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## RESPONDING TO TERRORISM: TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY APPROACH

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**Abstract:** *Terrorism has become the main threat to international peace and security. The evolving nature of the threat and the challenge that it triggers both at domestic and international level is heightened with the advance in technology and globalization in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This has become clear to the international community especially after the September 11 incident. Countries reacted to the growing threat of terrorism in different ways by employing different policy tools both before and after September 11. However, the success achieved is highly uneven and the threat is becoming more devastating. Counterterrorism policy scholars suggest that a 'Comprehensive Counterterrorism Policy' is the only way to overcome the threat posed by terrorism. The objective of this research is to evaluate this 'Comprehensive Counterterrorism Policy Approach' and to substantiate whether a country with a Comprehensive Counterterrorism Policy is more successful in combating terrorism. Two countries, Ethiopia and Kenya, are selected as case countries and their counterterrorism policies are assessed against the attacks and damages they faced from a transnational terrorist group of Al-shabaab for 9 continuous years (2006-2014).*

**Key words:** *Terrorism, Counterterrorism, Policy*

### 1. Introduction

Almost every country has experienced some form of terrorism throughout history and they have responded to the challenges that terrorism poses in a varying ways. The main counterterrorism policy tool that countries used to deal with the violence in the past, however, was nothing more than the criminal justice system. After September 11, as the international dimension of terrorism and its effects became clear, the use of other policy tools such as military action has also come into the picture. Scholars and policy makers

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have also been propounding one or the other policy tool as a response to the threat. However, the intimidation that terrorism triggers to human security has increased over the past decade in an unprecedented way and we have also observed an uneven degree of successes among states in their efforts to combat terrorism. Terrorists have continued to exploit the vulnerabilities of states both at home and abroad. Hence, the question of how countries can overcome the challenge and what policy approach can make a difference in fighting terrorism have become increasingly important.

Terrorism, whether domestic or transnational, affects the international community in one way or another. In the contemporary world where mobility is becoming indispensable for different socio-economic and political reasons, no one or no country seems to be able to escape the challenge posed by terrorism and terrorists whether at home or abroad. Hence, given the recent trend and the challenge that terrorism is posing and possibly will continue to pose to the international community, it is vital to devise and use a proper policy tool which helps to tackle or at least minimize the irreversible fatality and damage that terrorists perpetrate indiscriminately. The study of counterterrorism policy as such is very crucial in producing research-based policy solutions which help to effectively respond to the developing threat. Crelinsten (2009) argues that how countries respond to the threat of terrorism is very crucial in defeating terrorism than the threat per se. Recently, counterterrorism policy scholars such as Cronin (2004b), Crenshaw (2004, 2011) and Crelinsten (2009) have developed and suggested a 'Comprehensive Counterterrorism Policy' theory to effectively overcome terrorism. They argue for an integrated usage of the different arrays of policies such as criminal justice, policing and intelligence, diplomacy and military in a harmonized manner and as complementary policy tools in the campaign against terrorism rather than sticking to a single policy.

## **2. Approaches to Counterterrorism**

Countries devised different counterterrorism policy approaches to respond to the evolving challenges of terrorism they encountered throughout history. However, the growing internationalization of terrorism and the unprecedented casualties it precipitated during the late 20th century and the beginning of 21st century alarmed the international community to rethink how to approach the rising threat.

Crelinsten stated that "the danger that terrorism possess to democratic values and the way of life that they permit stems not just from terrorist threats and violence and the vulnerabilities that the terrorists exploit but the

ways in which the societies think about them, talk about them, prepare for them, respond to them and recover from their impacts” (Crelinsten 2009, 7). One important point that Crelinsten’s text tells us is that what matters more about terrorism is neither the potential and actual threat terrorism poses nor the vulnerabilities terrorists exploit but how a society responds to them. Hence, the subject of counterterrorism policy is crucial so as to properly deal with the societal concern about the challenge both in the present and in the future.

Crelinsten (2009) argued that the complexities of the contemporary challenges of terrorism need a more comprehensive policy approach than relying on only single policy options. Crenshaw (2011) also supported this position by criticizing pre and post-September 11 US counterterrorism policies. Clutterbuck (2004, 140) argued that no comprehensive counterterrorism response can be based exclusively on one or the other single policy approach. Clutterbuck suggested that the widest and flexible combination of policy tools must be used by bringing together the criminal justice system, intelligence, military approaches to effectively and efficiently respond to terrorism (Clutterbuck 2004, 140). Even though what the scholars meant by a ‘Comprehensive’ approach is not an enclosed basket, Crenshaw’s ‘Strategy and Grand Strategy’ (Crenshaw 2011), Cronin’s ‘Grand Strategy’ (Cronin 2004a, 285) as well as Crelinsten’s (2009) and Clutterbuck’s ‘Comprehensive policy’ (Clutterbuck 2004, 140) encompasses and suggests the integrated use of the criminal justice system, the intelligence, diplomacy and military as a pillars of comprehensive policy tools to effectively respond to terrorism.

### **3. Method**

To address the research question, two countries were selected for a case study, specifically Ethiopia and Kenya. The challenge of terrorism to both countries and their respective response over the past nine (9) years will be assessed. These countries are geographically located in the same region of East Africa and both share a boundary with the failed state of Somalia. Ethiopia shares 1,010 miles long border with Somalia while Kenya shares 424 miles. Somalia, with its fragile government, is currently serving as a safe haven for transnational terrorist group of al-Shabaab- an organization which was designated as such by the US in the early years of 2008. As both of the case countries share a long border with Somalia, they are equally vulnerable to the transnational terrorist group. Moreover, al-Shabaab has vowed and confirmed in its subsequent activities that both countries (Kenya and

Ethiopia) are its targets since it claims territory from both countries with a view of creating a greater Islamic State of Somalia. If that makes them target, both countries have contributed to the establishment of the TFG, the government which the extremist group fights in Somalia. However, the case countries have experienced different levels of attack and assaults from the group since its birth in 2006.

Data of attacks and assaults by the terrorist group for nine (9) years were collected. Specifically, from the year 2006 when the terrorist group started an armed insurgency against the TFG and its supporters within and outside the country to the year 2014.

## **4. The responses of Ethiopia and Kenya**

### **4.1 The response of Ethiopia**

#### ***4.1.1 Criminal justice***

Until the year 2008, terrorism has been treated under the ordinary criminal law of the country. Ethiopia moved to adopt a new and special anti-terrorism law in 2009 (also called Anti-Terrorism proclamation No 652/2009) as the previous legal framework was found inadequate to deal with the recent developments in terrorism. The objective of the law was clearly provided and it aims at prohibiting terrorism and foiling terror plots as clearly set in the preamble. It also aimed at creating a legal framework which enables the security officers and the police to effectively control terrorism. The preamble of the proclamation states that “it has become necessary to incorporate new legal mechanisms and procedures to prevent, control and foil terrorism, to gather and compile sufficient information and evidence in order to bring to justice suspected individuals and organizations for acts of terrorism by setting up enhanced investigation and prosecution system” (Proclamation No 652/2009 preamble).

The new anti-terrorism law also describes acts constituting the crime of terrorism. Accordingly, both direct involvement in committing terrorism or indirectly supporting the commission of such act is clearly prescribed as a crime of terrorism (Art. 3). So long as indirect support is concerned, both material and moral support constitute the crime of terrorism under the law. Material support refers to the provision of finance, explosives and any kind of material input which contributes to the crime in one or another way (Art. 3). Moreover, intentionally harboring or helping the terrorist to escape also constitutes the crime of terrorism. Under the law, a person commits the crime

of terrorism when he or she fails to inform the responsible authority while having information or evidence that may assist to prevent terrorism before its commission (Art.12). Providing false information or evidence in this regard also constitutes the crime of terrorism (Art. 11). The law criminalizes publications or broadcasting statements that are likely to be conceived by a section or all of the members of the community to whom it is published as a direct or indirect inspiration or inducement to them to the perpetration, preparation or encouragement of terrorism (Art.6). Moreover, the fact that there shall be no period of limitation in investigation and prosecution of persons suspected of the crime of terrorism as provided under Art. 12 will have a strong message in combating terrorism.

#### ***4.1.2 Policing and Intelligence***

The same proclamation provides for the establishment of a special intelligence, policing and prosecution within their respective offices (Part six, Art. 28-31). All the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), the Federal Police, and the office of prosecution have their own respective special task force handling cases of terrorism. Apart from establishing special departments within these sectors, the law brings these offices together under an independent organ called National Anti-Terrorism Coordination Committee (NATCC) with a clear chain of command (Art.30). The NATCC comprises the heads of the Ministry of Justice, the NISS and the Federal Police (Art. 30 (2)). The NATCC draws a joint counterterrorism plan, sets up a joint counterterrorism task force and works in a coordinated manner to combat terrorism under the leadership of the Director General of the NISS (Art.30). The law empowers the police with a flexible power so as to avoid or minimize the irreversible damage to the life and property as a consequence of acts of terrorism. The police have the power to conduct a covert search into property upon court authorization or through unilateral decision depending on the imminence of the threat. The police can arrest any person reasonably suspected to have committed or intending to commit a terrorist act without a court warrant. It can also freeze any financial circulation suspected of aiding terror activity.

The mandate of handling cases of terrorism was put under the jurisdiction of the Federal High court and Federal Supreme court (Art.31).<sup>2</sup>As per the

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<sup>2</sup>Ethiopia follows a federal structure and hence judicial system is established both at federal and state level. Articles 45-47 & 78-80 of the 1995 Federal constitution clearly provides for the court structure and possibilities of delegations to equivalent regional state courts.

proclamation, a separate academic quality and professional experience and integrity is required for officers who handle cases of terrorism in the police and prosecution departments (Art.28). Such personnel need to have testimonial evidence from the relevant senior officials of the Ministry of Justice or the Federal Police as to their professional competence, ethics and integrity.

The coordination between intelligence and police assisted the Ethiopian criminal justice system in making fast and strategic decisions and finally to effectively respond to the threat of terrorism. Gardad, while writing on Ethiopia's relative success in weakening al-Shabaab stated that "The Ethiopian intelligence worked very hard to not only decimate the original al-Shabaab leadership, but also to infiltrate and control it" (Gardad 2015). Similarly, attributing the main success to the coordinated and improved intelligence service, Sahay wrote that "the fact that Ethiopia hasn't faced a major terrorist attack in the last few years is not for lack of trying (by the terrorist)", he argues that it is rather because of "the dedicated members of the countries intelligence community being a step ahead of the terrorists." (Sahay 2015).

#### **4.1.3 Diplomacy**

The usage of diplomacy as a tool to deal with a religiously inspired group, no matter what the religion is, would not be as easy as such. However, it is important for states to make sure that it is ineffective before moving to use the alternative options. This could be done only through opening a peace talk with the organization(s). States must be open to such deals throughout while also protecting public peace and security. As it is highly decentralized, there was and there is a high possibility to deal with each fraction of al-shabaab separately even where such deal is less viable at the centre (Abdi Elmi and Aynte 2012). The Ethiopian government has negotiated with some of the leaders of al-Shabaab even after the group was ousted from Mogadishu (Berhane 2011; Gardad 2015). Those leaders who took a moderate position were even later allowed to participate in the transitional government (Gardad 2015). Even while moving to war with the ICU the government had an open position for peaceful solutions to the problem (BBC 2006).

Ethiopia cooperated with the transitional federal government of Somalia and other neighboring countries in putting political influence on the group as part of its diplomatic strategy (EMoFA2016). The Ethiopian policy towards the neighboring countries is clear as stipulated in its general policy statement. The policy statement puts this in an equivocal manner saying "...it is when we strengthen our networking, when we seek the widest participation, and when

we play a key coordinating role that we can build our capacity to deliver what is needed to protect our interest and security” (EMoFA 2016). Ethiopia seeks to be more engaged than to have a mere relation both with its neighbors and the rest as can be noted from the policy statement. Ethiopia cooperated with other countries in fighting terrorism at the global level and it contributes to collective actions of the IGAD, AU, EU, and the UN (EMoFA 2016).

#### **4.1.4. Military approach**

The Ethiopian military approach as part of its counterterrorism policy tool can be seen in light of its general policy and the 2007 military action against the ICU. Ethiopia used a military action against ICU and subsequently against al-Shabaab in early 2007. The group has vowed to remap territories inhabited by the Somali ethnic group in the region, which include territories both from Ethiopia and Kenya, with an intention of creating a greater Islamic Somali state as its main goal (Solomon 2015). This was not accepted by either Ethiopia or Kenya. However, what immediately led to the military action on the part of Ethiopia was the group’s declaration of Jihad against Ethiopia as a response to the support of the latter to the TFG (Gettleman 2006). A similar appeal for Jihad was also subsequently made by Al-Qaeda-leaders against Ethiopia (BBC 2007).

Even though the intervention of Ethiopia has been criticized ever since by many who argue that the action led the group to a more radical position, Ethiopia perceives its action as a lesser risk compared to what might happen once the group assume power in the region (Council on Foreign Relation 2007). Ethiopia used the military approach as part of its counterterrorism policy as it is evident from its counterterrorism discourse. It is also clear that the country employed military action after the peace discussion was found unsuccessful (Berhane 2011). In this regard, while speaking on the military action, the late prime minister stated that his government has ‘only been forced by the circumstance’ (Cited in Gettleman 2006).

#### **4.2 The responses of Kenya**

Kenya also started to experience the recent wave of terrorism in the late 1990s and in the early 2000s similar to Ethiopia. In 1998, al-Qaeda operatives attacked the US embassy in Nairobi (Rotberg 2005). In the year 2002 a similar group attacked an Israeli-owned Hotel in Kenya causing many deaths and injuries, while at the same time failed in its attempt to bring down the Israeli chartered flight (Rotberg 2005). Within few years following these events, al-Shabaab emerged as another threat in Kenya’s neighbor failed state, Somalia.

Under this topic we specifically observe the response of Kenya to the challenge in light of our measurements.

#### **4.2.1 Criminal justice**

Until the year 2012, Kenya had no special criminal laws dealing specifically with terrorism. Even though acts such as homicide were criminalized by criminal code and provisions with regard to such acts can also be used to prosecute terrorists who commit similar acts, the term terrorism was not employed in the then criminal code (Mwazighe 2012). Hence, it was hardly possible to prosecute terrorists under Kenyan criminal system. One Kenyan Police authority described in one instance that they were forced to deport suspected foreigners because 'Kenya does not have anti-terrorism laws that would enable prosecutors to directly charge suspects with extremist activities' (Cited in News24 2004). While writing on this, Mwazighe argued that "If suspects were prosecuted once sufficient information on the planned commission of a crime were foreseen, many of the explosions and bombings in the country might be made less severe, if not prevented entirely" (Mwazighe 2012, 22).

Enacting anti-terror law and fighting terrorism was for a long time perceived as a US interest than addressing a national threat per se among Kenyan elites (Arson 2013). Considering the recent developments and evolving nature of terrorism with the advance in technology, it would be difficult for Kenya to overcome terrorism under the old laws. Activities such as funding terrorism and usage of social media are some of the key areas that modern laws need to address to deal with the contemporary challenges. It also needs to provide an enabling but restricted power to the intelligence and security services to detect terrorist cells and plots as early as possible so as to avoid the irreversible damages that terrorism entails. The Kenyan criminal justice system was devoid of such quality for a long time. Efforts made by the Kenyan government to have an anti-terror law in 2003 and 2006 to address the shortcomings of the criminal code remained frustrated for about a decade (Aronson 2013). The laws were objected by oppositions despite its updated nature to deal with the contemporary developments in terrorism starting from attempting to define the crime (Mwazighe 2012).

Recently, in 2012, Kenya came up with another bill to confront the ever-growing threat. The new law (also called the Prevention of Terrorism Act) has made a progressive attempt starting from defining the 'acts of terrorism'. The law addressed different acts that can constitute or contribute to the commission or aggravation of terrorism under part III. Acts such as financing, recruitment, training, and preparations to commit a terrorist attack are also

prescribed as a crime (Sections 4-30). In 2014 the government made further effort to widen and strengthen the power of the security services through the adoption of the security law (amendment) bill. This Bill, apart from providing enabling clauses for police and security officers, has also attempted to tighten and balance laws regulating media and publications. Even though the Bill is passed into law by the parliament, the important provisions, especially those which would have greatly assisted the counterterrorism efforts, were again thrown out by the High court on the ground of unconstitutionality (Analo 2015).

Moreover, the Kenyan criminal justice system lacks certainty. The scattered and unstable nature of the laws makes the system unpredictable and hardly understandable for subjects. What constitutes terrorism or not, what are the consequences of certain acts, what are the responsibility of individuals or citizens in assisting the combat, which otherwise also a crime in itself etc. needs to be clear and certain to the subjects. This helps to inform potential criminals the consequence of their acts. It also saves states from arbitrary action by setting what is wrong and what is right in advance which otherwise contribute to the terrorist objectives by eroding the credibility of governments. Arson, writes that “The flawed terrorism laws in Kenya have caused a grave problem and even with improved legislation over last few years, success has been minimal” (Aronson 2013, 31).

#### ***4.2.2 Policing and intelligence***

The responsibility of policing a crime and following up national security in Kenya also lies with police and intelligence service (Mwazighe 2012). In Kenya, the task of counterterrorism is divided between the Kenyan Police, Directorate of Criminal Investigation and Administration Police, and non-police agencies such as National Intelligence Service and Defense Forces (Mwazighe 2012). However there were no effective coordination and cooperation among these different offices. The US Department of State (Department of State 2015) in its country report on terrorism reported that the operational effectiveness of Kenyan security service is hampered by poor coordination among and within the police, intelligence, and military forces (Department of State 2015). The report also disclosed the prevalence of lack of clear command structure and explicit political interferences. The Garissa University college siege in 2015 affirms this assertion. The siege at Garissa University College by al-Shabaab militants lasted for about 15 hours and the security forces arrived only at the final hours (Bremmer 2015). Kenyan police and intelligence suffer from different problems including lack of enabling legal framework and weak institutional coordination. The security law

amendment bill of 2014 attempted to organize a new agency called a National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) which is an inter-agency body to address this problem. The centre consists of different organizations such as National Intelligence Service, the Kenyan Defense Force, the National Police service and other necessary agencies to be determined by national Security Council. Though the initiative is a good start, the effectiveness of the organization will depend on subsidiary rules and how the law is going to be implemented in the times to come.

The Kenyan security officials attribute most of the security failures to the availability of limited resources for conducting policing and intelligence service and insufficient training (Odula 2014). The Kenyan government admitted the allegation that the security sector is under-resourced. Speaking on the issue of under finance of the security service after the Westgate Mall attack, President Kenyatta stated that 'For a long time, the security sector has not been given the attention it deserves....' (Cited in Odula 2014). The Department of State also released the same findings in its 2014 country report on Kenya (Department of state 2015). Related to the issue of financial constraint is the prevalent corruption to the extent of compromising national interest. The same report by Department of State put this as an "endemic corruption", implying how much severe the situation is. Data from transparency international also endorse similar facts. The Kenyan security sector, specifically the police, is identified as the most corrupted government department (Transparency International 2008). Evidence shows that there were instances where suspected terrorists escaped by paying a bribe to the police after they caught while conducting surveillances for future attack (Odula 2014).

