April 2010. The main objective of this Declaration was to boost regional cooperation between Balkans countries and their EU membership prospects (Sarajlic 2010).

New Turkish Foreign Policy in the Balkans has strengthened by dynamic and increasing number of the economic investments. In that way, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) has program coordination offices in almost all the Balkans' countries. But, the fact is that TIKA is mostly active in areas populated by Muslims. Its active fund concentrates from 50 to 70 percent of its resources to restoration. During the years, TIKA has rebuilt or participated in the rebuilding of numerous monuments of Ottoman cultural and historical significance in the Balkans region (Think tank Popolari 2014).

Also, the **Turkish Cultural Yunus Emre Center(s)**<sup>11</sup> as a public foundation have offices in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Romania.

The **Gülen**<sup>12</sup> **movement** has found a fertile soil for its grow in the Balkans. This movement runs many schools in Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo. However, Turkish media establish them in the Western Balkans. Turkey's state-run broadcaster TRT offers radio programs and Internet news in all languages in the Balkans, like the *Anadolu Agency news service* in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Big part of those activities has become base for broadcasting Turkey's religious credentials to Muslim audiences, in Turkey and in abroad. Still, the Turkish entertainment industry has the most success in the Western Balkans, because Turkish soap operas have changed perception about present-day Turkey and development enthusiastic fan bases (Bilgin, Demir and Labas 2016).

## **8. Turkish Military in the Western Balkans**

Turkey has played significant role on the Balkans in the 1990s (from War in Bosnia and Herzegovina to Kosovo) and participated in peace operations in this region. Thus, Turkey has taken part in South-Eastern Europe Defense Ministerial process, initiated in 1996. Improving cooperation between the countries of the of the region, Turkey helped initiate the Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe, known as the South-Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG) (Ekinici 2009).

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<sup>11</sup> The Yunus Emre Foundation is founded on 5 May 2007. The aim of it is to promote Turkey and Turkish culture, language, art and history. It improves relations between Turkey and other country and increases cultural exchange (The Yunus Emre Foundation).

<sup>12</sup> The Gülen movement (*Hizmet* in Turkish) is worldwide civic initiative, rooted in spiritual tradition of Isma. It is inspired by the ideas and activism of Fethullah Gülen (Gülen movement).

In 1990s, Turkey actively participated in Bosnia and Herzegovina in UN Protection Force activities, because, after the *Dayton Agreement*, it is increased Turkish military presence to brigade level for the transformed NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR), which became the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in 1996. In that sense, Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina signed two bilateral agreements in fields of military training, defense industry infrastructure, military technology, scientific research and development, and military medicine. The second agreement had two objectives. First was bring the Muslim-Croat forces up to equivalence with the Bosnian Serb Forces by time when IFOR leaves the country, and bring the Bosnian Army much closer to the NATO standards. Second objective was the fact that agreement implied regular visits by high-level officials and delegations, training military personnel and contributions to the Train and Equip Program. It was evident the presence of the foreign fighters in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosnian country has a weak state apparatus, what was a fertile soil for the Islamic extremists (Bosnia Sign Military Cooperation Accord 1995).

In addition, Turkish assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkey provides an opportunity to participate as an observer in a Joint Battalion Task Force with *NATO's Partnership for Peace Agreement* (Aksaç 2003).

In August 2006, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey signed cooperation agreement, as the aim to enabling Bosnia to use a NATO anti-terror training base and to benefit from free access to the NATO-run base.

After the declaration of independence from Yugoslavia, FYR Macedonia was weak and with no international support. Hence, till 2006, Turkey has donated a total of \$15 million worth of military equipment to the Macedonia, in aim to support Macedonian toward integrations in the Euro-Atlantic structures. After that, Turkey led several operations in Macedonia, like: Essential Harvest, Amber Fox, Allied Harmony, Concordia and Proxima. Turkey, during the years, has remained the main non-EU contributor within the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy mission and operations in Macedonia. One of the main reasons for it is eventual Macedonian accession in NATO.

Military relations between Albania and Turkey started in early 1990s. Some kind of a defense cooperation pact was signed between those two countries in 1992, in Ankara. In this occasion, despite the fact that Albania was not in that period NATO member, Albanian Defense Minister Safet Zhulali, visited top-secret Turkish military facilities, that only NATO member countries were allowed to see. In 1998, Turkey in Albania sent troops, at the time when the conflict in Kosovo escalated, and officially Kosovo sought support in Turkey. In that period, NATO launched airstrikes on Serbia and

Montenegro. After 1999, Turkey participated and contributed in the international peacekeeping force stationed in Kosovo. Additionally, it is important to mention that Turkey wanted to play active role in post-war Kosovo through the peacekeeping mission and reconstruction and development of the country. After NATO airstrikes, Kosovo was placed under UN administration. Hence, *UN Security Council Resolution 1244* authorized the establishment of the UN Mission in Kosovo and the development of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (Turkey sign Military Agreement 2006). Later, in 2009, Kosovo and Turkey signed the *Defense Industry Cooperation Agreement* which commits them to implement joint research, development, production and modernization of spare parts, tools, instruments, etc., as well as military visits to unit headquarters and institutions (Sener 2015).

Finally, I need say that since the dissolution of former Republic of Yugoslavia, Turkey has had Important Role in the Western Balkans. During the time, Turkey was forced to integrate its activities into the EU and NATO processes, in order to remain the most important and influential actor in the Balkans.

## 9. Conclusion

Throughout the history, the Balkans always has played significant geostrategic role, as the crossroad between West and East. Turkey has enormous Importance and Role in the Western Balkans. Therefore, Turkish proposal is to bring a good atmosphere and foster dialogue and collaboration in the Western Balkans. Furthermore, it expresses commitment to promoting peace and stability in Western Balkans as well as, it supports the European and Euro-Atlantic integrations of the region.

Turkey and Western Balkans countries want to become part of the European Community, and the EU accession in this region has high priority of foreign policy of Turkey and Western Balkans, although the European enthusiasm is replaced by pragmatism and significant control of integrations expectations. Hence, the implementation of the EU enlargement policy in the next period will be continued within the 'enlargement negotiations and neighborhood policy' (the *Strategy for the Western Balkans* adopted by the European Commission on 6 February 2018), in order to resolve the accumulated internal EU issues and unsteady Union, regarding the matter of joint actions and foreign policy priorities. In a best-case scenario, no regional country in the Western Balkans will join the EU before 2025, only progress to be made; it will take place the Western Balkans itself. Also, it is important to understand the growth of the Turkish influence in the Western Balkans.

Turkey needs to precede its competitive power in this region. In my opinion the EU should include Turkey into multilateral activities and stop viewing Turkey as an enemy. Hence, it needs to be very careful, because Turkish stabilization role in the Western Balkans could be transformed into 'Trojans horse', where all regional conflicts would be part of the European Community.

Turkey in last period close cooperates with the Russian Federation (at the defense field: the Russian system *S-400*) created the room for American dissatisfaction and it makes a potential treat for the interests of the world community in Turkish neighborhood. In the light of the above, perhaps there is no dilemma that the Erdoğan's authoritarian rule will make of Turkey a great power, but not the EU Member State (till 2023).

This article argued that Turkey plays Important Role in the Western Balkans through prioritizing political relations, strengthening economic presence, social and cultural relations with the Western Balkans, although it has been focused too much on history and Ottoman inheritance.

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## SCIENCE AT HIGH SCHOOLS – COLLABORATION BETWEEN RESEARCHERS AND STUDENTS

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**Abstract:** *In the text the theoretical backgrounds of the relationship between knowledge production and transfer and civil society are elaborated. The central concept is cognitive mobilization. In this context, the distinction between scientification of society and socialization of science is important for the understanding the notion of knowledge society. Citizen science and other models of the inclusion of active citizens into the scientific research can be considered as instruments of socialization of science. As an illustration, some aspects of the project aimed at collaboration between researchers and young citizen (high school students) are presented.*

**Keywords:** *Cognitive mobilization, Knowledge Society, Citizen Science, High Schools, Ecology, Sustainable Development, Civil Society, Deliberative Democracy*

### **1. Introduction**

In order to fully understand the effects of techno-scientific applications, we have to motivate the active citizens (non-scientists) to include in research teams. It is, therefore, very important that part of the humanities and social sciences are given the opportunity to reflect on and monitor the effects of technical/scientific applications on society and the environment.