#### **4.2.3 Diplomacy**

Diplomacy is another important policy tool in combating terrorism. The Kenyan use of diplomacy in combating terrorism can be observed both from its relation with the terrorist group and other states engaged in combating terrorism in the region. The transnational nature of the challenge needs a strong diplomatic relation with other countries in the region and other parts of the world. It needs an exchange of intelligence information, experience, cooperation in policing and taking military action whenever necessary. Lack of mutual understanding, cooperation in information exchange, in experience sharing and in taking action will give a breathing room for the terrorists. It also makes the campaign inefficient and ineffective. As one of its foreign policy pillars, the first ever written Kenyan foreign policy since the country's independence provides that, the Kenyan government would "collaborate with

other African countries to strengthen the conflict prevention, management and resolution capacity of regional institutions, including the East African community (EAC), intergovernmental authority on development (IGAD), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, (COMESA), and the African Union (AU) with the aim of promoting peace and development...” (GoK 2014). Kenya has a good relation with the US and other allies in The West such as the UK and Israel in fighting terrorism. The US department of state country report on terrorism reveals that Kenya shares experience and benefits from US logistic and technical assistance especially since 2013 in fighting global terrorism (Department of State 2015). However, the indictment of President Kenyatta by the International Criminal Court in relation to the violence of post 2007/2008 election has affected Kenya’s foreign relation and engagement during this critical time (Frazer 2013).

Even though the determination to work with allies in combating terrorism is there at the policy level, the engagement of Kenya at the regional level with neighboring states so far is under a huge self-restraint. While writing on Kenyan diplomacy in fighting terrorism, Adan stated that “... the government of Kenya did not apply much effort to incorporating the countries in the horn of Africa region in a unified regional counterterrorism strategy because of the belief that Kenya was a victim rather than a source of international terrorism” (Adan 2005, 38). Fear of political risks that might follow from full-scale engagement in counterterrorism was also mentioned as a reason behind Kenya’s operation under a high self-restraint (Adan 2005).

When it comes to dealing with the terrorists, few months after the Westgate mall attack, the Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta stated that ‘Extremists prefer death and destruction than discussion and compromise. They will be dealt with ruthlessly and within the law’ (Cited in Abdi 2014). Kenya has contributed to the establishment of TFG and it was even an important player during the negotiation to establish the TFG because of its neutrality. But, after the rise of al-Shabaab Kenya remained passive because of the fear of backlash from within the country until the recent deadly attacks. The recent approach on the other hand is a hard-line position (Abdi 2014).

#### **4.2.4 Military**

Military action in countering terrorism is another policy tool suggested as an integral part of counterterrorism policies. Despite its actual vulnerability and the repeated attacks it faced, Kenya remained reluctant to take military actions until 2011. It is almost a decade after the birth of the threat that Kenya drew itself into a military action. The ICU seized power in Somalia in 2006 through armed force. The Ethiopian defense force joined the TFG in fighting

the group in early 2007 which resulted in a relative restoration of the power of the TFG. However, al-Shabaab remained in control of most part of the country mounting attacks within and outside Somalia (Buluma 2013). As the report by International Crisis Group (ICG) reveals, during this time, al-Shabaab militias and leaders have used Kenya for different counterinsurgency purposes (ICG 2014). As the situation in Somalia deteriorates, the UN Security Council authorized the AU to deploy a peacekeeping mission through a resolution 1744(2007) with a mandate of protecting peace and security in Somalia jointly with the TFG security forces. Accordingly, the AMISOM force was created in January 2007 to assist the TFG in overcoming the threat posed by al-Shabaab (AMISSOM 2016).

It was only in October 2011, that Kenyan Defence Force moved into Southern Somalia to pursue al-Shabaab after a series of kidnappings of tourists happened along its border, allegedly by the terrorist group (AMISOM 2016). One month later, the Kenyan government agreed to integrate and operate its forces under AMISOM. For a long time, Kenya operated under serious reservations because of fear of retaliation (Adan 2005). In general the discourse shows that the Kenyan military approach is retaliatory than forward-looking in responding to terrorism. In a similar fashion, the study by ICG asserts that the response of the Kenyan government as “reactive at best” (ICG 2014, 15). Such retaliatory action on the other hand will possibly lead to a cycle of action where the terrorist group also looks opportunity for retaliation. In its previous report on Kenya’s military action on al-Shabaab, the ICG has found Kenya’s internal unpreparedness which should have preceded the military actions. ICG stated that “Kenya urgently needs to reform its internal security services; what is presently on display is an incoherent system that weakens national security” (ICG 2012, 8). The report also reveals that the Kenyan military action was short of the necessary diplomatic alliance both with the TFG and the neighboring countries involved in the countries stabilization (ICG 2012, 8).

### **An overview of the data of attacks and damages caused by al-Shabaab in Ethiopia and Kenya**

Table 1: Al-Shabaab attacks, fatalities and injuries in Ethiopia (2006-2014)

<b>Year</b>	<b>Terrorist group</b>	<b>Number attacks</b>	<b>Fatalities</b>	<b>Injuries</b>	<b>Targets</b>
2014	Al-Shabaab	1	0	0	Police

2013	"	3	14	0	Private, Citizen Military
2012	"	0	0	0	-
2011	"	0	0	0	-
2010	"	0	0	0	-
2009	"	0	0	0	-
2008	"	1	0	0	NGO
2007	"	1	100	0	Military
2006	Al-Shabaab	0	0	0	-

Source: Data gathered by the author from GTDB, 2006-2014.

Table 2: Al-Shabaab attacks, fatalities and injuries in Kenya (2006-2014).

<b>Year</b>	<b>Terrorist group</b>	<b>Number attacks</b>	<b>Fatalities</b>	<b>Injuries</b>	<b>Targets</b>
2014	Al-Shabaab	79	238	319	Private citizens, business, police, Military
2013	Al-Shabaab	37	135	327	Private citizens, business, police, Military
2012	Al-Shabaab	53	81	367	Private citizens, business, police, Military
2011	Al-Shabaab	32	33	133	Private citizens, business, police, Military

2010	Al-Shabaab	8	8	41	Private citizens, business, police, Military
2009	Al-Shabaab	1	0	0	Police
2008	Al-Shabaab	1	0	0	Police
2007	Al-Shabaab	0	0	0	-
2006	Al-Shabaab	0	0	0	-

Source: Data gathered by the author from START (2006-2014).


The data of the terrorist attacks and assaults gathered represent the period from 2006 to 2014. Within this period of 9 years, Kenya faced a confirmed 211 attacks from the al-Shabaab terrorist group. The finding from the data shows that 495 deaths and 1,187 injuries were registered. This figure would have been much higher if the Garissa University attack of 2015, which claimed the life of more than 148 and injured more than 79 were included into the study.

On the other side, six (6) attacks were perpetrated in Ethiopia over the given period by the terrorist group. There are 114 deaths registered while there were no injuries registered according to the source. Even though not mentioned in the data, two of the three deaths registered in the year 2013 in Ethiopia were the suicide bombers themselves than innocent civilians or other targets.

The terrorist group targeted private citizens, businesses, religious institutions, the police, the military and government and other public institutions throughout in both countries. The terrorists used firearms and explosives in undertaking their terror act. Even though there were many attacks within the time frame in Kenya, the 2013 Westgate mall attack was recorded more gruesome. The Westgate attack in September 2013 claimed a life of 72 people and left 201 wounded as per the data from GTDB. The April 2015 Garissa University attack, the data which is not included in this observation, caused the death of 148 people and left 79 injured (BBC 2015).

The degree of vulnerability, attack and casualties shows an increasing trend in Kenya while the data shows a less frequent and a decreasing trend in both the attack and causality in Ethiopia as represented by the following figure (Figure 2). If data of the year 2015 were included we would have observed a more increasing trend in attacks, fatalities and injuries in Kenya.

Figure 1: Trend of attacks and injuries in Ethiopia and Kenya, 2006-2014



Source: Author generated

In Ethiopia, the most deadly attack was the one that targeted the military and it claimed the lives of 100 people in the year 2007. The most recent assault is the October 2013 suicide bombing attempt against the football fans watching world cup qualifying much between Ethiopia and Nigeria, as later revealed by NIA (Moore 2014). The explosives detonated prematurely causing the death of the two suicide bombers and damages to buildings (Moore 2014). The other conspirators who plotted the attack later confessed to the police and intelligence force that the attack was targeted at the gatherings in the football stadium and other two malls (Maashoo 2013). Maashoo writes, one of the suspects of plotting the terror told the police that the two men who were blown in the rented house returned back with their explosive vests which they had planned to detonate inside the target because of heavy security (Maashoo 2013). It would have caused many injuries to the fans in the stadium if the suicide were succeeded.

## 5. Conclusion

Terrorism is a complex threat which needs a flexible and coordinated policy response. I employed an empirical approach in this research to answer the research question whether a country with a more comprehensive counterterrorism policy is more successful than the others. The case countries selected (Ethiopia and Kenya) to evaluate the theory were very pertinent to assess the contemporary challenges of terrorism. The research consulted different secondary and primary data on the challenges posed by the transnational terrorism to the countries, the responses of the countries to the challenge and the outcome of the counterterrorism policies in the respective countries. The research found that a country with a more comprehensive counterterrorism policy is more successful in countering terrorism. Such country will have more capacity to detect the terrorist cells, to foil terrorist plots and to degrade terrorist organizations.

The Kenyan approach is characterized by an uncoordinated use of the policy tools. Kenya did not have specific laws dealing with terrorism until 2012. Still, the implementation of the 2012 act and the bill passed in the year 2014 is being hampered by oppositions and weak institution. Seen from the criminal justice parameter, the introduced law itself is still scattered and it is hardly possible for the subjects to understand what constitutes terrorism and what does not. It is difficult to predict the Kenyan criminal justice system because of its uncertainty. The security sector, especially the policing system, suffers from rampant corruption which in turn wrecked the efforts made through the criminal justice. Kenya kept the use of the military approach out of the policy options for fear of backlash and the political threat that it may trigger. It also operated under a high self-restraint in cooperating with neighboring countries fighting terrorism. Moreover, there is no effectively coordinated intelligence, policing, and prosecution system as observed from the law and as evidenced in the practical cases. The weak criminal justice, policing and intelligence at home, which could back the external engagements, made Kenya more vulnerable when it was later forced to engage outside as the threat grew unprecedentedly.

Ethiopia used the counterterrorism policy tools relatively in an integrated and comprehensive way. The criminal justice system, beyond defining terrorism, formally integrates the police, the intelligence and the prosecution sectors effectively. It puts a clear chain of command in their operation and the diplomacy and military actions were used concomitantly. Ethiopia, with a better comprehensive policy where the criminal justice, the policing and intelligence, the diplomacy and the military as a policy tool are jointly used, faced almost only insignificant attacks comparatively.

Terrorism, whether domestic or transnational, is an elusive and dynamic threat in nature. Responding to such a complex threat, as Crelinsten (2009) and other scholars suggested, needs the use of different arrays of policy tools in a coordinated and comprehensive way. Neither the sole use of a single policy tool nor uncoordinated policy instruments can help to address the contemporary challenge. Counterterrorism, as Crelinsten writes (2009), should not be merely reactive or coercive. A simply reactive or a simply coercive counterterrorism policy entails a repercussion and brings down countries to the hands of terrorists. Countries should be able to put a coherent and consistent criminal justice in place in advance. The policing and intelligence must be strengthened ethically, logistically and institutionally. Moreover, governments should be able to bring these institutions together formally in a meaningful manner with a clear chain of commands. Countries should engage more with countries in their region and the international community in a determined fashion so that terrorists can be deterred from benefiting from policy gaps. The military approach, must be made an integral part of the rest of the policy tools and should not be a mere reactionary. It must plan and act ahead so as to avoid the unnecessary cycle of actions and reactions as it is happening now.

In general, as demonstrated by the outcome of this research, a comprehensive counterterrorism policy approach is a sound policy option to respond to the growing challenge of terrorism. Hence, countries need to devise and put in place a comprehensive counterterrorism policy in their effort to respond to terrorism. However, responding properly through comprehensive policy still needs a political willingness and a determination on the part of the states

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## IN ARMENIA'S TRACES: TOWARD A NEW ARMENIAN PERSPECTIVE OF RECONCILIATION

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**Abstract:** *This paper focuses the concept of Armenian-ness beyond its legal recognition in the last constitution of the Republic of Armenia and its usage in everyday politics and public statements. In the pursuit of conducting a cross-country identity analysis, the term "Armenian-ness" is employed to point out both political and cultural potentialities for facilitating prevention for vulnerable Armenian groups living in marginalized borderlands and for creating a "crisis-mode-management" in order to unfreeze historical rivalries and conflictual relations with neighbouring countries.*

**Key words:** *Armenian-ness, Antonio Gramsci, Recognition, Identity, Circle of Humanity*

### 1. Introduction

*"The Armenians who find themselves scattered throughout Europe should make Armenia known, bring it alive for the unformed, for those who do not know and pay a heed"*<sup>3</sup>. By these words, in his article titled "Armenia", the Italian thinker Antonio Gramsci noted how the aftermath of the First World War had stirred up the "Armenia question" in the light of the mass-scale massacre conducted by Ottoman Turks against the Armenian population from the Mediterranean region to the Caucasus. While Gramsci's brief article reveals his unequivocal empathy for oppressed peoples and subalterns, whose images recollected to his mind his father family's experience of escapees from their historical land of origin<sup>4</sup>, his commentary seems to have historically imprinted the collective

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<sup>3</sup> Signed A. G. "Il Grido del Popolo", 11 Marzo 1916, anno XXII, n.607, ora in *Opere di Antonio Gramsci. Scritti Giovanili* (1914-1918). Translation, Ara H. Merijan, 2015.

<sup>4</sup> His father's family descended to from the people: Albanian Christians who began to settling parts of Italy in the fifteeneth century following Ottoman occupation of their native land.

identity of the diaspora-Armenian descendants and their Armenian-based peers.

Almost three decades onwards the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the transition of power in Armenia has recently elicited great public and international interest in the light of the already well-known »Armenia's Velvet Revolution« triggered upon Pashinyan's call for civil disobedience against the State apparatus. , Therefore, the latest mass-scale protests have facilitated the ongoing transition of power that began with the institutional transformation of the former presidentialto parliamentary system and two-constitutional reform processes aimed at establishing a more stable political regime in the path of a full-fledged democracy. Moreover, Armenia has taken a more active role in the political attempts to project itself as protector of some of ethnic groups that belong to Armenian heritage as well as those that do not but continue to live nowadays within the formerly Soviet Republic's territory. As mandated under new constitutional text, Armenia's Kurdish, Yazidi, Assyrian and Russian national minorities have been represented in the National Assembly with three members among the Republican Party and one with the Bloc Tsarukyan. Interestingly enough, while Armenia's political parties and institutions have expressed a high level of socio-political and cultural respect towards non-Armenian ethnic minority groups, kinship with scattered and broken segments of the ethnic Armenian communities has been stressed in order to foster definitive appease with "other Armenians". Since 2006, indeed, the approved dual citizenship law and the creation of a new government body of the Ministry of Diaspora began to mobilise emotional ties to the homeland and to implement cultural and spiritual interconnectedness among worldwide ethnic Armenians on behalf of the policy of *hayadardzutyun* (e.g., back to the roots)<sup>5</sup>. Although what means *being* or *feeling* Armenian (Bakalian 1993) today is different from the past and it has constantly changed in each of the historical time mainly due to Armenians diaspora, latest constitutional reforms and referendums have mutually opened the doors to the debate over understanding otherness in a (un-)conscious process of sharing and feeling common experiences of historical upheavals and forced dispersals. In this instance, Armenians' and Assyrians' experiences of trauma triggered by 1915 Genocide during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and today's Armenian solidarity towards "forgotten Armenians" in Syria and Iraq who have been forced to flee due to ongoing turmoil across the Middle East, have come to embrace otherness and diversity more than in the past within a set of previous experiences.

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<sup>5</sup> Darieva 2018.

Throughout this paper, I will pin down what differentiates the identity of the third and fourth diaspora-born generation of Armenians and that of their Armenia-based peers by employing the concept of Armenian-ness beyond its legal meaning, whose recognition in the Armenian constitutional text refers the Article 19. By doing so, I will attempt to implicate cultural aspects of Armenian-ness with a so-called *philosophy of praxis* that may bring Armenian culture to flourish as a whole. In pursuit of pointing out such dynamics of this reemerging communitarian identity, I will use the historical relevancy of the so-called “Armenian question” that Antonio Gramsci had raised in his short contribution “Armenia” for the Turin-based newspaper “Il Grido del Popolo” in Italy on 11 March 1926. From his philosophical viewpoint, Gramsci succeeded to bring to publicly light the “Armenian massacres” carried out by the Young Turks across Europe, describing at the same time what really happened throughout the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In tandem with this article from his juvenilia, which remains decidedly minor in comparison to a larger contribution of his cultural theory and political economy, I shall point out how Gramsci’s *wider circle of humanity* may potentially unravel process of recognition to those diverse forms that Armenian-ness that has taken (Cornell et al. 1998) in time in tandem with policy of inclusiveness and recognition of otherness. In particular, I will use philosophical and cultural insights by Smbat Hovhannisyan, Narek Mkrtchyan and Ara Merjian among others, in order to lay Armenian-ness out with what Gramsci referred to *philosophy of praxis*, which may culturally be oriented towards the creation of a prevention model for scattered and broken segments of Armenians at risk, and a “crisis-mode-management” aimed at unfreezing historical rivalries with neighbouring countries and strengthening future international alliances.

Of particular note is the central section of this paper, in which I will shortly present the main broken and scattered segments of Armenian communities and their re-production of Armenian culture and life norms diffused and borrowed in their both cultural everydayness and political practices. Hence, in the light of the current migratory phenomena that began recently to impinge on the Republic of Armenia, the apparently never-ending “life of purgatory” within which enrecognised Armenians live in the de facto Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, and the deep mourning sense of “a society of loss”, I shall define Armenian-ness as result of a hyphenated identity that – beyond its legal recognition – may bring Armenia out from economic and demographic crises by turning its geographically unlocked position and nostalgia into a future policy of reconciliation and cooperation.

In this attempt, I use to theoretically reject the idea of uniqueness and straightforward essence of a given identity that self-embodies the one and

only community. In the light of specific-group and intersectional issues that arise from within, such as LGBTQI and feminist perspectives, disabled people's issues, in the case of Armenian-ness I argue over the stable and pristine understanding of such identity, deriving from a preordained essence that would have schematically been racially, ethnically, linguistically, culturally or ontologically definable. On the contrary, I will define Armenian-ness as well as the cultural overview of "one's people" as a dynamic, complex, fluid, plural, multiple, overlapping, socially constructed and perhaps contradictory identity exposed to a selection of a set of available archetypes which, in turn, are evolving in time and tend to change.

However, I remain far from desecrating the Armenian identity, but at the same time I will define today's Armenian-ness as a form of new politics for potential perspectives for the young Caucasian Republic. In conclusion, rather than using Gramsci's relevant *denuncia* to pointed out once again how "*nothing was done, or at least nothing of any substance*" for recognizing the crime against Armenians, I shall try to avoid vivid images of individuals in flesh and blood by presenting Armenian-ness into a result of potential (re-)/interpretations of a millennial and transnational identity(-ies) and (trans-)/formations of form of politics through the mirror of culture, literature, history, and philosophy itself (Mkrtchyan 2016).

## **2. Between Nostalgia and Endurance**

Historical upheavals Armenian communities have passed through have never softened the rise of a powerful nostalgia for the partial loss of their historical lands of origin. While Abdul al-Hamid's massacre launched against the Armenian population within the Ottoman regions, forced expulsions of Armenians from the so-called "Western Armenia", the further Soviet takeover over the Caucasus and reallocation of Armenia-historically inhabited regions of Nakichevan and Karabakh to SSR Azerbaijan have framed an Armenian "society of loss" (Fedoseeva 2012).

Since 1960, the Armenia National Unification Party's requests sent to Moscow for re-allotting Turkey's Western-controlled territory and the majoritarian Armenian-inhabited regions of Nakhichevan and Autonomous Oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh back to SSR Armenia have been reduced to insignificance, remaining unvoiced due to the politics of the Cold War and Soviet inertia. Within this, a consequently increase of a strength sense of community began to shape more and more a nostalgia and collective perception of living across a fragile boundary zone in between Soviet outskirts and Turkish-NATO controlled-territory. All of these increased a

communitarian sense of insecurity over contested borderlands accordingly, bringing Armenians to live under pressure of the Soviet central power on the one side and Turkish enemies on the other one. At the same time, migratory outflows reduced dramatically the Armenian population after the Second World War, shaping a “communities in exiles” have never interrupted political campaigns for achieving recognition, revenge from history and preserve their faith.

As the time went by, the demise of the Soviet administration and the achievement of independence did not paved immediately the path towards potential reconciliations between Armenians and their previous experiences. By contrary, the breakup over Nagorno-Karabakh came to negatively (inter-)/play a crucial role in Armenian consciousness in shaping a collective sorrow and mourn based on the idea of endless experience of suffering. After the definitive dissolution of the Soviet regime, indeed, Nagorno-Karabakh’s rivalry with Azerbaijan has come to constitute the condition for the possible emergence of an Armenian-ness as an entity aimed at uniting that regional unfamiliarity that Western Armenians and Eastern Armenians have always experienced. With the eruption of the conflict within the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, an enchanted space whose meaning is based on the historically communitarian act of self-embodiment in defence of “one’s community”, the Karabakh Movement stirringly campaigned to transfer the enclave to Armenia, coalescing afterwards into a self-defencing force against Azerbaijan’s attempts to keep the disputed territory inside its de jure national borders.

While unsurprisingly endurance has been the Armenian legacy (Goldenberg 1994, 133), unconsciously Armenians did not give up in Gramsci’s suggestion to make Armenia known and bring it alive for the unformed, for those who do not know and pay a heed.

However, such historical experiences have allowably taken Armenians to be prudent in processes of integration of non-Armenian communities at first and in political engagement historical disputes and rivalries with Turkey and Azerbaijan at second. Moreover, uncertain prospects of brighter cooperation with Caucasian countries and other communities of the Armenian diaspora have showed unexpected concerns and further restrictions. In this instance, as Anny Bakalian pointed out in his survey on American Armenians, while the Armenian diaspora has lent Yerevan a certain stability over how much material support post-Soviet Armenia can count on from the émigré community, Armenian diaspora’s focus on restitution for the 1915 Genocide have been inflated. The rise of nationalism across the South Caucasus brought Armenians to suffer the rise of national campaigns, such as in Georgia, shifting

into a marginalized position of ethnic minority groups or hidden unvoiced conditions due to the risk of ethnic cleansing and violence, such as in Azerbaijan and Eastern Turkey.

More recently, however, the policy of potential return to the motherland for Armenian descendants seems to open among Armenia-based citizens a way for (re-)thinking a closer comparison and deeper understanding with the Armenian identity. Although all of these have come to concern Armenian descendants who in time have acquainted cultural intimacy and got used with different sets of social practices and intercultural relations (e.g., mixed marriages, different languages, social practices, different religions), which have been considered (arguably) to be far from a pristine and real Armenian-ness, the application of the so-called *hayadardzutyun* seems prompt to potentially foster from within a more and more close ties among Armenians from all over the world. Recent political events, which have shaken Armenian communities across the Caucasian region and Middle East and discovered other, have indeed gone beyond the constitutional framework and legal application of Armenian-ness by touching other related issues of communities that *feel* and *are* Armenian.

### **3. Armenian-ness: whose identity?**

Since the last Armenian constitution came into force, Armenian-ness seems to trigger a process of self-(re)identification of what makes and who is “an Armenian”, impinging not only on the sphere of law due to the introduction of the legal term “Armenian-ness” (Article 19) but also in the attempts to rethink what Gramsci had introduced. In other words, whether the historically Armenian identity question was forcedly reduced to a narrowly political discussion that ended up into a voiceless position, the comprehensive linkage with the worldwide Armenian diaspora in order to preserve their millenarian native heritage and facilitate a return “home” may go beyond its legal reference.

While it may be too early to define any definitive conclusion, there are solid grounds for thinking that the policy of Armenian-ness and its cultural conception among Armenia-based citizens will be one of the cornerstones of future full-fledged democracy.

In this regard, in the past two years the application of Armenian-ness has brought the Ministry of Diaspora to handle the impact of an unexpected movement of a relevant number of people from Northeast Syria, Lebanon and Iraqi Kurdistan with Armenian origins through a herculean policy of resettlement aimed at facilitating their comeback to their “motherland”.

Although the application of such legal framework has already harboured about 22.000 refugees who have heartbreakingly decided to leave family members and friends behind in order to seek refuge in Armenia, the strategy itself seems to challenge the political purpose of such welcoming policy, whose aftermaths (i.e., integration, inclusion, participation and so forth) may seriously challenge the contemporary Armenian society. While unsurprisingly the majority of refugees decided to permanently remain in the country as they represent the third and fourth diaspora-born generations of those Armenian survivals of the mass-scale massacre occurred in 1915, the decision of a few hundreds of them to resettle their life down in the contested region of Nagorno-Karabakh, supported by Armenian Minister of Diaspora, remains arguable. Despite potentially military escalation and hostilities with Azerbaijan's military attempts to retake control over the region might impinge the newcomers' everyday life, in the modest village of Ishkhanadzor 15 miles north of the Araxes river alongside the Iranian border, about two hundred Syrian and Lebanese Armenians joined the local community living in the uncertain area<sup>6</sup>. On the one hand, their willingness to live within another region under fire shows how Armenian diaspora continues to feel attached what is still considered their historical land of origin. On the other hand, while recently Ministry of Diaspora affirmed that the Armenian Syrian problem is a pan-Armenian concern to tackle, the Republic of Artsakh's<sup>7</sup> representative authorities envisage to give ownership right to land to those Armenian countrymen who express their desire to contribute to the agriculture and horticulture sector of the contested region.

Besides politically-oriented interests of the policy of Armenian-ness, the former outlines prominent and diverse forms of Armenian identities. To a certain extent, this outlines Bakalian's argumentation concerning the fact that Armenians have not lost their identity of being community, whereas they have held onto it and transformed it (Bakalian 1993). When hundreds of thousands of Armenians were targets of pogroms throughout the demise of the Ottoman Empire that took place since the Hamidian massacre between 1894 and 1896 with the slaughter of 200-300.000 Armenians until up to the end of First World War where 1.500.000 Armenians died, a significant

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<sup>6</sup> See more "Ghettoization, Insecurity and Destabilization: Refugees Crisis in Southeast Europe and South Caucasus"-©HOLDS Foundation | IISA 2017, p.9.

<sup>7</sup> In 20 February 2017, the popular referendum held in Nagorno-Karabakh approved the change of name to the "Republic of Artsakh". According to the Artsakh Central Election Commission, 79,314 voters participated in the voting - 76.44% of eligible voters, at final tally.

number of survivors flew out moving to United States. By 1900, 12,000 Armenians had taken refuge on the American soil, while by 1915 other 60,000 Armenians continued to come from various parts of the Middle East because of a variety of reasons. Nowadays, the Armenian-born third and fourth generations have marked a relevant shift in the concept of the so-called “Armenian-ness”. Within this, those Armenian Americans who are descendants of the first wave of Armenians have marked a relevant shift by reducing their “Being Armenian” without stopping themselves of “feel Armenian”. As Anny Bakalian notes in his survey conducted among Armenian Americans who currently live in US, if “Being Armenian” is referred to sharing a distinct language, living with a distinct lifeworld, carrying a common and identifiable culture, and living one’s life within predominantly set of social rules and relations (i.e., marriage, friendship, faith and so forth), “feeling Armenian” is different. Similar to Armenian descendants who came back home from the Middle East after the breakup of the latest turmoil across Syria and Iraq, Armenian American great-children of the immigrant generation continue to maintain a high level of Armenian-ness, whose identity-oriented affiliation is proudly expressed by a cultural bandage with their ancestral heritage and a strong sense of “we-ness” and peoplehood.

Nevertheless, despite politically limited and culturally exposed to changes, Armenian communities living across the Caucasus and worldwide diaspora have tended to proudly keep their “being Armenian” rather than showing an erosion of it. Armenians of Georgia, for instance, majoritarian in the region of Samtskha-Kvemokartly in the districts of Akhalkalak, Akhaltska, Aspindza, Borijom and Ninotsminda, in Tbilisi, Shulavari and Manuli and in the province of Kutaisi, Gori, Javakhk, have historically expressed their sense of belonging to Armenia-ness in spite of the stereotypic and pejorative epithets of “Bosha” (literally empty or vacant from the Turkish folk-term *boş*) and “Gypsies from Caucasus” with which they are named and addressed even by other Armenia-based peers. Although such identification undermines their affiliation with the Armenian heritage, Armenians of Georgia have maintained their sense of belongingness in time. Besides being adherents to the Armenian Apostolic Church and having a strong Armenian-speaking attitude, their low level of political participation and civic engagement in the Georgian political landscape shows one of the most typical attitudes of national minority groups bounded in a clan system based on familiar and friendship relations (ECMI – Caucasus 2015), has never eroded their Armenian sense of membership. Moreover, their sedentary and rural lifestyle excludes any involvement in borderless lifeworld such as the one of the Roma populations and defies the term “Gypsies from the Caucasus”. However, the term *Hay Bosha*, which refers

an “Armenian Gypsy”, is used for addressing bad attitudes in sociality as well as social differences between city-dwellers and villagers who belong either to the Armenian city of Giumri or its surrounding rural areas. The Apostolic Armenian Church, too, refers to Armenian peasants by using the term “Maghegarts Hayer”, which means Armenian-sieve maker. Because of that, Armenians in Georgia do not often say publicly their origin even though such term is nowadays tolerable and tightly connects the Armenian community, whose members have Armenian ancestors from past generation (Marutyan 2011, 311) living in the Ottoman Armenian millets.

With the demise of Soviet administration, the issue of Armenian communities and their Armenian belonging began to address those territories that in the post-Communist state-building processes impinged human security within disputed borderlands, such as in Marneuli Bolnisi and Abkhazia in Georgia and in the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in de jure territory of former SSR Azerbaijan. While in Georgia the declaration of independence and the breakups of armed conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia truncated the country, in the territory of former SSR Azerbaijan the eruption of the conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) exposed Armenians to a wide range of abuses, such as in Baku, Sumgait and even before in Kirovabad.

In both cases, Armenians have stood up in defence of their unique identity. Throughout the Georgia for Georgians campaign carried out by Gamsakhurdia’s followers, which paved the way to a Bosnia-like scenario, Armenians began to protect the Armenian St. Nsham Church in spite of the imposed change of their suffix surname from *-yan* to *-dze* or *-shvili* (Goldenberg 1994). Meanwhile, Karabakh Armenians began to impinge on Azeri national-building process until coming to entirely control the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) and militarily occupying surrounding buffer zones in protection of Armenians and in connection with today’s territory of Republic of Armenia. However, many ethnic minority groups belonging to Armenian milieu, namely Armeno-Udis and Armeno-Tats, have consequently suffered the military hostilities with Azerbaijan. Alike Armenians in Georgia, indeed, in the agricultural areas of Nij Armeno-Udis has shed the *-yan* of their surname and were forced to serve the Azerbaijani army.

According to the census dated 1999, the Armenian community living in de jure Azeri territory amounted to around 120.700, with at least 120.000 living only in the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. Others, who belong to Armenian milieu, live around the rural areas of Mədrəsə and Kilvar within the Province of Baku and Sumgayit, the village of Nij, in the region of Qabala, in

the former province of Vartashar and Oğuz, suffering a high level of discrimination and living under the line of poverty. In retrospect, they have apparently lost their Armenian identity due to the separation from relatives and families that came as consequence of the exacerbation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Most likely, they represent the last members of the second and third generation of mixed marriages during the Soviet era. From a historical prospective, the so-called “Armeno-Udis” and “Armeno-Tats” have gained intimate acquaintance with Old-Armenian religious affiliation and linguistic roots. Since 13th century, for instance, Udis inhabited the old province of Owtickc between the Kura river and the region of Artsakh, today’s province of Tavush. Despite largely contested by Azeri historians who argue that a few similarities cannot completely prove such double tight bondage amongst Udis and Armenians, most likely Old-Udi culture has never undergone a process of modernization. Within this, both processes of Sovietisation and the creation of SSR Azerbaijan came to produce a cross-fertilization between Udis’ language and Oriental loans of Lezgian and Northwest Iranian dialects, shaping today’s Modern-Udi language in turn. Indeed Azeri literature, which considers a wide range of Russian studies on Udis of Karabakh, claims that those territories between Sevan Lake and the Kura River including a mountainous region in between belong to Caucasian Albanians with turksöy origin. Because of that, Azeri historians have kept arguing that Albanian Udis have never been Armenian but they got involved in a process of Armenianisation instead. By contrary, the Armenian historian Kirakos Gandzaketsi has dedicated a specific section to Caucasian-Albanian congeners and coreligionists within his “History of Armenia” in spite of their disputable identity.

In addition, Armeno-Tats address another historical issue of belonging alike Udis. Due to the conquest of the country by Arabs in the VII century, the entire Tat community was divided into three main groups along religious lines. The first and largest group, whose members adopted Islam became part of the Azeri ethnos, while others living in the northeast of today’s Azerbaijan adopted Judaism and are named “mountain Jews”. The third and least numerous group of Tats, adopted Christianity of the mono-physite direction which made them closer to Armenians. In the early nineteenth century, they lived in Khachmaz, in the settlements Kilvar (modern Devichi district) and Madrasa (Shemakha district) having preserved themselves as a distinct ethnicity. However, the number of Armenians that moved increased and that considerably accelerated the process of Armenianisation among Tats. As a result, although they spoke the usage of their Tat dialect in private life within the community, by the end of the 1920s about 90 percent of Kilvar inhabitants

spoke Armenian, especially those young people who emigrated for seasonal jobs to Baku (Volkova 1969, 38). The same process of Armenianisation also took place among Tats living in the village of Madrasa, where in the 1920s only the elderly knew the Tat language. In Soviet times, that group of Tats was completely Armenianised and when the Karabakh conflict flared up in 1988, they were perceived by those around them as Armenians and soon left Azerbaijan for Armenia and Russia.

#### **4. Instead of Conclusion: Armenian-ness as a Form of Cultural Politics and Reconciliation**

As discussed above, Antonio Gramsci's epistemological, phenomenological and more generally philosophical denuncia of the post-1915 upshot is key to look beneath surface of the issues of today's Armenian identity(-ies). In my opinion, Gramsci's suggestion to all "*Armenians [to] make Armenia known, bring it alive for the unformed, for those who do not know and pay a heed*" seems to have created a mixture of socio-political and cultural aspects (i.e., sociality, history, memory) that are interplaying in Armenia's international relations and national phenomena. Historically, whether unrecognised crimes against Armenians have come to directly alienate their worldwide community from what Gramsci himself called circle of humanity, Armenian-ness in tandem with the last recognition of otherness may trigger in day-by-day politics a so-called *philosophy of praxis*. In this instance, the cultural aspect of *hayadardzutyun* (e.g., back to the roots), namely Armenian-ness beyond its legal and judicial application, is first and foremost a direct result of Gramsci's *denucia* in defense of Armenians. Besides such historical perspective, Armenian-ness seems to bring to light also a new perspective of opportunities that would possibly achieve reparations (Havhannisyan 2016) for historical rivalries. To put it simple, Gramsci's philosophical approach to history and collective memory is as directly as indirectly related to ongoing Armenian political campaigns for recognition (e.g., 1915 Genocide in what is today Turkey) and millennial claims over their historical land of origin (e.g., Nagorno-Karabakh within *de jure* territory of Azerbaijan). Within this loop of a wider circle of humanity, in which everyone is involved if recognized, Armenian-ness has come to interplay a crucial role over issues of Armenian identities. In order to trigger such recognisability, according to reconciliation from historical trauma and worsening experiences from the past, transnational processes of society are especially indicated. Thus, as even Antonio Gramsci stated, for an event to interest us, to move into it, it must be something recognizable, it must affect a people of whom we have heard

spoken before<sup>8</sup>. Thereby, Armenian-ness seems here to label a transnational paradigm of identity that transcends the (mis-)/conception of imagined communities delimited by contemporary nation-state boundaries (Glavanakova 2016, 26), namely today's Republic of Armenia. Rather than an object of distress and symbol of sorrow, which has (self-)/embodied a community of victims and shape a deep sense of victimhood, current Armenian-ness in all its forms of expression brings those who are and feel Armenian to be agents, actors, authors of a perspective of opportunities oriented to set up a new international and national dialogue.

Despite the fact that the Armenian-ness deserves to be legitimately questioned (Cornell et al. 1998) in the light of the millennial claims over cultural and political recognition, the former involves Armenians into a circle of humanity whose becoming does not stand only in theory, but rather it concerns practice. Armenian-ness, whose recognition in the constitutional law goes beyond, is also a presence of a political and cultural force. In regard with the Hegelian-Marxist understanding of force that Gramsci borrows from phenomenological tradition, Armenian-ness is (inter-)playing the role of a force aimed at decisively reconciling and (re-)/thinking a transnational community in all its difference forms of existence with the purpose of bringing consciousness from "one" to the "also", and from "also" back into the "one" (Bhattacharyya 2011). In other words, Armenian-ness seems to be aimed at creating a new participatory space with the purpose to make the Armenians' community perceivable (with-)/in itself, for itself and for otherness. In addition, Armenian-ness is a form of manifestation of participatory process within which perspectives of getting Armenians involved a practical humanism. In fact, not only political practise carried out by ministers, government institutions and politics, but also those cultural-ideological institutions (i.e., mass-information, literature, church, school) are interplaying a decisive role. In fact, Armenian-ness is apparently fostering closer ties among Armenian communities - in both its Armenia-based and worldwide diaspora entities - by strengthening cultural connection over identity understood as a whole, e.g., literature, history, art, music, language, lifeworld and so forth.

In this instance, what Gramsci referred as a philosophy of praxis is indeed the mirror of culture, literature and philosophy itself (Mkrtchyan 2016, 121), which seem to provide a deep sense of humanism among Armenians by even raising collective awareness towards otherness. Due to this Armenian-ness's *philosophy of praxis*, whose activity functions mutually as process of

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<sup>8</sup> Antonio Gramsci, Armenia, op.cit.

alienation (re-idealization) of Armenian community considered to be a part of humanity are provided with an opportunity to not only get involved in the circle of humanity, but also to establish their transnational and national presence in tandem with its millennial heritage, legacy and potentiality.