We have to do with the scientification of society and the everyday life of the individual as well as with socialisation of science. The first, the scientification of society, refers to the “small but well-organised community of scientists and specialists who are persistently and worthily linking two seemingly separate worlds – science and the public” (Sopta 2013, 60). These

well-organised communities are mostly established as science organisations, scientific organisations or institutions and international scientific organisations.<sup>1</sup> Besides their public policy shaping role, they remain important actors of knowledge transfer. Secondly, we can talk about the socialisation of science when science becomes the subject of wider reflections. Important foundations for it are interdisciplinarity and ensured inclusion of all interested and well-informed citizens in scientific research and technological applications.

The main concern and orientation of our paper is to discuss the importance of civil society in knowledge-based society and the new changes in science, where a new social contract between science and society is being formed, with a greater emphasis on wide stakeholder inclusion and policy deliberation.

The first part also examines the question of cognitive mobilisation and involvement of citizens in science and scientific research. The second part complements the theoretical discussion by presenting the results of participatory research at high schools. The decision was to focus on ecology, environmental aspects and the challenges of sustainable development, since this topic forms part of both the social and natural/technical sciences. Moreover, they also serve as an inspiration for personal growth and social engagement (Shirk et al. 2012).

## **2. The knowledge-based society and deliberative democracy**

The proliferation of CSOs as bearers and generators of knowledge and expertise should also be viewed in connection with the emerging knowledge-based society, or learning society and learning organisation (Schoen 1983). Only in such an environment is deliberative democracy,<sup>3</sup> which brings about new actions and a new understanding of the role of civil society, actually possible. There is no doubt that in this frame of reference, a certain type of 'elitism' cannot be avoided. It is quite clear that the deliberative democracy model itself presupposes elitist characteristics, such as articulated knowledge, the ability to enter into public dialogue, and well-informed actors.

Further, 'forcing' CSOs to be actors in decision-making at the EU level actually implies 'cognitive mobilisation' on one side and, on the other, means the transformation of these organisations into professional advocacy groups in which grass-root participation plays little role. However, this does not necessarily mean a deviation from democratic principles: in given

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<sup>1</sup> See [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Scientific\\_societies](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Scientific_societies).

circumstances it can be an effective response to the processes that are characteristic of the global, knowledge-based society.

CSOs can play an important role as a mediator between politics, business and science and the rest of society and, thus, help in the creation of a new developmental discourse and the making of more carefully considered political decisions<sup>3</sup>. Conversely, new approaches to the sociology of science underline the distinction between 'reliable science' and 'socially robust science', meaning a new social contract between science and society with the emphases on wider stakeholder inclusion and policy deliberation on the long-term implications regarding the implementation of scientific and technological innovations. CSOs can also play a very important role as a mediator and 'translator' between scientific expertise and the broader public.

The long-term aim of the EU (Lisbon agenda) as a whole, as well as its member states, is to transform themselves into a knowledge-based society and economy (Westlund 2006; Rodrigues, 2002). This means that information, innovations, and scientific knowledge transfers, as well as 'knowledge politics' are becoming the main driving factors of (post)modernisation (see Stehr 1994; Stehr 2003). In these terms, long-term strategic decision-making aimed at sustainable development is increasingly important. This sort of decision-making is viable in the model of deliberative democracy; further, this model, based on rational discourse and arguments, can only flourish in a knowledge-based society. Deliberative politics can only function if actors exist who:

- (1) are competent and have the necessary expertise;
- (2) are oriented towards long-term aims and willing to transcend short-term interests; and
- (3) are able to formulate the expertise, i.e. policy proposals (including policy-related science) in a broadly understandable but not (too) simplified form of collective narratives (Gibbons 1999; Schoen 1983). There is no doubt that (at some types of) CSOs are acquiring new significance and a new mission in this context.

The Global Governance of Science report proposes several measures where CSOs could act as important elements. Research projects that enact fundamental human rights might be strengthened by greater cooperation with CSOs that promote human and citizen rights. Making the results of research as widely available as possible would profit from collaboration with open source initiatives and CSOs engaged in promoting wide dissemination of knowledge and engaging with intellectual property rights issues. As local culture, values and knowledge, and specific local problems are increasingly recognized as important elements to be taken into account when developing

and introducing new technologies, the role of CSOs familiar with the conditions and operating at a specific local level, becomes even more important, especially when they can provide valuable insights that are not available at the higher expert level.