For instance, this explains the inner sense of solidarity surmounted among Armenians towards Syrian and Lebanese and Iraqi Armenian refugees, the majority of whom have had opened the doors of integration in Armenia and the opportunity to seriously reconsider their Armenian belonging while turning their feeling of “being Armenian” into a deeply recognised “beingness” in all spheres of sociality. In confrontation with Bakalian’s argumentation over his survey on American Armenians and their “feeling Armenians” instead of being, Armenian-ness does not attempt to culturally reduce the dichotomy between those who *feel* with those who *are* Armenians, but also it is paving the path toward a “becoming”. Accordingly, by conceptualising Armenian-ness through ancestral belongingness and recollection of worsening memory from previous traumas (Denishinko 2015), Syrian-Armenian refugees and Boshia-Armenians of Georgia and tiny crypto-Armenian communities in Turkey and Azerbaijan alike could trigger a historical change of a “community in exile”, whose identity depends on their historical one’s positing. In few words, the cultural force of Armenian-ness is not essentialist here. Since Armenian-born third and fourth generations’ individuals differ in their personal experiences of intercultural exchange and contacts, they also differ in what cultural elements they choose in order to adopt and internalise. This, however, does not cease those Armenian descendants to all links with being Armenian.

All of these could have the potentiality to turn Armenia’s society of loss with its “blood of innocents” into a new path of a community in (re)making. In the perception of oneself as another, affiliation and attribution assigned to the other are after internalised by the Self in the act of self-identification. Here, a clear example could be the view of those Armenians have of those American or Russian or Middle Eastern Armenian descendants whose Armenian identity has been changing in time and they have internalised as different. Within, Armenian-ness, which is nowadays bringing today’s idea of Armenian nationhood to light under a different shade, will come to challenge the position of the country within the international arena. By feeling those who are just feeling to be Armenian, such as in the case of Syrian, Lebanese or American descendants of Armenians, Armenia-based peers would establish new cultural connections without portraying their feeling as “foreign” to them.

Concerning the longest post-Soviet conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenian and Azerbaijani refusal to look for a peaceful solution has in time shaped a collective inability to forget the horror and worsening pages of collective traumas. Although the youngest generations of Armenians have never had experience of encountering the “Other” because they have never personally experienced the war, nor they are descendants of Armenian or Azeri displaced families from Karabakh, nor former Soviet Karabakh dwellers, their sense of “being wounded”, which seems impossible to heal, continues to deeply-rooted intertwine images of war in their collective consciousness. It followed that all emotional and psychological patterns and objects of gross violence, a “life of purgatory” and heroic struggles for survival and resistance have strengthened and exacerbated a negative process of persuasion towards the image of “Otherness” understood as “enmity” or “theft”, whose responsibility for the death of innocent civilians must receive an appropriate punishment. In this instance, political discourse and conflicting memories around which the narrative of Nagorno-Karabakh’s rivalry has been in time (re-)constructed, has constantly maintained an unsustainable status quo without which it would be impossible for Armenians to maintain their coherent struggle for self-determination and for Azerbaijanis to keep campaigning for having Qarabağ back.

However, in the same way Armenian-ness and its *philosophy of praxis* found answers from history and shaped a deep sense of humanity (Marjian 2016) for assessing welcome policies for Syrian and Lebanese Armenian refugees, Armenian-ness may trigger future forms of involvement with the Other will be not reducible to simply binary opposition “us-against-them”. Also for constitutional recognition of Armenia’s Assyrian, Yazidi and Kurdish groups to ensure their positions in the country, such appropriate respect towards otherness may mutually assure respect from others (Kymlicka 1995, 105) by finding a path for reconciliation, hence repentance, forgiveness, healing and renewal, that in the first instance nation-building has avoided. With regards the so-called hidden Islamised Armenians of Turkey who began to recently come out from the shadow they have been living since Genocide 1915, such recognition could be key to unfreeze Armenia-Turkey hostile relations.

Such new Armenian attitude towards otherness and diverse forms of Armenia-ness have increased Armenia’s role over the region in the attempt to flee the landlocked position that nowadays affects the potential development of Armenia in the region. For instance, the official statement by the self-proclaimed Artsakh Republic to welcome Iraqi Kurds’ claim for independence shows how Armenian-ness has already come to formalise a form of politics.

Within this, rather than a policy of Armenian unity understood as a remembrance of “Great Armenia”, which remains seriously problematic (and might provoke serious security issues across the region), the recognition of tiny ethnic minority groups can lay grounds for bridging Armenian descendants and meanwhile trying to reconcile historical and political upheavals with neighbours. Besides Georgia’s deepening economic relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan and a few historical upheavals Armenians of Georgia have passed through, Armenian-ness could strengthen positive memories based on religious faith and good-neighbourly relations for fomenting friendly people-to-people images within both societies and politically even beyond. In other words, by shaping Armenian-ness as a form of politics within its different articulations and expressions, such Armenian identity could shape a new collective subjectivity and direct the worldwide community towards a path of political opportunities in order to foster new actors, agents and authors rather than perpetuating Armenian identity in terms of distress and victimhood.

In conclusion, Armenian-ness might offer to scattered (i.e., Armenian diaspora) and broken (i.e., Turkey’s hidden Islamised Armenians, Tat-Armenians and Udi-Armenians in Azerbaijan) segments of Armenian societies to become self-organised through theoretical and practical. It might be unique, long, but promising way to overcome voiceless-ness, humbleness and subordination. In this way, Armenians would not be forgotten in a world animated by new political, cultural and social phenomena that will be challenging Armenian identity and culture as a whole in the future.

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## **‘TO VOTE OR NOT TO VOTE...’ – THAT’S NOT REALLY A QUESTION: POLITICAL ALIENATION IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY**

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**Abstract:** *Since democracy won a decisive and ‘hegemonic’ victory over the other forms of government after the World War II, the question about the best form of government has ultimately been replaced by the best form of democracy. However; taking the ‘victorious’ version of democracy as a starting point and differing from it by some preceding adjectives, many models cannot succeed in laying a ‘dialectical bridge’ between the classical and the modern contested conception of democracy. Trying to build this connection/bridge upon the assumption that the dominant conception of democracy based on nation-states has expanded the borders (in terms of polity) and the boundaries (in terms of population) of democratic rule but failed to deepen its prototype Athenian Democracy, this paper probes into the problem of being an active political subject and participation within the context of the reciprocal relationship between political alienation and the size and scope of the political units.*

**Key words:** *Democracy, Political Alienation, Size/Scope of Political Units*

### **1. Introduction**

*“The entire history of political thought”, as Norberto Bobbio points out in his book *Democracy and Dictatorship*, “is riddled with disputes about the best form of government and within this dispute a recurrent theme has been the argument for and against democracy.” (Bobbio 1989, 138). As democracy gained a decisive and ‘hegemonic’ victory over the other forms of government after 1945, the relevant argumentation has turned into the best form of democracy. That is why various adjectives such as “radical”, “deliberative”, “consociational” etc. precede the concept of democracy. The main purpose of*

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these models of democracy is to increase the participation of individuals and to enhance plurality in political decision-making processes. However; regarding the 'victorious' version of democracy as a starting point and differing from it by the adjectives, these models do not make reference to the 'dialectical bridge' (which this paper assumes to exist) between the classical and the modern contested conception of democracy.

Trying to build this connection/bridge upon the assumption that the dominant conception of democracy based on nation-states has expanded the borders (in terms of polity) and the boundaries (in terms of population) of democratic rule but failed to deepen its archetype Athenian Democracy, this paper focuses on the problem of active political subject and participation within the context of an objective term "political alienation" that could be defined as the subjective hardships of individuals as political actors. In other words, the research question of this paper is the theoretical as well as practical means of handling the [paradoxical] problem of political alienation in 21<sup>st</sup> Century world where almost all states call themselves democratic/republican, and democracy has become a very strong rhetorical instrument used by world leaders.

Accordingly, the first part of the paper deals with the term/concept political alienation. It could be said that political alienation rises where 'appeasing' the discontent with the current democracy and 'longing for' the classical/ancient democracy intersects, and there are many 'checkpoints' like elections/sortition-lottery, representative democracy–distinction between citizens and politicians/direct democracy–overlapping of citizens and politicians. The second part tries to relate the problem of political alienation to representative and direct democracy by criticizing representative democracy. The third and the last part of the paper examines the size/scope of democracies or political units in the light of the first two parts: the size and scope of political units plays an important role because wanting human beings to engage in politics entails making the political units more 'humanistic', and this seems possible through rearranging today's political 'edifices' in a way that people say "the choice/decision is mine, and so is the responsibility.", keeping them away from 'powerlessness', 'meaninglessness, and 'isolation'. To this end, some criteria by Frederick G. Whelan, (namely; "all-affected principle", "problem of territoriality", "consent", "nationality" and "geographical features" in line with "autonomy") which are considered to be indispensable to re-sizing any democratic political unit, are used in an interpretive manner.

## 2. [Political] Alienation: Does Voting Make People Political?

In social sciences, many concepts like family, cities, the state, the administrative traditions and structures etc. could be traced back to ancient times in the long historical course of humankind. When it comes to alienation, however, there is no need to go deep in history: Alienation is somewhat new to human beings as its origins date back to 19<sup>th</sup> Century. The concept alienation is used and developed by Fichte (1762 – 1814) and Hegel (1770 – 1831) in philosophical sense, but it is Karl Marx (1818 – 1883) that gives the concept or the term its sociological meaning: human estrangement (Pappenheim 1956).

According to ‘young’ Marx, alienation starts in the process of production which is conceived as the most direct, important and inevitable social relation. The separation of labour from the means of production is the initial phase and the cause of alienation that leads to the fact that *“the more the worker produces, the less he has to consume; the more values he creates, the more valueless, the more unworthy he becomes; the better formed his product, the more deformed becomes the worker; the more civilised his object, the more barbarous becomes the worker; the mightier labour becomes, the more powerless becomes the worker...”* Once the worker is alienated from the products that he himself<sup>1</sup> produces, he is automatically alienated from the process of production. In other words, he cannot give any meaning to what he does or in Marx’s words; *“the alienation of activity, the activity of alienation”* begins (Marx 2007, 71-72).

The workers do, of course, not produce out of nothing. They intentionally change the material world or the nature with their creative labour. However, estranged/alienated labour is unable to draw a line between human beings (or what Marx calls “human species”) and the material world/nature. This is to say that mankind loses his ability to demarcate himself from other beings in the nature<sup>2</sup>. As for this problem, *“An animal produces only itself; whilst man reproduces the whole of nature”* says Marx, *“An animal’s product belongs immediately to his physical body, whilst man freely confronts its product”*. If

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<sup>1</sup> The reason why Marx chose to use only “he” for the third singular person is very simple: Marx points to industrial production when saying production, and in his times (still today) males are employed in industrial production. Today, the composition of employment is surely balanced by females. However, I also choose to use “he” not to break the consistency with the Marx cited work, *the Manuscripts*.

<sup>2</sup> One may find this remark pretty ‘anthropocentric’. However, it is true that of all the creatures it is human beings who are able to think about themselves (self-reflexivity) and make history.

man cannot freely deal with his products (not only industrial or material ones but also other products out of his 'abstract' labour) he becomes an inactive part of the nature and alienates both from the external nature and his own individual existence. This isolation results in self-estrangement and estrangement from others (Marx 2007, 74-77).

Table 1: Alienation in General and Political Alienation

<b>Marx's Concept of Alienation</b>	<b>Political Alienation</b>
Workers devoid of means of production	<i>powerlessness</i>
Workers alienated from the process of production	<i>meaninglessness</i>
Workers alienated/estranged from the nature	<i>normlessness</i>
Workers isolated/alienated from society	<i>isolation</i>
Workers alienated from themselves	<i>self-estrangement</i>

Source: Produced from Marx (2007) and Seeman (1959)

Although Marx conception of alienation seems to be specific for the workers/labour, it relates production and reproduction of material life to humans' general position and efforts towards daily life in its full sense. That is why Marx's concept can be conceived as a general and comprehensive notion of alienation which bears important and core resemblances to political alienation as a specific situation. In classical and highly cited articles, five alternative meaning or dimensions of political alienation, which are redolent of alienation in general, are pointed out: "powerlessness", "meaninglessness", "normlessness", "isolation", and "self-estrangement" (Seeman 1959; Finifter 1970): As it can be followed from the table above, powerlessness could be defined as individuals' belief that they cannot change or be powerful enough to influence general policies or political outcomes (Seeman 1959, 784; Finifter 1970, 390). This could be construed as individuals'/voters' devoid of means of politics just like workers' devoid of means of production. This is also bound up with meaninglessness, as individuals' devoid of necessary means for changing or influencing politics and political institutions thus excluded from the system or avoid engaging in it, cannot discern clear choices or decisions (Finifter 1970, 390). In other words, since "*the individual's minimal standards for clarity in decision-making are not met*" no meaningful prediction can be made about future consequences of political behaviour like voting (Seeman 1959, 786). In terms of meaningless, individuals/voters who are alienated from (or at least have no 'understanding' of) political system could be

resembled estranged workers from the process of production. Normlessness, in this context, can be taken as an ‘anomie-like’ situation in which political disorder becomes order, and this is like the relationship between the worker and the external world mentioned above. Following up normlessness, isolation means “apartness from society” or in its specific sense, “apartness from political life” that the individual/voter passively rejects the norms and goals shared by society in large (Seeman 1959, 789; Finifter 1970, 391). As the last dimension, self-estrangement could be regarded as the cumulative result of the four aforementioned aspects of political alienation.

As it can be inferred from the table above and the relevant remarks, there may be some gaps between Marx’s conception of alienation and political alienation as a socio-psychological phenomenon. However, the core point is the same: *“If my own activity does not belong to me, if it is an alien, a coerced activity, to whom, then, does it belong?”* (Marx 2007, 78). In terms of politics, the answer is clear: [‘professional’] politicians.

### **3. The Form Matters: What has been ‘Evaporated’ in the Transition from Direct Democracy to Representative Democracy?**

The first and foremost feature of representative democracy is the distinction between politicians and ordinary citizens. In other words, politics has appeared, so to say, as an ‘occupation or service’, excluding the ordinary citizens from governmental affairs as well as ‘lifting’ the burden of them from those citizens (As Aristotle once wanted it to be<sup>3</sup>) after democracy (as a direct practice) woke up from its long sleep and became a representative practice. To summarize the story:

Democracy, as we know and ‘embrace’ it, was born in Ancient Greece around VI. & V. Century, BC. Though more primitive versions of it had been practiced in various Middle East regions with the presence of local assemblies, a consultation model in Sumerian cities, and some administrators or governors who controlled the production and distribution, the Greek Polis

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<sup>3</sup> Although Aristotle accepts and asserts the ‘fact’ that “man is by nature a political animal”, not all men are capable of ruling or making political decisions. In his *Politics*, Aristotle makes clear distinctions between the services and people who are supposed to deal with these services, with pointing out that in democracies all the people are responsible for all the services. As far as “the service of political deliberation and civil jurisdiction” concerned, this service is to be performed by men who have adequate ‘wisdom’, free time and property (Aristotle 2009, Book VII, Chapter 9).

was the home to the first democratic administration and is still considered as the foundation of democracy and political theory (Canfora 2010, 24; Lipson 2005, 67; Uslu 2013, 138–139). In the ‘genesis’ of Athenian democracy there were three distinctive concepts: Freedom, equality and justice. The governmental practices and administration turned into a democratic one only after two reforms known as Solon and Cleisthenes Reforms. Through Solon’s rules slavery were abolished among Athenian citizens and they were given to right to go to court as a free citizen. According to Aristotle, this was the result of the revolt of people against the government by a few elites, oligarchy (Aristoteles 2013, 9 & 11). It could be said that with these changes in Athenian government two big issues, freedom and justice are somewhat settled. As for equality, Cleisthenes reforms came with a tremendous development which gave the government its true and final name. Through the reforms led by him, Athens was divided into 139 administrative units named “deme” or “demos”. The meaning of this development marked the great change in the organization of political entity: people/citizens were divided and regarded as equals regardless of their wealth and social status. In other words, citizens started engaging in politics according to their territory in which they lived, not a reference to their economical power or social/family status (Uygun 2003, 25; Lipson 2005, 331). After being dissolved by the Macedonian Kingdom, democracy fell into a long-deep sleep. Though it tried to revive through some practices in city states in Italy (during 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> Centuries), the Renaissance of Democracy was realized by political movements and documents related to human rights<sup>4</sup> or by the *content* of democracy: freedom, justice and equality. However, this time democracy’s salient trait or its ‘essential form’ is lost or ‘evaporated’. In Wood’s word, “[T]he idea of democracy has a very long history – something one would never guess from their account. There can be no doubt that modern conceptions of equality have expanded -at least in the breadth if not in the depth- far beyond the exclusive Greek conception which denied the democratic principle to women and slaves<sup>5</sup>. At the same time, the changes that have occurred in the meaning of democracy

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<sup>4</sup> 1679 Habeas Corpus, 1689 Bill of Rights and etc. could be mentioned as examples which cultivated in the French Revolution and the United States Constitution after a hundred years.

<sup>5</sup> Of course, the number of the free men in Athens was very limited, and the most famous “fearless speaker” Socrates was sentenced to death by the democratic regime. However, it should not be forgotten that slavery was survived until the late 19<sup>th</sup> Century in the USA as an ‘exemplary’ state of democracy and most of the democratic countries gave women their rights to vote after the Second World War (Castoriadis, 1997:275).

*have not all been on the side of delegitimizing inequality. Far from it. In fact, one of the most significant dimensions of the 'democratic revolution' [or 'awakening'] is that it marks the dissociation of 'democracy' from its meaning as popular power, rule by the demos." (Wood 1998, 66).*

It is a fact that the territorial 'reign of democracy' has steadily enlarged since its birth: from polis to the city states of Renaissance to the nation-states and to global-regional political actors even to the United Nations<sup>6</sup>. Accordingly, "Representative democracy" looks like the best 'fix' when the size of political units and the number of people living under those units are taken into account. As mentioned above, in terms of the *content*, it could be said that there is almost no incongruence between direct and representative democracy: freedom, justice and equality in ancient times 'resurrected' as "liberté, égalité and fraternité" in French Revolution; "isegoria" as freedom of speech, "isonomia" as equality before law etc... However, when it comes to the *form*, it can be assumed that there is a dialectical relationship between the Greek direct practice and modern representative democracy: If direct democracy is thesis, representative democracy anti-thesis in terms of *formal* mechanisms and functioning. In other words, despite the fact that representative democracy has enlarged and enhanced<sup>7</sup> the territory and the demos of political entities both in theory and practice, the formal qualities of democratic rule has gotten complicated and the direct practice of it *forgotten*<sup>8</sup>.

"*We have become*", says Wood, "*so accustomed to the formula 'representative democracy' that we tend to forget the novelty of the American idea. In its Federalist form, at any rate, it meant that something hitherto perceived as the antithesis of democratic self-government was now not only compatible with but constitutive of democracy: not the exercise of political power but its relinquishment, its transfer to others, its alienation. The alienation of political power was so foreign to the Greek conception of democracy that even election could be regarded as an oligarchic practice, which democracies might adopt for specific purposes but which did not belong to the essence of the democratic constitution.*" (Wood 2000, 216-217). This is to say that political alienation is a problem *of* and *for* and *by* representative democracy, if not to

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<sup>6</sup> To some scholars on transnational and cosmopolitan democracy, the UN could be regarded as "the embryo for a possible world government".


<sup>7</sup> In fact, representative democracy is one of the most important results of this enlargement and 'enhancement'; however, as a relation, once/since it appeared it has started affecting the conditions out of which it came.

<sup>8</sup> It is important to note that after the Greek experience, the most remarkable example of direct democracy is "Paris Commune" in 1871 which lasted 72 days.

say that it is a direct result of representative (version of) democracy. That's why the archetype of democracy, Athenian Democracy's legacy is still valuable although it is *diluted* by especially the American way of representative democracy, as Wood points out (Wood 2000:203). She further criticizes the Founding Fathers' conception of democracy compared to the Greek experience: *"The American republic firmly established a definition of democracy in which the transfer of power to 'representatives of the people' constituted not just a necessary concession to size and complexity but rather the very essence of democracy itself. The Americans, then, though they did not invent representation, can be credited with establishing an essential constitutive idea of modern democracy: its identification with the alienation of power. But, again, the critical point here is not simply the substitution of representative for direct democracy. There are undoubtedly many reasons for favouring representation even in the most democratic polity. The issue here is rather the assumptions on which the Federalist conception of representation was based. Not only did the 'Founding Fathers' conceive representation as a means of distancing the people from politics, but they advocated it for the same reason that Athenian democrats were suspicious of election: that it favoured the propertied classes. 'Representative democracy', like one of Aristotle's mixtures, is civilized democracy with a touch of oligarchy."* (Wood 2000, 217).

Wood may be too harsh on representative democracy. However, today it is a fact that peoples all around the world as citizens are experiencing political alienation. As seen the figure below, there has always been a gap between voting age population and registered voters from 1970s to 2010s.


Figure 1: Voter Population Statistics for Countries that Hold Direct National Parliamentary Elections (Lower Houses)



Notes: The Voter Turnout Database lists only the countries/territories for which voter turnout statistics are available. Voting age population is the estimated number of people above voting age.

Source: Solijonov (2016, 23)

Figure 2: Voter Turnout Trends Based on Types of Democracy




Notes: Freedom House indicators have been used to group countries as free, partly free and not free. Freedom House data are available from the 1970s until 2015.

Source: Solijonov (2016, 29)

In addition to the disparity between the number of people who are eligible for voting and the number of registered voters, as it can be seen in the Figure 2 above, the type or the quality of democracy (which is related to the *content*) has almost no significant impact on the declining trend in turnout rates: Democracies that are defined as “free”, “partly free” and “not free” have been through this predicament since 1970s.

Figure 3: Voter Turnout in Europe, 1945 – 2015



Source: Solijonov (2016, 26)

What is worse, as seen the figure above, that turnout rates started to plummet in post-communist countries as they got to know and turned to 'democracy'<sup>9</sup>. Then it could be assumed that representative democracy, if not the cause of political alienation, does not solve or appease the problem of low turnout rates which are the concrete as well as measurable indicators of the alienation. Another inference that can be made out of these three figures above is that voting or, at any rate, capable of voting/reaching at voting age does not make people political regardless of the quality of democracy. Hence, does peoples' discontent with politics have to do with the form of democracy? It is hard to say that going back to direct/ancient practice of democracy could resolve the problem of political alienation in modern representative version

<sup>9</sup> The 'dominant' answer to the question "what is it meant by 'democracy' when the word is uttered is liberal democracy or "the end of history" (!). Although this is too big a question to deal with in this paper, it is necessary to say that some scholars like Francis Fukuyama claim that the only possible and best way of democracy is liberal democracy, for the other systems of government and ways/types of democracy fail to pass the 'examination' of history. To him, liberal democracy is the only survivor of this struggle in question, being the most appropriate means for organizing the collective political will and legitimizing the state's sovereignty (Fukuyama, 2006: 43–45). However, it could be assumed that this approach falls into a fallacy and results in a very limited understanding of democracy by considering liberal democracy as a trans-historic phenomenon because its 'soundness' over time and as an out-of-history concept by extending it to the future with its reference to [the end of] history paradoxically.

or 'performance' of democracy (this would be too 'automatic'); however, this problem deserves to be discussed or 'speculated'.

#### **4. Beyond Representation: Again Representation?**

There is no doubt that representative democracy *represents* remarkable 'gainings' for political life and institutions such as political parties. Thinking back of direct ways and examples of democracy in the face of political alienation does not lead to the conclusion that we need to get rid of representation and its 'yields'. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, political alienation is related to the form and means of democracy rather than its content. If political alienation is to be handled, it is likely to be a question of new *formal arrangements* which are also the questions of size/scope of the political units and the magnitude of the population. As well-know sociologist Daniel Bell points out, nation(al)-states are too big for local problems and too small for global problems. If democracy (based upon nation-states) is conceived as a formal and legitimate means for reaching collective decisions towards the common problems of people/society, the size/scope of political units (territoriality) and the population (demos) need to be discussed to problematize representation and political alienation.

The problem of and the discussion about territorial and normative boundary/scope for democratic political units has always been a controversial issue because of the fact that any democratic political entity (which aims to reach collective decisions) is supposed to based upon a 'defined' territory and 'certain' people (Whelan 1983, 13–14). In terms of drawing the boundaries of demos or the people, Whelan proposes six criteria: "all-affected principle", "problem of territoriality", "consent", "nationality" and "geographical features" in line with "autonomy".

All-affected principle could be seen as the most immediate problem of democracy, and be taken as the rule that anyone who is affected by a democratic decision should have a say on the decision in question. In other words, if rules made for everyone, everyone is to be involved in the decision-making processes. Since the scope or the size of political units has been extended from city-states to nation-states, mechanisms of representations have been devised (Whelan 1983, 13–14). Apart from this territorial and 'demographic' hardship, there could be other complicated situations which do not allow the principle come to being: For example, every year thousands of people legally or illegally immigrate to the United States of America (USA), but the regulations on immigration are legislated by the representatives of the US citizens and the immigrants who are affected by these regulations have no say

on them. The immigrants as 'decision-takers' have no direct impact on the decision-makers and decision-making<sup>10</sup> (Song 2012, 50-52). Referring to the all-affected principle, this case seems to make 'no sense' until the problem of territoriality comes in the play.

The territoriality principle makes a distinction between decision-makers and decision-takers through "coercion". To give the same example, the immigration act mentioned above that binds the immigrants are made by the representatives of people who accept 'the legitimate coercive power' of their state. In this sense, people who recognise this power have a priority. However, like the "all-affected principle" this criterion is also blurry. The exact opposite of this situation could apply to the US citizens in other the countries that give immigration to the US. Furthermore, the boundaries of active citizenship 'wavy' and liquid and all democratic regimes are supposed to treat people equally (Song 2012, 52; Whelan 1983, 20). If "all-affected principle" and "territoriality" are not able to resolve the scope problem for both land and population, other principles or criteria should be added.

"Consent" as one of these criteria constitutes the basis for any legitimate decision as well as voluntary cooperation under a political organisation. When territorial citizenship's or membership of a state's inborn and compulsory character is taken into account, it could be said that communities/societies which come together under consent appears as more local, flexible and spontaneous. Moreover, small communities or societies growing out of consent are more successful in satisfying "all-affected principle" and more legitimate than other large communities. These small 'publics' could range from religious groups to membership of a canton or federal units (Whelan 1983, 25-26). If consent appeases the problems of all-affected and territoriality, the logical extension of it is to discern one community from other. "Nationality" and "geographical features" are then included in the criteria.

Nationality, different from nationalism in suggesting a kind of 'methodological nationalism', places its emphasis on the homogenising factor in a community instead of factors that highlights otherness or differences from other communities. Although the exclusiveness in classical nationalism is not present in this principle, a kind of isolation seems to be inevitable (Schaffer 2012, 323). "Geographical features or salience" is used to demarcate communities without isolation. Instead of ethnic/cultural homogenous features, the salience principle "natural and unavoidable boundaries" constitutes the size/scope of political units, for these boundaries also point to

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<sup>10</sup> Donald Trump's travel ban could also be taken as bad example of this situation.

the conditions of living and making decisions. However, historical/political particularities should be included to draw the lines separating communities from one another. Otherwise, the salience principle leads to claim that what make French society French society are the mountain ranges of Rhine-Alps-Pyrenees with no regard to the Great Revolution and its values (Whelan 1983, 35-36). All these principles including nationality and geographical salience are then considered as complimentary and considered with the last principle “autonomy”.

Autonomy is the constitutive political principle of all other criteria mentioned above. This is to say that autonomy is the political guarantee of the relatively small communities/publics gathering around “fate” (history, culture etc.) and “nature”. Literally, autonomy means that every decision which affects the population in the political unit is made by the political unit itself which presents opportunities for active citizenship or membership of an ‘optimum’ political entity (Whelan 1983, 38). Although sizing and resizing political units and the demos with reference to these criteria seems to increase and enhance participation in decision-making and in politics, Robert Dahl’s warning should be remembered: “*A persuasive argument to classical Greeks as well as to many modern democrats is that smaller systems at least hold out the theoretical potential for greater citizen effectiveness than larger systems, even if in practice that potentiality is not always realized. Judged from this perspective, as a site for democracy the city-state was clearly superior to the national state, at any rate in its potentials. Judged from the perspective of system capacity, however, the city-state had some obvious disadvantages, notably in defence but conspicuously also in economic capacities. [...] That larger political systems often possess relatively greater capacity to accomplish tasks beyond the capacity of smaller systems leads sometimes to a paradox. In very small political systems a citizen may be able to participate extensively in decisions that do not matter much but cannot participate much in decisions that really matter a great deal; whereas very large systems may be able to cope with problems that matter more to a citizen, the opportunities for the citizen to participate in and greatly influence decisions are vastly reduced.*” (Dahl 1994, 28). This ‘admonition’ resonates with the question of nation-states’ scope and capacities as Bell points out: Being too small for global problems and too big for local ones. However, the trade-off between participation and system capacity should not prevent us from thinking resizing (even downsizing) political units with a reference to the classical Greek practice, because political alienation is as serious a question/problem as system capacity is. Actually, it is this paper’s assertion that the *content* of democracy has not

posed crucial disagreements throughout the long history of democracy, but the *form* of democracy has always been controversial.

As it is pointed out before the relationship between direct and representative democracy in terms of the form is of a *dialectic* nature: representative democracy 'represents' contradictive elements to direct democracy such as elections vs. lottery, citizen engaging in politics vs. citizen interested/participating in politics etc. It can be said that "*to vote or not to vote*" is the problem of representative democracy (and if the figures above are remembered, it is a tremendous one) not the problem of direct democracy. In the same vein, political alienation is the problem of representative democracy, not the direct practice of it. Furthermore, it can also be assumed that representative democracy represents *alienated/estranged democracy* in the times of ever-globalizing world of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. This is, however, not to say that representative democracy with its historical/political 'yields' should be 'eradicated'. Rather, the dialectic relationship between them should be examined and elaborated to come up with a *synthesis* which is able dealt with political alienation. Trying to going beyond representation does not necessarily means going back to the direct archetype of democracy, but if the problems of representative democracy are to be handled it is going to be realized by the help of/thinking back of the original model.

## 5. Conclusion

Democracy in Ancient Greece was not born with political alienation. In other words, political alienation is, so to say, not a 'birth defect'. It is a problem of representative democracy which can be considered to be the extension/transformation of the archetype Athenian democracy in terms of the *content*, but to be the dialectic counterpart or antithesis of the direct ancient practice in terms of the *form*. That is why, in this paper, the 'cure' for political alienation is sought in the synthesis which comes out of the dialectic relationship/clash between direct and representative democracy, not in the various kinds of democracy with prefixes. This is to say that the formal arrangements should be made to overcome, at least to mitigate the problems of "powerlessness", "meaninglessness" "normlessness", "isolation", and "self-estrangement" which could be regarded as many faces of political alienation.

In order to contemplate these formal/structural arrangements, Whelan's (1983) principles or points are evaluated in an interpretive manner: "all-affected principle", "problem of territoriality", "consent", "nationality" and "geographical features/salience" in line with "autonomy" could/should be taken into account to downsize the size/scope of territory and the 'magnitude'

of demos which constitute the boundaries of any political entity. These points are also made to think of the elimination of ‘complexities’ by representative democracy and its byzantine political edifices. In other words, if humans as citizens are to be included in politics, political life and institutions should be designed in a ‘humanistic’ way. For example, there is no surprise that an individual feel “powerlessness” living under enormous and complicated political units with millions of others. Even sometimes, it is very hard to determine who the demos are, as the problems upon which people have a say are ‘too big’ and all of them affected like global warming. These arrangements and the theoretical efforts towards it is the immediate logical extension of the fact that voting per se is not enough make people political or make individuals more active in politics and political life. After these ‘tuning’ both in theory and practice, we cannot anticipate beforehand if beyond representation is representation again or not.

The bottom line is that democracy without any adjectives (or “the idea of democracy” based upon the originals not upon its ‘hegemonic’ version after 1945) needs to be reconsidered with a special reference to its origins, which leads to the ‘sublated’ (suppressed yet conserved) version of Athenian Democracy as the “negation of negation” within the 21<sup>st</sup> Century’s historical context and under the relevant and ever-changing circumstances. It seems to be a necessary task of future research to evaluate democracy of this sort to come up with a theoretical horizon that shows formal possibilities and solutions to the paradoxical problem of political alienation in the age of democracy since the fact that the justification of democracy goes hand in hand with the promotion of active participation. In other words, the future research or any theoretical/empirical attempt directed at the question of political alienation in democratic systems should draw on, at least, take the origins into account. Otherwise, democracy will be likely to face being labelled as “extreme alienation” or ‘alienation of the people’, just like it was condemned by some philosophers as “extreme equality” about 2500 years ago.

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## LOCAL APPROACHES TO PEACEFUL, SUSTAINABLE AND JUST COMMUNITIES

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**Abstract:** *In the light of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, there is a growing need for approaches, tools, policies and practical solutions for peaceful, just and sustainable communities. This paper describes how the specific local Närpes approach assists in achieving the Sustainable Development Goal 16 within the Närpes community in Finland. Employment ethnographic participant observations and semi-structured interviews have been used as a methodology for this study. Based on the findings, five elements have been identified; ethno-religious identities, values and personalities, migration and relations, socioeconomics, and cooperation. As a result, the holistic Närpes Model has been formed. This can be used as an example to implement the SDG 16 in different contexts worldwide.*

**Key words:** The UN Sustainable Development Goals, SDG 16, The Närpes Model.

### **1. Introduction**

The official end of the Millennium Development Goals in 2015 has brought the world to the new era of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (United Nations 2017). The implementation of the goals has become universal since the goals focus not only on the developing countries, but also on the developed ones to take action to provide a sustainable planet for the future generations (Fukuda-Parr 2016). These 17 sustainable development goals

are adopted by the countries having priorities on climate change, economic inequality, sustainable consumptions, innovations, and peace and justice in order to end poverty, protect the planet, and assure people living in peace and prosperity (United Nation Development Program 2017).

Even though, all 17 goals are interconnected, they have different aims and targets (Nilsson, Griggs and Visback 2016). The most fundamental issue with SDGs is to work collectively and interdependently in order to reach the targets set out in the SDGs. In this regard, it is crucially important that private sectors, civil societies and citizens work together in order to achieve the SDGs along with the governments. It is challenging to integrate the economic, social and environmental dimensions into policy formulations and actions in a global level. If all nations work together collaboratively, turning plans into actions and promises into reality as foreseen in the SDGs is not something impossible to achieve (Le Blanc 2015).

The purpose of this paper is to establish and advance an anthropological overview of the role of the local approaches to SDG 16, which are regarded as fundamental points for understanding and achieving peaceful, just and sustainable communities by 2030 and beyond. With SDG 16, the international community for the first time has set out a shared vision for the central role of the institutions which enable sustainable development through effective, accountable and inclusive approach. Although this goal is highly important on its own, it also plays a crucial role to contribute to the wider delivery of the United Nations 2030 Agenda (Whaites 2016). In particular for SDG 16, there is a lack of concrete policies, road maps to follow and tools to implement. According to Whaites (2016), in order to have progress for this goal, the international community needs to focus on the five factors; the political settlement, the quality of international assistance, the presence of external incentives, global norms and economic growth.

Studies have shown that inequality creates political instability and causes social unrest (Alesina and Perotti 1996; Acemoglu and Robinson 2001; Dutt and Mitra 2008). Therefore, the link between financial inclusion and development is essential. In order to reduce inequality and promote peace, financial inclusion by providing equitable growth and improving the lives of the poor is needed (Klapper, El-Zoghbi and Hess 2016). For that reason, governments should reinforce the access and the use of the financial services more. According to Klapper, El-Zoghbi and Hess (2016) the financial inclusion helps to create the conditions that ultimately bring not only SDG 16, but also many of the SDGs within reach.

The Nordic countries are admired for their high employment, peaceful and transparent relations as well as their low levels of poverty, inequality and

violence. Scandinavian egalitarian and democratic welfare states produced a long-term stability model known as The Nordic Welfare Model (Hort 2015; Kuisma and Nygård 2015; Kuisma 2017). This model also pays attention to social integration, social cohesion and inclusion besides the high standard of living, small income disparities, substantial social mobility, sound public finances and emphasis on the environment (Albæk, Valkonen and Vihriälä 2014; Aerschot and Daenzer 2016).

In 2014, Johnsen and Perjo examined ten Nordic examples based on migration, social mobility and inclusion, access to services and regional attraction. Their study has exhibited how local and regional authorities have approached demographics and social inclusion. The successful initiatives include cooperation across policy areas, co-ordination and co-operation between administrative levels, engagement of private actors, citizen engagement and support for grassroots initiatives and project-based approaches (Johnsen and Perjo 2014). However, the other studies on the Nordic examples also point out that there is an ethnic residential segregation, the lack of employment opportunities for vulnerable groups such as displaced individuals and migrants, and the lack of access of equal and universal certain fundamental rights for all citizens (Borevi 2014; Halvorsen, Hvinden and Schoyen 2016; Keskinen et al. 2016; Wessel et al. 2016).

Finland in comparison to other Nordic neighbors is rather homogenous and has a modest immigration system (Tupasela and Tamminen 2015; Bondeson 2017; Ekberg and Östman 2017). Thus, the levels of peacefulness, sustainable development and social inclusion, cohesion and integration within the society of all the ethnic groups mainly focus on the bigger Finnish cities (Himmelroos and Leino 2015; Östman and Ekberg 2016; Brylka, Jasinskaja-Lahti and Renvik 2017). Multicultural environment and migration based on a labor demand within the small town of Närpes has been talked about and mentioned in written documents, but not studied extensively from the academic point of view (Sari 2014; Brusila 2015; Andersson, Nordberg and Eklund 2016; Björklund and Björkgren 2016). This is the first paper to explore the role of local holistic approach in Närpes which can play an important role in furthering achievement of the SDG 16 through enhanced understanding and advancing of national policies, practices and theories.