It is worth mentioning once more that practically all CSOs have their own interests and agendas, two illustrative examples in the discourse on the desirability of radical new technologies being the international transhumanist umbrella organization Humanity Plus (Humanity+, 2011), which promotes wide development and use of advanced technology to drastically improve the human condition, with goals ranging from radically extended lifespans to greatly enhanced cognitive abilities, and the international cultural and ecological conservation Action Group on Erosion, Technology and Concentration (ETC Group, 2011), which rejects such technologies on the basis that their negative impacts outweigh any benefits they might introduce. Such ideologies are diametrically opposed, but the new models of deliberation and participation would ideally enable CSOs with converging or diverging agendas to influence each other, eventually arriving at a mutually desirable direction for societal development that would be communicated to the policymakers and would influence science and technology policy decisions.

Addressing pressing societal needs, either at the transnational or at the local level, has already been recognized as one of the requirements that should be taken into account in the early process of researching and developing new and emerging technologies. The recommendations of the Converging Technologies for The European Knowledge Society (Nordmann, 2004) strive to steer technological developments in the European Research Area towards addressing European priority areas such as the needs of an ageing population, energy, transportation and environmental protection. Solving specific local concerns has also been highlighted as one of the key features of transdisciplinary research (Hirsch Hadorn 2008). Properties such as greater social responsibility and reflexivity, and research that stems from bottom-up initiatives, have been further expounded in what some have attempted to conceptualize as Mode 3 knowledge production (Jimenez 2008). Again, CSOs are the entities that are best suited for this purpose, as they are intimately familiar not only with local needs, but also with local capacities that could be employed for individual or joint research in collaboration with capacities at a higher level. The requirement is again that channels for effective communication with the domain of scientists and policymakers have been established.

As is evident, all these requirements regarding knowledge production systems in modern knowledge societies point to a strong need to develop “hybrid forums” (Callon et al. 2009) where experts, policymakers and citizens discuss and create new approaches for the social regulation of science and technology. Currently best placed among the institutions that could feature mechanisms and channels for stakeholder and citizen inclusion in science and technology deliberations are National Ethics Committees (NECs), expert bodies that provide policy advice on ethically and socially contentious technologies at the level of individual nations. However, a recent overview of NECs in 32 European countries (Mali et al. 2011) shows that less than half of these, 15, feature evident mechanisms for public involvement. Furthermore, a majority, 11, feature passive mechanisms, meaning one-way channels of knowledge flow from the experts to the public with the purpose of informing and educating, and only a minority, 4, feature active mechanisms, meaning two-way channels that enable the exchange of knowledge, preferences and opinions between experts on the one side and stakeholders and the general public on the other side. Among the latter NECs are those of Germany, with its open meetings for a public exchange of views, the Netherlands, with its enlarged special thematic committees, Portugal, with its Citizenship Forum, and the United Kingdom, with its consultation papers and deliberative workshops. In the last years the Citizen Science (Experiment) become increasingly relevant instrument of public involvement in research and collaboration with the scientist.

### **2.1. Cognitive mobilization**

It is an undisputed fact that contemporary societies and economies are characterized by the processes of the production, dissemination and application of knowledge. This means that the main factors of development and prosperity are education, complex competencies and creativity of R&D sector. The competitiveness of national economies is increasingly dependent on the success of research and innovation systems and on the investments made in these systems. In this sense is very important to monitor and measure correctly the performance and dynamics of these systems.

However, this represents a one-sided, ideal-type (in the terms of M. Weber) view of (post)modern societies. In addition to human and other less tangible forms of capital, economic (financial) capital still remains important in these societies. Moreover, individual national societies or regions are at various stages of development, where not only evolution but also stagnation and devolution remain possible. In the EU, for example, there are huge differences in terms of innovation capacities and the importance of

knowledge. The financial crisis and economic recession has also contributed to the fact that some countries are now paying less attention to higher education and science. Especially in the new EU member states and the Southern European region, a brain drain and the impoverishment of human capital are taking place. On the other hand, some countries, especially Scandinavian ones, as well as some others (Germany or Austria) have managed to maintain and even improve their research and innovation potential and systems.