The authors of this paper chose to study Närpes town in order to understand how and in which ways it has been able to become a successful SDG 16 example of sustainability, transparency and peacefulness within extreme diversity not only in homogenous Finland, but also in other Nordic countries. For that reason, the aim of this study is to find out how the specific

local approaches like Närpes can assist in achieving the sustainable development goal 16.

## 2. Case Study: Närpes

Närpes is a coastal Swedish-speaking town located in the South-Ostrobothnia region in Finland. This town is well known for its peacefulness, multiculturalism, successful integration and cohesion among the inhabitants. In 2016, 9387 inhabitants have been residing within the community of approximately thirty-five different nationalities (11% of all population) that has over fifteen spoken languages (Statistikcentralen 2017). However, because of the nature of the statistical database in Finland, the foreign population cannot be identified exactly in this database. There are two reasons for this; first, people that acquired Finnish citizenship are regarded as Finnish nationals, second, only those persons who have an A (visa type) status for staying in the country are officially registered (Poliisiammattikorkeakoulu 2016).

Table 1: Närpes Population Based on the Language Background in 2016

	Total	Finnish speakers	Swedish speakers	Other languages
Population	<b>9387</b>	<b>523</b>	<b>7 747</b>	<b>1 117</b>
Men	<b>4 750</b>	<b>210</b>	<b>3 951</b>	<b>589</b>
Women	<b>4 637</b>	<b>313</b>	<b>3 796</b>	<b>528</b>

Source: Statistikcentralen 2017.

Närpes was the first community that received refugees in Finland besides the metropolitan cities (Granholt 2009). In 1988, the first refugee wave came from Vietnam followed by the refugees from Bosnia in 1992. The labor immigration mainly from the other Balkan countries, Eastern Europe and Central America has been extensively taking place since 2004. Immigration based on marriage and family reunion has been present for the past 15 years. In 2014, refugees from Sudan have arrived (Mattila and Björklund 2013; Söderman 2015). Since 2015, varying number of the asylum seekers and refugees from mainly Middle East have been residing in Närpes (Migri 2016).

Based on the collected statistics from the year 2010 to 2013, out of the 304 municipalities, Närpes was ranked the 11<sup>th</sup> safest place to live in Finland (Björkqvist 2014). The only case of homicide since 1980 took place in 1995.

Only 23 aggravated assaults were recorded between the year 2000 and July 2015 (Kriminologian ja oikeuspolitiikan instituutti 2015). In 2015, a police establishment in Närpes was operating twice a week as a service station, which was totally closed in the beginning of 2016. Närpes municipality does not have any police station since then. (Nissen 2016; Poliisi 2016).

There is a high level of work sufficiency and low levels (4%) of unemployment, which is the lowest in the country. In Finland, overall unemployment is 13% (Närings-, trafik- och miljöcentralen 2016). In addition, in 2015, research that looked at a drug use for the depression, need for child protection, allowances given due to the sickness, and crimes influenced by alcohol or drugs found out that out of 317 municipalities, Närpes is the 5<sup>th</sup> happiest municipality in Finland (Johansson 2015). Närpes received a price for integration delegated by the ethics and justice ministry in 2016 (Nordmyr 2016) and a UNICEF price for a positive integration processes and children's rights in 2017 (Forsman 2017; Karlsson 2017).

### **3. Materials and Method**

In order to get the insights on the social cohesion and relations between the locals and immigrants of Närpes as well as to understand the work of institutions, two complementary methodologies were employed: ethnographic participant observations and semi-structured interviews.

Ethnographic participant observations have been conducted in 2016 and 2017. The data related to Närpes culture, its inhabitants and the institutions have been gathered and recorded by interacting with people on daily basis, and by going on the visits and attending social gatherings. Thus, it has been a possibility to conduct ethnographic observations on different occasions via the acquaintance networks. These observations were recorded on a paper in a notebook providing a commentary on the happenings, interactions and behaviors of the observed people.

In 2016 and 2017, semi-structured interviews were carried out with nine participants; six women and three men. These participants were selected via acquaintance networks based on their knowledge and familiarity of interest areas; a 56-year-old employee at the integration office, a 74-year-old member of Närpesnejdens fredsförening [Närpes Peace Civil Society], a 37-year-old member of Ljusets kvinnor [Women of Light CSO], a 77-year-old primary school teacher, a 33-year-old employee at the local employment office, a 46-year-old language and culture teacher at the local Adult Education Center, a 27-year-old teacher at the local high school, a 47-year-old greenhouse owner and a 25-year-old Red Cross Employee. Emerging themes for the interviews

focused on the social cohesion, daily lives, integration processes and socio-economics within the community, people's behavior and culture of a Närpes society.

Prior to the interview session, interviewees were informed about the topics of the interview, rights of an interviewee, usage of the material and practical issues related to the interview session. Four interviews took place at the respondent's workplace and the remaining five at the respondents' homes. Interviews were conducted in Swedish and approximately took one hour. The interviews were audio recorded, indexed by general topic, translated and transcribed into electronic form using a word processor.


#### **4. Results and Discussion**

In order to understand how to achieve SDG 16, which focuses on the peaceful, just and sustainable societies, culturally diverse and unique Närpes example has been studied as a local approach to comprehend a working model promoting the goal.

The results deriving from the participant observations and interviews were categorized and it generated the five components. As a result, the holistic Närpes model (Figure 1) has been constructed by the authors of this study.

The five components include: (1) the ethno-religious identities of the Närpes inhabitants, (2) the values and personalities of the Närpes inhabitants, (3) migration and relations within the Närpes community, (4) socioeconomic equality and stability, and (5) tight cooperation among different sectors and institutions.

Figure 1: The Närpes Model



Source: Own research

#### 4.1. The Ethno-religious Identities of the Närpes Inhabitants

The respondents of this study describe that in Finland, the Swedish community faces culture survival challenges but people of Närpes are proud of their strong unique culture deriving from the local traditions and traditions brought up by the immigrants. The Närpesians themselves are not true Finns or Swedes and they cannot be purely classified under the Swedish-speaking Finnish culture either due to their strong Swedish dialect or due to a great mix of cultures residing with the community.

The Närpesians are a minority within the minority Swedish population among the major Finnish population. They know how it feels to be an ethnic minority within the major culture, therefore, it is relatively easy to sympathize with the town foreigners. In general, it has been observed that the Finns have a positive attitude towards foreigners and appreciate considerate behavior. They are rather tolerant and accept peoples' diversity. A foreign population is viewed with an interest since Finns are open for adaptation to the new ideas and concepts. The Swedish-speaking Finns as minority is perceived as lively, versatile, prompt, wealthy, tolerant and accepting of differences in comparison to the Finnish speaking population. The strength of a Swedish-speaking population lies in its diversity; the only thing that actually unites them is their language. Other than that, they live in different social,

cultural and linguistic environments. In Ostrobothnia region, especially in southern towns where Närpes community is located, many inhabitants speak only Swedish and choose to follow Swedish current affairs and culture. There can be seen exclusion or grouping in social life since bilingualism is very much urban phenomenon. Most of the Swedish-speakers can recall an event when they suffered from harassment or embarrassment for speaking Swedish, especially Närpes dialect in public; particularly young adults know the places where using Swedish would invite a trouble.

During the fieldwork observations it has been observed that the Finnish-speaking Finns do not sympathize with the Swedish-speakers and this can be noticed in the day-to-day situations. For instance, for the elders, it is not customary to invite guests from different language groups simultaneously but the younger generation (>45) is more open to cross-linguistic contacts. The families with different ethnic backgrounds are the good examples of these cross-linguistic interactions. Just a bit outside the Närpes center lives a mother from Russia and a father from Croatia who raise three daughters that speak Russian, Serbo-Croatian and English at home, Finnish with their peers at school, and Swedish with their friends after school. They are used to spent time with their parents' friends from different countries as well as they are used to follow Russian, Croatian and the Finnish traditions at home. The forty-year-old couple with Närpes and Dutch backgrounds speak English between each other at home and Närpes dialect and Dutch to their eight and six-year-old daughters. Both girls attend a Finnish speaking school and they love to spend a lot of time with their parents' international employee community having Polish, Bosnian and Lithuanian backgrounds. It is a growing phenomenon that while growing up, a child speaks three or four languages as well as encounters traditions and behavior patterns of several ethnic groups.

Besides the multiculturalism and multilingualism at home, the context of belonging to certain culture based on the language varies depending on the circumstances. In a case of the hockey national games, the Närpesians would always cheer for a Finnish national team. In occasion for choosing a weekend trip to the neighboring country, the Swedish-speaking Finns including Närpesians, would choose cruise boat to Sweden, meanwhile Finnish speakers would take a cruise boat to Estonia.

A 29-year-old man in an agreement with other interviewees has told that his ethnic identity depends on a social context. If he is abroad or watches national ice-hockey game, then he is a true Finn. In terms of a mother tongue, he is never a Finn in Finland. In a Swedish-speaking Finland, he is not a true Swedish-speaking Finn either; he is a Närpesian with a strong dialect and traditions. A 46-year-old man admitted that when he travels either within

Finland or abroad, he usually lies and says that he is from Sweden, just because it makes him feel more comfortable in certain places due to the language and cultural stereotyping. When it comes to choosing working places, many choose to move to another country just because they do not have interest as well as they think that it is easier to learn any other language than Finnish. For instance, the language Närpesians speak is a far away from the standard Swedish [rikssvenska] or Finland's Swedish [finlandssvenska].

The unilingual culture in Närpes thrived for almost 700 years. A Swedish language and culture face challenges but the strength of Närpes community remains welcoming due to the including nature of its people, says a congresswoman and politician for Swedish Peoples' Party in Finland. Both immigrants and Finnish-speaking Finns that reside in Närpes have the same experiences. It has been said that dignity, acceptance and openness to other differences somewhat derive from Lutheranism.

Finland is a Lutheran country and culturally people live their lives in accordance to the values of the church. However, not many see their values stemming from the religion. The majority of Finns do not have any religious calling which means there is not much churchgoing. Commonly, Finns are not the members of a church and those that are members, do not fully include the traditional teachings of Lutheranism in their daily lives. For example, church funerals are more common than church weddings.

In 2015, the members of a local Närpes Youth civil society submitted an inquiry to Education Committee in Finland stating a necessity to replace religion lessons with, for instance, philosophy of life. This would minimize religious clashes among diverse classmates, says the high school teacher. Especially, the younger Närpesian generation are more open to the diversity and has more willingness to create cross cutting ties among the locals and foreigners. They practice religion less than their parents do and as they would say themselves it is due to higher education degrees, studies and work abroad and a rich blend of various cultures within their own community from the early age.

An informant from the Northern Ostrobothnia region says that she is happy to be living in Närpes since people are more open, less religious and less conservative in comparison to people in her own hometown. This is agreed by the Närpes people establishing a common opinion on a more religious culture in other Swedish speaking towns in Finland. Religious celebrations such as Christenings, confirmations and funerals bring families together in church, but it is perceived more as a traditional way to do certain things than following religious doctrine. The local Närpesians do not judge other peoples' religious call as long as they do not intrude with the personal

space of individualistic Finns. A 33-year-old interviewee says that it does not matter whether his neighbor is religious in any faith as long as s/he does not do any “weird religious stuff” which would intervene with his atheism.

A common metaphor of the Swedish-speaking Finns in terms of their behavior is the well-known children’s comic strip - The Moomins, written by Tove Jansson in the midst of a last century. Their home, Moominvalley, is a place where feelings of harmony at home and with nature, wellbeing, peacefulness, security and co-dependence are commonplace. Even the world is adventurous and Moomins’ lives are always challenged when encountering strangers for instance, yet life is good for the Moomins, who enjoy a wholesome lifestyle, rich in social capital. Both younger and older generations like to describe their identities and home from the Moomin’s life perspective.

#### **4.2. The Values and Personalities of the Närpes Inhabitants**

A history teacher from a local gymnasium explains that the old Finnish values owe something to a Scandinavian culture meaning that they are modern, educated and technology driven. Very often, foreigners see Finns as civilized, calm, independent, autonomous and silent people, but if they overcome embarrassment of speaking out loudly in public, then they say what they mean and mean what they say. The informants with foreign background have stated that, Finns can be shy as well as suspicious towards strangers but they are very honest and loyal once you make friends with them.

Finns value people and the strongest values noticed within the Finnish community are honesty, equality, humbleness, modesty, privacy, directness and integrity. To the Finns, it is very important to obey the rules which is also their moral and ethical code. The main characteristic of the Finns is their sameness; they do not like to stand out from the crowd and their mode of dress or style of home is very similar to everyone else’s. For example, Finns do not celebrate their achievements since it would be seen as bragging. They are naturally reserved, especially towards chatty foreigners, and are likely to seem very formal and aloof.

There is a relative absence of social barriers in the Finnish society. There is no class distinctions in education and everyday social life that minimize the gaps between social, class or racial superiority. In some cases, when keeping in mind the current fluctuating numbers of refugees, a question on racial equality can be raised; however, acceptance of immigrants has little to do with racism but more with the psychological difficulty of making room for others and sharing the hard-earned fruits of their labor, says language and culture teacher. According to the informants working with immigration, Sweden has longer and more extensive experience of immigration. This also brought up

an equal society, which is based on diversity: “we all can be equal even though we all cannot be the same”, a slogan one might hear on the Swedish talk shows.

When it comes to cultural values, Swedes value personal equality, they are liberal even though they are moderate and live their cultural lives based on traditions, stability and customs. Swedes are open-minded, social and chatty in contrast to the Finns. The values and personality traits of the native Närpesians is a unique blend of the Finnish and Swedish cultures.

The Närpesians themselves tend to consider other people’s well-being and as the local male informant would always say “there is no prosperous community, if we do not support each other”. They also have great levels of solidarity, which is very much based on trust. A primary school teacher remembers that his mother was not very specific in giving him behavior guidelines, however if it happened, she would always advise him to be trustworthy and honest in all kind of situations in life, and she would ask him not to lie to his teachers and not to cheat during exams.

In addition to caring, trust and honesty, the Närpesians could also be rather indefinite as noticed during the participant observations. This could be seen in their dialect expressions. For instance, to say that the food was delicious, they would use such phrases as “it har e na fäil” [there is nothing wrong with it] or “e jeg nog ti jiet” [it is possible to eat it]. The motto of the locals “as long as you do not disturb my lifestyle, I would not disturb yours” displays their attitude about being a good member of a community. A middle age informant told that during the New Year celebration, they did not fire the fireworks because their neighbors have dogs and they did not want them to bark which would cause disturbance in the neighborhood. To the Närpesians, it is important that a member of a community, whether he is local or foreign, would follow the ground rules of the society; engage in mutual obligations, have an employment, be a taxpayer, stay humble and modest, “do not be better than anyone else”, be honest, and appreciate other’s personal space and lifestyle. Both, local and foreign Närpes informants, have consensus on the unwritten behavior guidelines but well known by everyone.

In 2017, during the midsummer dance one of the informants has lost his wallet where he had all his identification and bank cards, and approximately 500 euros cash. The next day, a man in his early thirties called to the informant telling that he got his wallet: “I do not have any good explanation how your wallet ended up with me, but I would like to return it back to you”. He returned the wallet with all the cards and cash. As a compensation for the trouble, he received 50 euros. During the Halloween celebrations at the local bar, a girl in her early twenties lost her purse with the wallet and keys in it.

When she came back home, her purse with all her belongings was left by her apartment door.

All the informants state in an agreement that, in order to be a good member of a community which leads to inclusion, all the Närpes inhabitants are meant to follow the same moral codes, be respectful and take care of their responsibilities. For instance, the first Vietnamese refugee group was excluded from the community and were forced to flee due to their criminal-like behavior, irresponsibility and refusal to act in accordance to the local norms and law. Despite the first unsuccessful integration process, Närpesians gave a chance to the second Vietnamese group who, in fact, did not have the same behavior patterns and became a part of the community relevantly fast. Today, Närpesians regardless of gender and age feel themselves safe in this community and are not scared to walk in the streets in the dark. Local people say that it is safe and quite in Närpes; “our children can go to school unaccompanied and come back; and play safely in the parks and close by the forests”.

A member of a Women of Light organization remembers that when the first Bosnian refugee group arrived to Närpes, they had their own meeting during which it was agreed that everybody should behave according to the local rules and create friendships based on their cultural similarities instead of disconnecting with others due to their differences. It was informally agreed that in case of misbehavior, person would be first judged by their own group and excluded, if necessary, from the group. The town locals have a positive opinion about the Närpes Bosnian community, they say that Bosnians are hardworking people as well as they do follow the rules of the Närpes society.

During the past year, Närpes was also touched by the current refugee crises. During the first weeks, individuals and companies, locals and other town immigrants were quick to arrange themselves into working groups that would help refugees and asylum seekers with their daily life situations. For instance, one of the ladies that knits socks and gloves for the people that are staying at a refugee camp, found 300 euros anonymously left in her post box for buying necessities for a refugee woman that was about to deliver a baby. In addition, people collect clothes and other supplies, arrange charity events and in different ways engage in social activities that contribute to the well-being of others.

In fall 2014, Närpes received first Sudanese refugees from Egypt. The two women in their thirties told that immigrant coordinator has been visiting their families often after his working hours. He has been interested in their lives in Närpes and wanted to know whether there is something else he could do to help them. They also told how social workers have collected clothes and

other supplies for them and their family members. Recently, their children started to attend soccer practice. Women explained that for her young children winters in Finland are too dark and too cold to walk three kilometers to and from the practice. This has worried mothers for several weeks until other soccer moms voluntarily started to drive their children to the practice in turns.

The behavior of town immigrants as well as the locals differs individually. Not all the Närpesians are pragmatically open to the strangers; they can also be shy and suspicious. A 77-year-old man, who worked as a high school teacher in the local school as well as all his life he actively participated in the local cultural activities, explained that sometimes Närpesians can be negative. He used to hear from his co-worker that whenever foreigners rented premises for social gatherings, they always broke things and never cleaned after the event. In one of the informants' opinion, the same has happened among locals too, however, bad talk about less familiar people spreads faster. Thus, he highlighted that the same persons who usually have negative thoughts about foreigners also negatively perceive their local neighbors.

Nevertheless, municipality and local agencies has its responsibility to support internationalism, equality, equal treatment and promote positive interaction and good relations between different ethnic groups. Thus, municipality aims to create working and social environment where different cultures can naturally meet and interact. In 2015, the Närpes City Council signed an Equal Opportunity Plan that aims to ensure equal treatment among municipality members despite their gender, religion, ethnicity or sexual orientation.

### **4.3. Migration and Relations within the Närpes community**

The relation of the Närpes people to the foreign culture has much to do with the embedded tradition of emigration and immigration for about a century. An interviewee from a local employment office explains that the first migration wave to the US took place in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and during the 1960s and 1970s people migrated for the employment opportunities to Sweden. Due to the language and cultural similarities, the pattern of moving to Sweden, other Nordic countries, or bilingual towns in Finland for employment or educational purposes continues today.

Besides emigration, Närpes has a 30-year-long tradition of receiving immigrants and integration. In 1988, Närpes was the first Swedish-speaking municipality in Finland that received quota refugees, which was mainly followed up by the employment-based migration later. A woman from the local employment office highlights that a decision that comprehensively

inform local residents about the immigration and integration plan of the first comers was central in creating positive environment and communication. Evidently, emigration and immigration has shaped Närpes as a multicultural society. Already the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century brought up a Närpesian generation that acquired a mix of different cultures and religions when people relocated within Finland and abroad as well as later on were influenced by a diverse group of peers in schools, colleagues at work places and neighbors in the community. A great number of immigrants brought new and diverse cultural perspectives to the small town and its people.

For about a century, local Närpes people have been encountering foreign cultures whether by meeting immigrants in their own community or by being immigrants themselves abroad. As an interviewed lady in her fifties explains, this allowed them to learn about different cultures as well as acquire understanding of what does it mean to start a new life in a foreign country. She still recalls how her grandmother and mother moved to the US for the better employment opportunities. They had difficulties with the language, local culture, and it took some time to adapt to the local customs as well. After ten years of living abroad, her family came back to Närpes, bought a house and opened an own shop. An interviewee herself got married with a Russian man and together with her family has actively been engaging in integration work within the community since then.

Through the field observations, it has been noticed that the Närpesians who moved abroad for the employment or education opportunities or have people in their families with foreign experiences, acquire different worldview from the ones living all their lives in Närpes. Couple of years ago, one of the researchers of this study had a chance to meet a lady in her forties who works as a bookkeeper for the local companies. In every conversation they had over the years, she always used to highlight that town foreigners are only trouble makers, even though the researcher is a foreigner too, and for her, people are not supposed to move away from their home countries “this causes only difficulties for the locals”. Recently, her 20-year-old daughter moved to Sweden to work and created a family with a man from Italy who is chatty and religious and has a loud and intruding family, as the woman would describe him herself. Today, she seems to be excited when telling about her interactions with the in-laws. Thus, she started to do a small talk with the local Närpes foreigners and to ask them about their ways of living. In addition, from speaking Närpes Swedish dialect with the researcher, she switched to English language as a more comfortable language for communication.

Currently, the Närpes foreign population consist of immigrants mainly coming from Bosnia, Croatia, Vietnam, Russia, Estonia, Lithuania, Thailand,

Ukraine, Belarus, and the Netherlands. In addition, Närpes municipality is offering resident places to the current quota refugees and asylum seekers.

Today, it is relevantly easy for the immigrants to come to Närpes since they already have family members or friends who explored the town before them. As Närpes immigrants would explain themselves, they already know what to expect and thus, a newcomer does not have to feel alone or lonely since there are others who have similar cultural background and reasons for immigrating.

When it comes to quota refugees, besides a carefully made integration plan by the state, they are also assigned “vän familj” [friend family]. A friend family is an interesting and useful concept, says several newly arrived refugees. A friend family can be an actual local family or an individual person who interacts with the newcomer for the most on their arrival. This includes everything from having dinners together to helping with formalities or getting around in a new place. This is done for learning about each other’s culture, helping the new comer to have own responsibilities and duties which aims towards a two-way integration, explains a Red Cross worker. She also gives an opinion and attitudes towards others. She says that both locals and immigrants can be xenophobic, but this type of attitude does not last long. In such a small town as Närpes, people have to communicate with each other on daily basis and so once they start to know one another, differences start to be seen as advantages for shaping a multicultural community.

#### **4.4. Socioeconomic Equality and Stability in Närpes**

Local Närpesians and the Närpes immigrants clarify that local people are known as hardworking and so they have deep-rooted entrepreneurial skills. This is shown in the high levels of work sufficiency and low levels of unemployment. An informant from the employment office tells that among the municipalities in Ostrobothnia, Närpes is the only one who is self-sufficient in a workplace and in 2017 had the lowest unemployment rates in the country. Despite an elite self-sufficiency development now, only couple of decades ago economic situation was intermittent. In the middle of the twentieth century, a large proportion of the working age Närpesians emigrated which led to unbalanced age structure in Närpes. In the beginning of the twentieth first century, there was a big need for a labor force, therefore, immigration from abroad successfully met labor demands. Even though there is still a lack of working age people, and a fewer women than men, a positive labor immigration contributes to the development of various industries and entrepreneurship within the community.

Since 2000, the main immigration to Närpes was due to the employment. Nowadays, labor immigration is more intense than it has been ten years ago. This balances widespread emigration, especially among the youth, due to which labor needs within the sectors of agriculture, health care and metal industries had emerged. Mostly labor immigration takes place from Balkan countries, Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia due to the family and friendship relationships. International social networks of the existing immigrants were and are used to recruit more working-class people. Labor immigrants become employed taxpayers that occupy vacant and create new working places as well as they inspire and develop entrepreneurship. Since labor force has increased, entrepreneurs were also able to expand their businesses. The small family-based firms became well-developed companies. Especially, it had a positive effect on the greenhouse and metal industries where the town foreigners do main work.

Local entrepreneurs explain that immigrants have positive attitude to work and are more diligent than locals are particularly when it comes to work in the greenhouses and metal factories. Interviewed greenhouse owner told that Vietnamese people appreciate working in a greenhouse since “it is warm inside and reminds them of their home”. The workers of this particular greenhouse have told that from their own, their family and friend experiences, Finnish employers treat their employees with a care and respect. The Vietnamese workers explained that they appreciate a close relationship with their employer since it is very helpful when starting life in a new place. For instance, their employers help them with housing, borrowing equipment to work around their house, finding a suitable daycare for their children, translating documents from the authorities and similar favors. In balance, employers of this greenhouse say that they want to do everything they can to keep their employees satisfied since it is the most successful step in a successful business. A daughter of a greenhouse owner explains that she is not sure whether their employees just want to please them or they are always very friendly and grateful. Her family feels responsible for their workers’ lives, and helps them with house and property purchases, lending tractor or other machinery needed around the house and the land.

In another case of a local metal factory, relationship tends to be rather similar. This particular factory always appreciated workers from Balkan and Eastern European countries. During the five years period, they were in need of competent employees and several times recruited men from Bosnia and Herzegovina who eventually moved to Närpes with their families due to good working and living conditions. Two men from one of the families who moved to Närpes as recruits clarify that it has been easy to move all the way to

Finland with their wives and children. They started to work once they arrived and their employer took care of all the necessary documents, helped in finding schools for children, and directed their wives to an adult education center where they were learning Swedish language and at the same time pursuing desired vocational training.

Commonly, newly arrived women begin to work in the greenhouses and after gaining some knowledge of a Swedish language, they start school to receive a practical nurse education. Both women and men work with the elder generation in the adult day cares or elderly residential homes. A 77-year-old interviewee described that the retired Närpesians appreciate the company of foreigners since they give more care and respect to the elders in comparison to the locals.

During the fieldwork observations, it has been witnessed how the Närpes immigrants become well-known entrepreneurs, politicians, restaurant owners, photographers, academics and respected people not only in Närpes, but elsewhere. Both younger and older immigrant families acquire their own apartments in town and houses in the countryside from which the elder local generation has moved away closer to the city or elderly housing.

Immigrant interviewees from different countries agreed that steady income is an important factor for their well-being, life quality as well as it allows them to plan their own economy and the future. This financial security also allows raising a third generation that has opportunities to have free education, health care and a future in Närpes.

Närpes municipality pays a great attention to all levels of education for adults and children. Immigrant adults can participate in language and culture courses either as a fulltime job or after work. Immigrant children also have an opportunity to receive lecturing in native language that could strengthen multicultural identity and create functional bilingualism. This positive inflow of international migration, which is also typical for many municipalities in the Nordic countries, balanced age structure and allowed Närpes to become a transparent society that has transformed from emigration to immigration to the rural countryside.

#### **4.5. Tight Cooperation Among Different Sectors and Institutions**

People from Ostrobothnia region are known to be self-assertive and noblest. Day to day life affairs are handled based on compromise, negotiations and consensus. Within the small-scale community like Närpes, errands are fixed based on a close communication between the community inhabitants, immigrants, companies, authorities and the third sector.

Employers actively facilitate integration, especially the labor integration. Different authorities such as employment office or social care services, for instance, can easily guide people to acquire suitable housing or schooling. A project coordinator of the integration office that directly works with integration says that it is relatively easy to communicate and solve problems in a small town with people you know.

Many people in the municipality institutions, social services and associations work with different projects that have something to do with integration or work with the projects that support integration projects. There is a communication with the majority population about the immigration and its policies. Thus, there is an established dialogue between different actors within the community. People are usually aware of happenings within the community and they are quick to react to any potential problems, issues and needs.

Within the past years, several projects have been conducted that worked with multiculturalism and immigration. For instance, since 2012, project for integration called Welcome Office has been giving advising and tutoring to immigrants as well as locals. Another project called MEDVIND provided culture and language lectures to the foreign employees during their working hours. The project SHAISSYD supported the lives of immigrants in Närpes and supervised their progress. In summer 2015, the local South-Ostrobothnia newspaper started a summer campaign during which each week was published an article about multi-culturalism and stories of foreign families within the municipality to foster cultural awareness of diversity. In 2016, an employment office noticed a need for an additional language course for labor immigrants coming from Vietnam, Bosnia, Morocco, Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine, Poland, Philippines, Palestine and Nigeria. Authorities within the education sector were quick to offer suitable courses for working and study groups. Language and culture education plays an important role in integration of all Närpes inhabitants, says a local teacher. Therefore, municipality aims to develop methods for learning and availability of courses for refugees, labor immigrants as well as locals.

The ability to speak a common language, interact with each other and understand each other's cultural backgrounds not only support peacefulness within the community, but also fastens employment processes. Employers are an important part of a puzzle when it comes to social cohesion, creation of sustainable and prosperous community, explains the interviewee. Employers aim to create good working conditions which increase understanding and good relations between their employees despite their diverse national

backgrounds so the cultural clashes and interpersonal conflicts are minimized.

The role of cooperation and the work of a third sector plays unreplaceable role in developing approaches to a positive communication and cohesion among people. A third sector includes various CSOs, associations, non-profit organizations and clubs that are generally important to a Swedish-speaking community and their identity. These networks, existing in the geographically fragmented area inhabited by Swedish-speaking Finns, provide a great number of meeting places, which are of great importance. Associations that are connected to traditions, native regions, cultural manifestations and language are more important to a minority, and this is certainly true when it comes to Närpes population.

In Närpes, 108 registered associations have their interest areas within the culture, politics, religion, sports and various other hobbies. The life of a third sector also has an immense meaning in creating society that is more coherent; it keeps people of different ages and cultural backgrounds active and interactive. For instance, many foreign men interact through soccer practices, women have their own cultural association such as Ljustets kvinnor [women of light] among the others, children interact through various after school activities with the most popular being dance, gymnastics, soccer, tennis, hockey and choir practices. One of the local cafeterias operates as a place where young adults with different ethnic backgrounds could get together for various cultural activities or just simply to hang out with each other. Multicultural association "Intercult" organizes road trips, dance, singing and food serving gatherings where people have a chance to meet one another and create new friendships. "Närpesnejdens fredsförening" [Närpes Peace CSO] arranges lectures, get-togethers, cultural events and reacts to current happenings to decrease cultural clashes and to improve relationships and communication within and among Närpes inhabitants. Relevantly the small size organizations in the small size community creates personal relationships and positive circles of interaction.

## **5. Conclusion**

International community for already three years has been supporting the progress of the Sustainable Development Goals. There are many global and place specific challenges and threats in achieving the targeted goals worldwide. It is a first time for the SDG 16 to be set up among the goals and there is no blueprint to follow in order to achieve this goal, implement its targets and transform the world by 2030. The targets of the SDG 16 put a

special focus on peaceful, just and sustainable societies. Swedish-speaking Närpes community has been known for its peacefulness, high employment, cohesiveness and successful integration of diverse ethnic minorities in Finland where implementation of the SDG 16 targets can be observed.

This paper presents a holistic example, the Närpes Model, which is a successful approach to implement the SDG 16 within the small-scale exceptionally multicultural Swedish community in the Finnish context. In this particular case, there are five components, which complement each other to create inclusive and harmonic environment for the Närpes inhabitants; (1) the ethno-religious identities of the Närpes inhabitants, (2) the values and personalities of the Närpes inhabitants, (3) migration and relations within the Närpes community, (4) socioeconomic equality and stability in Närpes, and (5) tight cooperation among different sectors and institutions.

These five components exhibit ways of commitment to life that could be learned from and employed in Finland, Scandinavia and elsewhere. It inclines to work (1) within the community that appreciates solidarity, honesty, equality and empathetically relates to the conditions of others, (2) within the community under 10,000 inhabitants that provides flexibility, transparency and personal contact with a moral order present, (3) economic security is established by providing equal working and educational opportunities for all, so people get a sense of security and can plan their future, and (4) actors within the community actively communicate to create cross-cutting structures for socially and culturally inclusive society based on a mutual respect and positive circles of communication.

The Närpes Model can be used as an example to form more peaceful, equal and inclusive social structures within the small-scale communities using a bottom-up approach at the grassroots level. It can also inspire other small municipalities or communities to learn from the components forming the model and adapt it to their own environment. It is crucial to keep in mind that this model is a product of continuous development of methods and approaches that are direct responses to changing social constructions within the community. Safe, nurturing and equitable communities need to be fostered in order to improve well-being, ensure a safer and fairer environment that promote sustainable development.

For the future research, the authors of this study suggest an application of the components forming the Närpes Model to different communities, towns and even cities of different cultural contexts. This is to see whether the components deriving from the current study work elsewhere in the same sustainable manner. The study has a potential to be extended in longitudinal and comparative ways. In addition, the policy makers may identify

opportunities based on the evidences discussed in this paper for further investigation.

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## RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE: MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION

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***Abstract:** The two major responses to climate change have been mitigation and adaptation. This paper commences with the meanings of the two terms in the context of climate change and exhibits how various philosophers have deliberated on these two responses to climate change. Moreover, the paper shows the differences and potential links that can be found between the two strategies in overcoming the problem of climate change. In addition to this, the paper attempts to propose some ethical issues that arise with regard to adaptation and mitigation as responses to climate change. Finally, some general observations are made on the two strategies and an integrated approach to respond to climate change is offered.*

***Key words:** Climate Change, Mitigation, Adaptation, Ethics, Environment*

### 1. Introduction

Researchers on the ethics of climate change have acknowledged that there are a wide range of ethical issues related to the effects of climate change and it is important to notice that each requires a specific response. On the other hand, there is also widespread international consensus that climate change requires a collective response from all those who contribute to causing it. According to the situation of climate change in the present day, global collective action on climate change ought to be achieved or else the major threats posed by a rapidly changing climate are likely to have catastrophic effects for all living and non-living things on the earth. Although all major governments have recognized the causal role of anthropogenic emissions in producing rapid global warming, little action has been taken to reduce such emissions.

A prominent debate in climate ethics concerns itself with who should take the responsibility to do 'what'. In this paper, I will focus on the 'what' part of this debate. The 'what' is usually discussed under two headings: mitigation and adaptation (Hayward 2012, 1). These are the two related moral commitments in climate ethics. Mitigation aims to reduce the harmful actions,

that is, to curb anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions while adaptation commits to support and fund prevention and adjustment activities against climate impacts.

Sarah L. Burch and Sara E. Harris in their book *Understanding Climate Change: Science, Policy, and Practice* state that “the task of reducing greenhouse gases and adapting to the impacts of climate change has largely been divorced from each other in scientific and policy making communities. This divorce is justified on the basis of different benefits that adaptation and mitigation have” (Burch and Harris 2014, 263). But I believe that there are also reasons to think that an integrated theory is appropriate to tackle the climate change problem. In this paper, I will highlight some of the general aspects of mitigation and adaptation and emphasize on the success of these two strategies to cope with the problem of climate change. I will also consider some shortcomings of these two approaches. Moreover, I will bring to light some connections between the two strategies and eventually suggest that rather than considering mitigation and adaptation independently, an integration between the two would help to deal with climate crisis in a better way.

## **2. Adaptation or Mitigation?**

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines mitigation as an “anthropogenic intervention to reduce the anthropogenic forcing of the climate system; it includes strategies to reduce greenhouse gas sources and emissions and enhancing greenhouse gas sinks” (Parry et al. 2007, 878). It defines adaptation as an “adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities” (ibid., 6).<sup>11</sup>

Mitigation is a process where humans intervene to reduce sources of greenhouse gas emissions and other substances which contribute directly or indirectly to climate change (Ussiri and Lal 2017, 290). Adaptation involves actions taken to counter the emerging environmental challenges and lessen the vulnerability of human systems to the effects of climate change. Adaptation can take place in expectation of an event or as a response to it; it involves alterations by planning for climate change by individuals and public bodies (ACT information 2015).

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<sup>11</sup> For these definitions, also see “Appendix I: Glossary” in *Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability—Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*.

The aim of mitigation is to avert hazardous anthropogenic intrusions with the climate system while adaptation seeks to lower the risks posed by the consequences of climatic change. Mitigation addresses the root cause by reducing greenhouse gas emissions. With mitigation every effort is done to stop global warming from occurring. It can be done by various means, for instance, by reducing our use of fossil fuels and by using technologies like hybrid cars or solar panels. Moreover, we can also mitigate by making some changes in our lifestyles.

Having glanced at the definitions of mitigation and adaptation, we can now ponder upon some of the differences in the ways in which these strategies would work. Scholars maintain that mitigation is global as reducing greenhouse gases benefits anyone and everyone on the globe while adaptation is majorly local as the benefits accrue mostly to the communities and the places where the action is taken (Burch and Harris 2014).

Moreover, adopting of adaptation measures will be a major challenge for developing countries. This is because climate change is a global problem and developing nations are relatively more vulnerable to the consequences of the changing climate. Not only would they be hit much harder by physical impacts, the low level of development and the lack of funds would also make adaptation a more challenging task for them, as compared to industrialized countries. In other words, one can say that the developed world can easily adapt to climatic changes without sacrificing much.

Traditionally developed countries in the global north push for more money for mitigation while the global south wants funds for adaptation. This is mainly because the south has fewer emissions to mitigate and more urgent climate despairs to adapt to (Wheeling 2017). Nonetheless the choice between mitigation and adaptation has further issues within its fold.

David W. Orr in an online article titled “Learning to Live with Climate Change Will Not be Enough” maintains that at some point there will be limits to what can be done and to how far adaptation measures such as developing heat and drought tolerant crops for agriculture and changing architectural standards to withstand greater heat and larger storms will be effective. He continues: “With predicted changes in temperature, rainfall, and sea level rise, it is unlikely that we can promote ecosystem resiliency or adapt to such changes with no regrets, as some have suggested. On the contrary, ecological resilience and biological diversity will almost surely decline as climatic changes now underway accelerate and going forward we will surely have a great many regrets — chiefly of the ‘why did we not do more to stop it earlier’ sort” (Orr 2009).

Besides this, scientists are also adopting more extreme adaptive measures such as geo-engineering. Geo-engineering is the intentional, large-scale technological manipulation of the earth's systems. It is like a techno-fix for combating climate change. Climate geo-engineering technologies would include solar radiation management, which covers reflecting sunlight to space, greenhouse gas removal and sequestration and weather modification. Geo-engineering would embrace a wide range of techniques such as blasting sulphate particles into the stratosphere or whitening clouds to reflect the sun's rays, dumping iron particles in the oceans to nurture carbon dioxide-absorbing plankton, firing silver iodide into clouds to produce rain or genetically engineering crops so that their foliage can reflect sunlight better. This would thereby provide temporary cooling to the atmosphere.