Proceeding from sociological, long-term observation, it can be said that, on one hand, we are dealing with the scientification of society, which refers to the increased impact of scientific discoveries and scientific logic on all social subsystems, as well as on everyday life. On the other hand, we can speak about socialization of science, which presupposes the ability of individuals and societies to cope with the new risks and opportunities offered by scientific and technological progress. Etzkowitz thus talks about a “cognitization of society” and notes the intertwining of science, business and policy decision-making institutions as well as civil society (Etzkowitz 2011), and the authors of the Mode 2 production of knowledge stress the “context of application” (Gibbons et al. 1994, see also Carayanis and Campbell 2012). The main problem of these and other similar approaches is that they do not consider systematically the implications proceeding from distinction between the commercialization of knowledge and science in one side, and the socialization or embedding of science and technology in the broader framework of civil society on the other side. In this connection the concept of cognitive mobilisation can be used which means the response of individuals, organizations and societal subsystems both to the processes of the scientification of society, as well as to the socialisation and commercialisation of science and knowledge (Adam et al. 2005). Here the following accent is important: cognitive mobilisation does not solely reside in the function of the capability for action and the utilisation of knowledge, but also refers to the ability of (self)reflection, which can act as an important lever for long-term and strategic thinking and decision making.

Cognitive mobilisation affects innovation capacity, although it cannot be reduced to the commercialisation of knowledge in terms of innovations and patents. A society that is built and dependent on the principles of innovation also needs the ability to take a reflexive attitude to its future and the long-term coordination and synergy of social actors. The innovation performance of companies also largely depends on the research system and the education level, as well as on cultural patterns and social capital (Adam and Westlund 2013).

## 2.2. Involvement of active citizens in scientific research

In this subchapter we present several definitions of the complex category of citizen science and several examples of projects where this concept is put into practice.

Recently, many attempts have been made to define Citizen Science. The term itself refers to a broad concept which includes many different aspects ranging from the observation of natural events to the democratisation of science.

It can be noted that in Lewenstein's definition (Lewenstein 2016), the broadness characterising the concept of Citizen Science persists as each part refers to a distinct scientific branch (i.e. scientific research, scientific policy-making and science advocacy). Another definition is offered by the Green Paper on Citizen Science where Citizen Science refers to the general public's engagement in scientific research activities when citizens actively contribute to science with their intellectual effort and knowledge/information relevant for scientific observation.

The above-mentioned collaboration enables professional researchers to gather large-scale or hidden data they could not access otherwise. In this sense, although Citizen Science projects have primarily concerned and flourished in the natural sciences<sup>2</sup>, nonetheless recently Citizen Science projects have also been initiated within the social sciences. As Heiss and Matthes explain, the rise of certain favourable conditions is responsible for that. They not only include more attractive funding programmes for citizen engagement, but also the increasing willingness of societal actors to actively contribute to scientific research. Further, public engagement has been favoured by new technologies.

Moreover, the experiments contribute to the certain STEM-related skills being acquired (i.e. responsibility, critical-thinking and problem-solving). These "interdisciplinary process skills [...] are paramount to solving 21 century problems."<sup>3</sup>

Climate change is definitely one of the 21 century problems, being a complex scientific and social problem. Therefore, incorporating climate

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<sup>2</sup> In this sense, the American colonialists who recorded changes in the weather may be considered the first citizen scientists. We owe credit to Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklyn for the birth of a network of weather observations that provided, and still do, the National Weather Service with data. Other examples of Citizen Science pioneering experiences include fields such as ornithology and astronomy.

<sup>3</sup><https://msutoday.msu.edu/news/2013/attracting-more-students-to-stem-by-teaching-climate-change/introduction>. by Tom Oswald, Aaron M. McCright.

change to the curriculum is an important aspect of citizen science. Interdisciplinary approach is the prerequisite to fully understand climate change. Dealing with it requires knowledge from biology, chemistry and physics.<sup>4</sup> In the paper, the authors<sup>5</sup> offer three examples of climate change-related STEM education projects that are interdisciplinary in nature:

- The “hockey stick project” in which students work in groups to teach their classmates about a topic related to it. The hockey stick graph is a visual that illustrates how global warming has dramatically increased over the last 100 years.

- “Climate change week” in which first- and second-year college students sit in on a variety of STEM courses to learn about the relevance of several disciplines for understanding climate change.