But since the effects of geo-engineering are largely unstudied and its risks primarily unknown, it can be kept only as a last resort. Therefore, a recent article in *Foreign Affairs* suggests that "the best and safest strategy for reversing climate change is to halt the buildup of greenhouse gases" (Victor et al. 2009). In order to halt the buildup of greenhouse gases we need to adopt certain mitigation measures. The proponents of mitigation give priority to limiting the emission of heat-trapping gases as quickly as possible to reduce the climatic disruption. Practically, climate mitigation means reversing the addition of carbon to the atmosphere by making a rapid transition to energy efficiency and renewable energy.

However, it can be asserted that the climate is already changing because of the existing buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Therefore, it is important to be prepared for and adapt to such changes. While actions to reduce emissions are also critical, the existing greenhouse gas concentrations mean that some effects of climate change are inevitable in the present and in the coming decades. Hence there must be adequate planning to help the economy and the society adapt to these changes (Onu et al. 2016).

There are reasons why focusing on adaptation is better than emphasizing on mitigation. The purpose of choosing adaptation is that some of the effects of climate change are bound to remain for years and so plans to start adapting should be made. On the other hand, a very strong and interesting argument in favour of mitigation can be offered. Adaptation cannot fix the main problem. Mitigation is a more logical way of preserving and protecting the planet. The aim of mitigation is to evade dangerous human interference with the climate system. Using our resources to find ways to halt pollution, reduce human impact on the natural environment, conserve the limited resources and find renewable resources is exactly how we can save the earth from becoming unsalvageable (Sustain 2016).

One of the reasons given for choosing mitigation over adaptation is that adaptation measures adopted today may become outdated in a few years (Orr 2009). It is now obvious that the climate will change as the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases are on the rise. Scientific records show that climate change is occurring at a much faster pace than what was previously believed, that it will affect virtually every aspect of human and non-human life on earth and that it will last far longer than what was previously believed. Seeing this, one wonders about what will happen 50 years on when the forcing effects of our present particles of carbon will manifest. No one knows for certain, but trends in predictive climate science suggest that they will be worse. In such a scenario, one needs to ask, to what climatic conditions do we adapt? What happens when previous adaptive measures become obsolete? So focusing on mitigation seems to be a feasible option since the effects of mitigation will only be noticeable in the long run and measures adopted for adaptation may become obsolete after a certain period of time.

On comparing the two strategies, it can be said that adaptation works best at the local level because of the geographical and social characteristics of each location. By and large, advocates of adaptation are not insisting on responding to changes after they occur; they are arguing for the need of preparing to adjust which makes it a preventive measure. However, arguments in favour of preparing for the consequences of global warming rely on the assumption that we should know what to prepare for. If uncertainty prevails over the consequences of climate change then it becomes difficult to adapt. The benefits of adaptation can be almost immediate if implemented in response to current climate risks.

Adaptation therefore might work as a response to climate change and must be appropriate to specific hazards or threats in a given period of time. One cannot disagree that an effective adaptation in local climate could over time become inappropriate as the circumstances would change. Similarly, mitigation strategies might also face certain challenges. Since most of the greenhouse gas emissions are a result of energy use by humans, reducing these emissions means that we need to lower carbon emissions significantly or reach a point where absolutely no further carbon emission takes place. Moreover, there is a need to achieve an unprecedented rate of energy efficiency in the coming decades.

Mitigation costs would then principally result from such energy-related changes that we would require to cut down our carbon emissions. Examples of this would include changing production processes and equipment so that there are fewer emissions being released and/or lesser energy being

consumed, better insulating houses and building techniques and switching from non-renewable energy sources to renewable ones.

Concomitantly, significant investment in adaptation measures will also involve costs to deal with its effects, which range from the development of new drought-resistant crops to that of reinforced buildings to deal with extreme weather events, and also of stronger flood defense structures.

Both adaptation and mitigation therefore have some benefits as well as some limitations. Based on the above discussion, I will now attempt to highlight some of the important ways in which mitigation and adaptation differ from each other:

1. The first difference has to do with the time that is required for the strategies to become effective. As stated earlier, the benefits of mitigation measures carried out today will be evidenced in several decades because of the long-time existence of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, whereas many effects of adaptation activities would be obvious immediately or in the near future.
2. The second difference relates to the area of impact. Mitigation will provide us with global benefits as compared to adaptation which typically takes place on the impacted area which can be regional.
3. The third difference that affects the choice between mitigation and adaptation is concerned with the extent to which their costs and benefits can be determined. Both measures will involve costs. One has to compare the benefits of implementing mitigation and adaptation measures with the costs they involve (which would differ from place to place) in order to see the cost-effectiveness of these options.

Due to the limited availability of resources such as money and time, some communities and nations might be forced to choose between the two strategies. In order to make such choices, one has to look into the various aspects of each option such as the costs involved in each case or the duration of the climatic changes.

The implications of the choice between adaptation and mitigation do not fall just on those who are living in the industrialized nations, but also on those who lack the resources to adapt or mitigate, and on future generations who will have to live with the effects of whatever atmospheric chemistry we leave behind. A few wealthy communities and the developed world may be able to avoid the worst for some time but unless the emission of heat-trapping gases is reduced soon, worsening conditions will hit those who are least able to adapt. The same can be said far more forcefully regarding the future generations. In its starkest form, the choice between mitigation and

adaptation is also a moral choice as it raises some ethical issues. I will discuss some of these issues in the next section and exemplify ethical problems related to mitigation and adaptation.

### **3. Adaptation and Mitigation: Some Ethical Issues**

Both mitigation and adaptation may act as effective responses to climate change. But there are some limitations that these two moral commitments face. There are many ethical issues that arise in relation to these strategies. Stephen Gardiner mentions that the two duties [of mitigation and adaptation] involve different areas of ethical inquiry: scientific uncertainty, responsibility for past emissions, the setting of mitigation targets, adaptation and compensation for past and future harms, scientific and technical resources, geo-engineering and threats to non-humans (Gardiner 2010). Scholars are beginning to question adaptation planning strategies believing that they might be aggravating unequal outcomes (Shi et al. 2016).

Multiple social dilemmas are thrown up once adaptation or mitigation strategies are applied to resolve the climate change issue. These involve moral and justice issues like who gains and benefits from these strategies and trade-offs between mitigation and adaptation (Adger et al. 2017).

Low income or developing nations tend to be more vulnerable to climate risks than those that are developed. This inequitable distribution of negative climate change impacts creates problems to adapt or mitigate in the developing world. For instance, some adaptation measures such as increasing access to education and health facilities will put more pressure on developing nations. It is still unclear how expensive these measures will be or who will pay for them.

Adaptation to climate change also presents formidable dilemmas of justice, many of which are most heightened in the developing world. However, the basic ethical issue is one of distributive justice: developing nations have been less responsible for causing the climate change problem but are the ones who will suffer the most harm. So there is a conflict as to who should pay for the cost of adaption.

Much public discourse that speaks about the questions of justice and morality prodigiously focuses on responsibilities for sharing of efforts on mitigation of greenhouse gases (Adger et al. 2017). However, moral concerns have different characters in diverse social, political and cultural contexts. Scholars maintain that people used numerous moral bases while interpreting climate change (Vainio and Makiniemi 2016).

Generally, two broad types of moral arguments have been distinguished. “These can be termed as vulnerability-based moral arguments (aligned with liberal positions) and system-based moral arguments (connected to conservative orientations)” (Adger et al. 2017). Vulnerability-based arguments are premised on the idea of the inequity of imposing injury on others in harmony with those on whom harm has been imposed and on the appropriateness of protecting susceptible populations according to ability and need. The vulnerability imperative has long been at the centre of discussions on climate change harm (ibid.).

It is largely suggested that the wealthy countries who have contributed more to the problem and who have in fact benefited the most from the developing nations should now pay to help developing countries to adapt to the negative impacts of unavoidable climate change. Recently the Paris Agreement called for making finance flow steady with a way towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resistant development in support of a global transition towards sustainability. This climate finance would include all forms of financial assistance from public, private and alternative sources that target low carbon and climate-resilient development in all countries of the world. This agreement stipulates that developed countries shall provide financial resources to developing countries to help them reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to a changing climate (United Nations 2015).

But here again the problem is that to what extent can developed nations be held responsible and accountable for current climate impacts. This is however not easy to determine. It can also be asked whether it matters to the victim of climate change where the harm is coming from or it is just more important to ensure that the harm is prevented.

The greater vulnerability of the developing nations and the developed world’s much larger share in past and current greenhouse gas emissions make the financing of activities that promote adaptation and the allocation of resources the main causes of disagreement between developed and the developing countries. Therefore, these issues should be set in a sound ethical framework and brought to centre stage in an endeavour to foster fair and effective climate negotiations.

Mitigation also raises some challenges. To meet the goals of the Paris climate agreement immediate and considerable mitigation efforts across all sectors of the global economy are required. In general, to reach below -2 degrees rapid emission decreases at rates reaching net zero emissions during the second half of this century should be followed (Van Vuuren et al. 2018). A key issue which concerns this global mitigation target is how to ascertain this

minimum level of greenhouse gas emissions in the light of the differences that exist between the developed and the developing world.

This question invokes fundamental ethical considerations. The scenarios in the developed and the developing world are different. Therefore, how carbon emission reduction should take place is a matter of justice and fairness. These issues are further linked to mitigation costs. How much will it cost to reduce emissions? Is it worth to spend on mitigation strategies?

All these deliberations about mitigation and adaptation do not just limit themselves to the present generation along with the distinctions that exist between the developed and the developing world. They spread themselves out to future generations as well. It can be suggested that many sacrifices has to be made by the present generation if future generation would suffer from the ill effects of climate. Efforts to mitigate greenhouse gases by the present generation should be in place so that our future generations do not suffer much. Weighing the benefits of future generations against the costs of the present generation is again an ethical concern.

It can be noticed that mitigation and adaptation put forward different kinds of burdens and costs. Philosophical inquiry into justifiable burden and benefits allocation formulas is required. The justifiable allocation of benefits and burdens may lead to offer a range of solutions which may fluctuate between the equity-based principles of distributive justice or principles of corrective justice. Distributive and corrective justice focuses on different facts and invokes different normative principles. They may prescribe disparate burden allocation formulas with the former setting aside each country's historical emissions as irrelevant to future emissions entitlements and the latter taking historical emissions as the cornerstone for remedial liability.

It can be observed that certain ethical issues related to justice and future generations are inexorably connected to the allocation of emissions and the adaptation costs and burdens. Despite the presence of these ethical issues, I believe that both strategies will be necessary and effective in any broad approach to climate change. To stabilize the climate now will be expensive and loaded with ethical difficulties but it will be much cheaper and easier to do it sooner rather than later under much more economically difficult and ecologically tormenting conditions. After all, a stitch in time saves nine. If we wait for too long to prevent climate change we will perhaps create conditions beyond the reach of any conceivable adaptive or mitigation measures. There will be unavoidable and tragic losses in the decades ahead.

Although mitigation and adaptation are two distinct options for climate change, both are somewhere linked to sustainable development, but in different ways. The next section will explore certain links between the two

and how connecting the two would be a better option than adopting just one of them.

#### **4. Adaptation and Mitigation: The Interlinks**

At the global scale it is now important to realize that discussions should not be restricted to whether to implement any measures against climate change but be focused on how drastic these measures should be. Moreover, deliberations should be on how to design an integrated climate policy that can go well with the sustainable development plans. It can be noticed that sometimes mitigation and adaptation strategies may overlap. In fact a viable climate policy should include both the options. In the following paragraphs I will discuss some of the interactions and links between these two climate strategies and their implications.

Until recently, the primary attention in climate policy has been on the targets and time schedules for reduction of greenhouse gas emissions – that is, mitigation. The social and scientific community was dominated by the strategy of mitigation (Martens and Chang 2017). Nevertheless, it should be identified that measures to mitigate climate change and to adapt to it complement each other. Integrating adaptation into mitigation projects may increase their resilience to climate variations, the permanence of carbon storage and their acceptance by local communities, as adaptation responds to local issues (Suckall et al. 2015).

In effect, some of the adaptation techniques may also serve as mitigation measures and some of the mitigation projects may also have ancillary adaptation benefits. Without taking measures to mitigate climate change, there is a great threat that the average temperature can rise to levels that can bring dangers to the lives of many people as well as destroy non-human life in different regions. Thereby only adaptation measures would not be able to guarantee any benefit or bring out everyone's well-being. Moreover, even if emissions were successfully controlled, the slow removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere would affect the climate for centuries to come. Thus, we need both adaptation and mitigation in order to control the climate change menace.

Scientist Bruno Locatelli in an interview says, “when it comes to on-the-ground activities in land-use sectors such as forestry and agriculture, it does not make sense to separate adaptation and mitigation objectives because land-use management affects both the volume of emissions and the vulnerability of ecosystems and people to climate variations” (Landscape News 2017). He further maintains that “forests and trees produce multiple

ecosystem services that are relevant to fight climate change: they store carbon (mitigation) and they protect local communities from climate impacts (adaptation) by regulating water, reducing soil losses, protecting coasts from storms, and diversifying livelihoods” (ibid.).

Some responses to climate change or in other words some adaptation measures may have a negative impact on the efforts to mitigate and vice versa. For example, the increased use of air conditioners in response to higher temperatures is an action that one could take up to adapt to higher temperatures, but this would lead to an increased emission of harmful greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Nonetheless if we continue to considerably reduce emissions by installing more energy-efficient appliances and insulation at home and offices, which in turn are acts of mitigation, it would help to reduce the need for adaptation.

On the other hand, there are a number of adaptation measures that could help to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. One example of this could be increasing the green spaces within urban areas which would provide shade and help in cooling the atmosphere and this in turn would help to reduce the need for air conditioning.

The fundamental idea is that the more we mitigate the less we will need to adapt and vice versa. If this is understood then it is not difficult to see why adaptation and mitigation should be pursued alongside one another and therefore the links between the two can be ascertained. Consequently, it is vital that we move towards tackling climate change with a double-sided approach, which includes both mitigation and adaptation. In general, it can be agreed that an optimum mix of mitigation and adaptation can serve as a good ethical response to climate change since there are a number of ways in which adaptation and mitigation are related. So mitigation and adaptation must be seen as two parallel strategies rather than two different strategies.

This can be further explained with the analogy of a doctor and a patient. When a sick patient goes to the doctor, the latter tries to fight both the cause and the consequences of the disease at the same time. It is assumed that the patient has a viral infection (which is the cause) resulting in high temperatures (which is the consequence). The doctor prescribes him some medication which treats the infection but increases the fever or gives him medication which lowers the fever but increases the infection; in both the cases the patient can have serious problems. Thereby it is required that both the cause and the consequence is treated by the doctor.

Similarly, in the case of climate change the problem can be treated with two types of medication, one which fights the cause that is mitigation and another which fights the effects that is adaptation. If one is applied and the

other ignored then we would probably be back to the point from where we started. Therefore, linking mitigation and adaptation is required to cure the climate change disease completely.

Linking adaptation and mitigation would provide a way to unite global emission reductions with the impacts of emissions. To ensure that in future high greenhouse gas emissions do not occur, the introduction of greenhouse gas mitigation measures are required. Adaptation will help to manage the greatest climate risks, while mitigation will reduce the likelihood of the severest consequences. The benefits of mitigation are achieved by adjusting to climate change and as adaptation does not change the level of climate change, it will be more difficult if no mitigation takes place.

Adaptation and mitigation can both work towards maintaining a safe level of climate change. Therefore, the relationship between adaptation and mitigation is complementary. Because global warming is inevitable, there is a need to consider the link between adaptation and mitigation measures in order to achieve the best possible outcome.

## **5. Conclusion**

At the outset, this paper considers definition of the two responses to the climate change problem. It asserts that mitigation refers to addressing the causes of climate change and adaptation to adjusting to the impacts of climate change. The paper illustrates how these two strategies differ in their approach towards providing a solution to the problem of climate change. Some of the bases on which the two strategies differ are analyzed. The paper also explores how existing literature on climate change responses has argued either in favor of mitigation or of adaptation.

It is also pointed out that the two strategies pose certain ethical problems in front of us which include the questions of justice and bearing of costs of mitigation and adaptation between the developing and developed nations. Despite many ethical problems, the most important being the distribution of costs and burdens, it is observed that the duties of mitigation and adaptation are quite influential in coping with the climate crisis and a holistic answer to the problem of climate change can be attained by linking the two responses. It is ascertained that both mitigation and adaptation are equally necessary since some of the mitigation measures may involve adaptation techniques and many adaptation techniques need mitigation measures to be successful.

Hence, I conclude that while scholars continue to bicker on whether to adapt or mitigate, there is a need to understand that the earth's climate is constantly changing and causing various effects and in the light of these

changes, regardless of the costs and benefits involved in mitigation and adaptation strategies, both are equally necessary to solve the issue. So a favourable mix of both strategies is required. If at all any climate policy is made it should include an optimum mixture of both the strategies in a way which tackles climate change significantly. Mitigation is required to keep climate change impacts as low as possible and adaptation is required because impacts cannot be avoided. Consequently, I argue that the commitments of mitigation and adaptation are like two sides of the same coin because they both ultimately address the same fundamental moral issue, which is, preserving people from harm.

However, both have their own shortcomings. Each has its limits but both are collectively necessary. Moreover, development plans and strategies should be made sustainable so as to enhance mitigation and adaptation. Governments, nations, organizations and policy makers should take decisions with explicit reference to providing opportunities to integrate adaptation and mitigation.

Besides understanding the issues and challenges that both mitigation and adaptation raise and considering that an integrated approach can be applied, there are certain other significant observations that can be made regarding the two strategies which can help in understanding who should facilitate these plans. It can be seen that they both involve:

1. Huge costs in terms of finance and other resources
2. Technological advancement
3. Strong infrastructure planning related to climate change adaptation and mitigation
4. The making of governmental policies within which mitigation and adaptation policies can work well.

Generally, the agents who can work for mitigation and adaption can either be individuals or collectives. As far as the above observations are concerned, it should be noticed that both mitigation and adaptation can be applied on a large scale. It seems that cost, infrastructure requirements and other basic resources are needed for both adaptation and mitigation. Such large-scale requirement may not be fulfilled by individuals alone. There is a need for support from higher levels such as governments and nations. Thereby it can be suggested that such measures can be facilitated both by individuals at their own level and also by collectives at their level. In order to bring out a well-organized response to the climate change crisis integration is required between the collectivees and the individuals too. However, there is a lot of scope to deeply ponder on and develop this view in detail.

Having argued that mitigation and adaptation are complementary responses to the threats posed by climate change, I also admit that such a view may not be perfect in all respects. It has its weaknesses and strengths; it may have many practical limitations as well but I nevertheless recommend such an integrated approach because it has better potential to deal with the present climate catastrophe. The situation at hand demands such an approach. However, future research can find ways to make this integration possible with sustainable development and think of how to deal with ethical issues of justice and equality alongside it. The final effects of this can be far-reaching and I hope future research can bring out something more meaningful in this area.

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