- “Climate change semester or year” in which a long-term course is team-taught by instructors from many disciplines.<sup>6</sup>

Defining the complex category of citizen science or the citizen science experiment, and continuing definitions from above, having in mind the co-creation (co-design)<sup>7</sup> nature of the citizen science, the citizen science projects are also defined according to the type of voluntary participation:

- contributory projects: participants take part in data gathering, analyse the data at certain points in the project and help disseminate the results

- collaborative projects: as well as the above, the participants analyze the samples and, on occasions, help design the study, interpret data, draw conclusions or disseminate the results

- co-created projects: the participants collaborate in all stages of the project, including the definition of the questions, development of hypotheses, discussion of results and response to further questions that might arise (Follet and Strezov 2015 in Senabre, Ferran-Ferrer and Perello 2018, 30).

The millennium is the era of technological breakthroughs, of everything digital, and the job market goes in the same direction: the highest expected salaries are in fact those of future graduates in science and technology, and

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<sup>4</sup> See:

<https://msutoday.msu.edu/news/2013/attracting-more-students-to-stem-by-teaching-climate-change/>.

<sup>5</sup> Promoting interdisciplinarity through climate change education. 2013.

Aaron M. McCright, Brian W. O'Shea, Ryan D. Sweeder, Gerald R. Urquhart & Aklilu Zeleke. *Nature Climate Change* (3): 713–716.

<sup>6</sup> See: <https://www.nature.com/articles/nclimate1844>.

<sup>7</sup> ...co-design is defined from an understanding of the co-created modality of citizen science as »participatory science« or »civic science« (Wylie et al., 2014 in Senabre, Ferran-Ferrer and Perello 2018, 30).

the current job market demands for more digital professionals than higher education can supply.

### 3. Involvement of young students in scientific research

Data on Slovenian students' attitudes towards ecology was gathered in the school year through participatory experiment and survey conducted by IRSA at five different Slovenian high schools. As it was an exploratory project, many different methods were used, including elements of quasi-experiment, presentation with discussion, content analysis and group discussion with students about the survey results.

The questionnaire was addressing three different aims and involved ten open questions. Firstly, we aimed to determine the level of students' knowledge of ecology, where does this knowledge come from and what is students' level of self-estimation of this knowledge. The results show, that the students discuss topics related to ecology at home and follow media reports and websites on these topics, but not as many discuss ecology related topics with their peers. Regarding their self-evaluation of knowledge about ecology, around 60% of them believe their level of knowledge is very good and consider it as sufficient to form and express their opinions.

Table 1: Sources of information on ecology issues<sup>8</sup>

	First group	Second group	Third group	Fourth group
1	School	School (Geography)	School (Biology)	Media
2	Ecology symposium at the Faculty of Social Sciences	Home (family)	School projects and workshops	School
3	Web media	Media (web and TV)	Web (articles, documentary movies)	Out-of school activities

<sup>8</sup> 1 means the most frequent, 4 the least frequent; data analysis from grammar school 1, where participants were from 16 to 19 years old, from 3rd and 4th class of secondary (grammar) school.

4	Classical media	/	/	/
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Source: own

Results show, that students acquire most of the knowledge about ecology from Biology courses, followed by Geography and Environmental Studies (which is not implemented in all schools). In some cases, Sociology and Chemistry were mentioned in this context. One group referred to media as the source for information. When asked about their engagement, students were more likely to use the media than to actively engage in interest circles or civil organisations<sup>9</sup>

Regarding the used teaching products, professors mainly referred to the use of interdisciplinary curriculum titled Environmental education as education for sustainable development<sup>10</sup>.

Regarding the low levels of students' civic engagement, they expressed views of active engagement not leading to any results. Furthermore, one of the groups expressed an opinion that their knowledge of ecology is school-based, theoretical, forced upon them, which is why students do not internalize this knowledge and they are not willing to deal with them at home.

Discussion with students shows, that they are school-centric and pragmatic regarding their engagement with ecological issues. They show little interest in global (macro) social problems and even those choosing Sociology for their final exam mainly deal with micro-level topics. This not problematic per se but it would be productive to connect the micro levels with macro in global issues.

Combining the survey results with the results of the discussion, we can conclude the following. High school pupils obtain a lot of information at school, but their synthetic and interdisciplinary levels of knowledge are quite poor. Prevailing attitude towards ecology is passive, while students with a natural sciences orientation are more likely to deal with ecological topics. There are also huge differences among high schools regarding knowledge transfer, optional subjects and curriculum. It also seems that many high

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<sup>9</sup> See:

[https://www.dropbox.com/s/a8qwqd932ipfz3p/Analiza%20anketnih%20vpra\\_alnikov%20in%20skupinskega%20dela%20na%20temo%20ekolo\\_ke%20problemati ke%20%281%29.docx?dl=0](https://www.dropbox.com/s/a8qwqd932ipfz3p/Analiza%20anketnih%20vpra_alnikov%20in%20skupinskega%20dela%20na%20temo%20ekolo_ke%20problemati ke%20%281%29.docx?dl=0).

<sup>10</sup> See:

[http://www.mss.gov.si/fileadmin/mss.gov.si/pageuploads/podrocje/ss/programi/2008/Gimnazije/K\\_OKOLJ\\_VZGOJA\\_gimn.pdf](http://www.mss.gov.si/fileadmin/mss.gov.si/pageuploads/podrocje/ss/programi/2008/Gimnazije/K_OKOLJ_VZGOJA_gimn.pdf).

schools are rather closed social systems, some other are more open to the environment.

#### **4. Conclusion**

We will start with the conclusion of the citizen science pilot experiment in high schools in Slovenia. During this project we gathered different types of qualitative and quantitative data. In conversations with the teachers we realised that huge differences exist among high schools in terms of their openness or closedness regarding the environment and initiatives from the outside. The same is true of their study programmes. In some schools, students acquire most information related to ecology or sustainable development from traditional subjects like biology. In others, they have the opportunity to choose the study of the environment or eco-school as optional subjects

However, despite the high level of self-estimated knowledge, the interest in dealing with these topics in any more profound way proved to be low. By using the method of group feedback analysis where the students of one class deliberated on the research results for the five high schools, it turned out that they are acquiring 'theoretical' knowledge that is relatively disciplinary fragmented and disorganised.

On the other side, social engagement is also weakly expressed. The CSE revealed that the high (grammar) schools are in a cognitive and social sense quite closed systems, despite some teachers being willing to experiment with new methods, due to their study programmes (curricula) being determined on the basis of a mono-disciplinary approach. Such a constellation requires the full attention of pupils, leaving very little room for manoeuvre for other learning/teaching options parallel to a lack of incentives for a more creative approach to practise alternative methods of learning and doing research.

Secondly, these results denote the need for innovative educational approaches to successfully address the interdisciplinary nature of the addressed topics. Innovative educational methods, such as hands-on activities, inquiry-based learning (IBL), learning via experiments, gamification and multimedia have been developed in connection to STEM fields (science, technology, engineering, maths and medicine) to rise interest of young students for studies in STEM fields.<sup>11</sup>

Besides innovative approach to learning and interdisciplinary approach to school curriculum, in the broader sense, knowledge transfer is the hottest

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<sup>11</sup> See: <http://www.stem4youth.eu>.

issue when speaking of open communication channels between science and society. Scientification of society as well as cognitive mobilisation has thus become the current concepts and the new approach of connecting the two: the citizen science experiment. As the prominent author of the CSE Josep Perello with his collaborators states:

“In particular, co-creation is perceived as a fundamental factor in participants’ motivation and commitment, a key aspect in citizen science projects.” (Senabre, Ferran-Ferrer, Perello 2018, 32).

Co-creation, meaning the inclusiveness of participants in scientific research, as well as data interpretation and conclusion making, has been part of the presented CSE project in high schools which was part of the STEM4Youth<sup>12</sup> and Pioneers project,<sup>13</sup> conducted by IRSA,<sup>14</sup> as well.

The future steps would involve high schools open for external cooperation with scientific institutions as well as with NGOS dealing with popularization of science. In class, the curricula should be re-defined, with greater attention paid to:

- combining individual performance with teamwork (an amalgamation of competition and cooperation – ‘co-opetition’);
- organised discussion and reflection in small groups;
- a problem-solving approach by employing knowledge from different disciplines;
- scientific methods with a special accent on a synthetic approach;
- interdisciplinarity should be more stressed
- ethical issues of research
- regarding the environmental issues and ecology students should be encouraged to focus on case studies
- very important is also support and co-operation of teachers

We believe that students will be more productive and creative in such a cognitive and social settings. Our analysis of the results of using CSE reveal this method of intervention is worth applying in high schools. We also believe we have added to understanding of scientific research and its role in broader society as well as to the current trends of the complex relation between science and society.

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<sup>12</sup> <http://www.stem4youth.eu>.

<sup>13</sup> <https://pioneerscse.wordpress.com>.

<sup>14</sup> <http://www.institut-irsa.si>.

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